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TECHNICAL PAPER
A HISTORY OF AEROSPACE PROBLEMS, THEIR SOLUTIONS, THEIR LESSONS
I. INTRODUCTION
The author, along with the support of the Structures and Dynamics Laboratory, has made a major
thrust to develop criteria, design guidelines, and "lessons learned" as a part of an effort to provide
mentorship and to transfer knowledge to new NASA employees. A study of the problems experienced is
a part of that effort. These criteria and guidelines should not become the layering of old laws or addi-
tional laws to protect against a failure or problems experienced, but should be overarching principles and
guidelines that allow for creativity, innovation, and accountability by each and every member of a
design and operations group. The study of problems serves as a basis for developing these high-level
principles that guide the development of future programs. Problem study is not to be the negative finger
pointing "look what you have done wrong," but the beacon to illuminate "what to know and understand
in order to build low-cost, robust aerospace systems of the future."
This paper is an attempt to establish part of this needed knowledge foundation. It is based on
many years of experience in both the early and present years of space exploration. This study is an
expansion of information published in references 1, 2, 3, and 4. It is presented with the faith that some
will be challenged to launch out into the deep. Only to the degree that the individuals of the aerospace
community launch out into the depth of their specialties, yet maintain a bend toward being a generalist,
an integrator, or a systemist, will the technology of the future aerospace (and possibly our Nation's) be
served.
The information presented has many sources. Much of it was developed by the various vehicle or
spacecraft contractors. The information was obtained in general from briefings; however, some came
from reports and papers (see reference list). The remainder of the information was produced by NASA
engineers as they performed their tasks of managing the various project contracts, or conducting
research and technology development. Given the vast scope of this paper, it is impossible to credit all
the individuals who contributed; however, it is they, and not the author, who did the work, had the
insight, solved the problems. The author's task has been to collect the information and draw lessons
from it. The author has been involved in all the projects presented, as well as most of the specific
problems discussed. Therefore, the selection is generally limited to the author's experiences and does
not cover all NASA or Department of Defense (DOD) aerospace experience. In addition, the solutions
set forth do not cover all the many disciplines of any given project.
The format used is first a discussion of the characteristics of each project, followed by a dis-
cussion of the technology development/creativity and innovation brought to bear as a result of design
challenges and problems, along with highlights of key problems. This portion of the report is, therefore,
a summary providing the reader with insight without the details. Second, the appendix contains a
detailed listing of all problems/documents and a discussion of problems not previously documented. A
selected few of previously documented major problems are included for completeness.
The approach for applying the study of problems to current projects is straightforward, but
important. First, study the documented history of problems, their solutions, facilities, technology, and
the resulting knowledge (theory, knowledge, guidelines) to understand the physics of the problem and
the solution approach. Second, tailor the results to the individual project under consideration. A natural
outcome of this tailoring is the further development and enhancement of models, simulations, test
facilities, etc., that are keys to good design and are the basis for solving the complex problems that
develop during the new product's design and operation. The importance of having this knowledge, these
tools, and facilities going into a new product cannot be overstated. Numerous examples can be given
wherethe program would havebeencanceledhad not thesetechnologies,tools, skills, and facilities
existed.The advancedturbopumpdesign(ATD) liquid oxygen(lox) pumpfor the spaceshuttlemain
engine(SSME) is a classicexample.In this case,a deadlinewasgiven for the solutionof the bearing
wear problem or the program would be canceled.The skills of Government/industry/universities
assumingaconcurrentengineeringteam,theMSFC flow facilities,Pratt& Whitney'sE-8 teststandand
manufacturingunit, andthesilicon nitride ball bearingtechnologydevelopedat MSFC,were thecon-
tributing factorsthatensureda solutionin timeto savetheprogram.Futureprograms,therefore,require
from thepastandpresent:
- Humanskills andknowledge
- Tools (analyticalandcomputational)
- Facilities
- Enablingtechnologies.
Fromthesecomeknowledgeanddesignguidelines,etc.,thatserveasthefoundationof futureprograms.
I would like to thankall who havehelpedpull togetherthe informationcontainedin this report.
Eachof the laboratory'sprojectleadengineersput togethertheproblemmatrixes.Othershaveprovided
lessonslearnedandotherkey comments.I would like to thankKarenSpannerfor a significanteffort in
pulling togetherthe SSMEflight readinessreview databaseand write-upsof someof the key SSME
problems.WerhnerDahmandHaroldScofieldmadesignificantcontributionsto thesectionson innova-
tionsandcreativity.
II. GENERAL
A. Why Study Problems
The study of problems and their solutions is the foundation of the success of future space pro-
grams. The design and operation of these space programs are very complex and challenging, pushing the
state of the art. They are made up of space vehicles, spacecraft, payloads, manufacturing facilities, and
operations facilities (including communication systems) that continuously push state-of-the-art technol-
ogy in engineering, management, and leadership. The systems being developed are highly tuned,
balanced between competing requirements. This is true whether one is designing a turbopump, balanc-
ing the hydro output (pressure, flow) with vibration, stability, life, weight, and cost, or a launch vehicle's
performance versus operational robustness, cost, schedule, etc. In general, these systems are high-
performance driven, which leads to a "high-q" system (sensitive to small changes and highly tuned).
The role that problem analysis/study plays in a products success depends on the time phase the
product is in. An excellent discussion of product time phasing by Utterback is in "The Dynamics of
Innovation" in reference 5. There are two major observations in the book. The first has to do with shift-
ing of emphasis from the product development (technology) to the process (fig 1). The second deals
with the impacts of the invading radical, innovative technologies on the established products
(fig. 2). Invading technologies cause the established product to accomplish bursts of improvement to
counteract the invasion. For a period of time, this works; however, if the invading technologies are
strong, they can win out and replace the product. As figure 2 indicates, parallel with this development is
the shift from a technology to a process improvement and product standardization. As the product life is
in its early phase where technology development/implementation is the focus, problem history and
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Figure l. The dynamics of innovation.
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understandingis very important, as it guidesthetechnologydevelopmentfocus, including the deter-
minationof thetechnologiesandsystemsneeds.The problemsexperiencedin pastprogramsdrive the
technologyprogram.The processof moving a product into anestablishedphaserequirestechnology
focusby leadershipandmanagersin orderto understandproblems,their source,their systemsimpacts,
andthe final product.As theproduct movesinto theprocess-controlledphase,theemphasisis on fine
tuning the technology/processesto achievebetter operations,higher reliability, and lower cost.This
processfocusof leadershipmustbekeenlyawareof problemprevention.Problemhistoryplaysa major
role alsoin this problempreventionof theproduct.Thetransitionperiodbetweentechnologyfocusand
processfocusis alsoverycritical in thatduringthis timetheproducteithermakesit, or it doesnot.The
role of problemhistoryanalysishereis clear.
Spaceexplorationis certainly in thetransitionperiodwheremuchof the productstechnologyis
at thestandardizedphase.This meansthat theemphasisis shifting to theprocessfocuswith cost,opera-
tions, and reliability playing key roles, yet spaceexploration requires high performance.High-
performancesystemsrequireattentionandcareor problemserodethegainrequiredfor costandopera-
tional efficiency. In order to maintain the high performance/lowcost, new technologiesmust be
developedto meetthesegoals.
Thinking aboutthis productevolution andtherole problemanalysis/historyplays,a key inter-
relationshipemerges,thatis requiredto solvedevelopment,operating,andnewtechnologiesinclusion.
The key interrelationshipsare, in general,betweenpeopledevelopment(learning organization),tool
development (facilities are included here), and technology development. Senge, in "The Fifth
Discipline,"6makestwo observations.First, it is the tendencyof a teamto performat the level of the
memberwith the lowest IQ (i.e., skills); andsecond,with properleadershipandsynergy,the teamcan
performhigher than thememberwith thehighestIQ (skills). The conclusionis that peopleskills, both
technicalandleadership,mustbeconstantlydeveloped.Style of organizationalleadershipstartsat the
top, technical leadershipstartsat the bottom. First line supervisorsmust necessarilybe style and
technical leaders.Style without technologyis like an English teacherwho writes eloquentlybut has
nothing to say. Most of the time this learning is best accomplishedby working and developing
technology options first during the product emergingphaseand thenduring the sustainingprocess
controlled phase.It is alsoclear that if this secondleg, technology,is not developedparallelwith the
productdevelopment,a time will comewhenthe productwill be lost without supportingtechnological
solutions. The third interrelationship leg is tool developmentand maintenance.The tool leg is
multifaceted,coveri.nganalysis,testing,information networks,facilities, andmanagement.Thereare
numerousexamplesin spaceexplorationwhensimultaneousexistingof thesethreelegssavedaprogram
(product).Figure 3 tries to symbolically capturetheserelationshiporganizationalcharacteristics.The
bottom line is that the organization must have two parallel emphases.One works on fine tuning,
improving the current product. The secondexploresnew technologiesthat can drastically alter the
productto accomplishthetask.For example,thetypewriterreplacedby thecomputerword processor.
These,in general,aretwo specificgroupsof peoplewho arenot competingbut workingdifferent roles.
Spaceexplorationmustfollow thispath.
How doesthisrelate to thestudyof problemhistory/analysis?Problemhistory/analysisplaysat
leasttwo major roles. (1) It servesasa sourceof knowledgethat relatesin a wayno academicprocess
can,showingthedepthandsubtletiesof a problemandsysteminteractions/sensitivities.(2) It provides
the road map/informationfor developingthe technologygap analysisand,thus,the priorities andpro-
gramsthat developthe supportingtechnologies.Clearly, it could help to identify the competingtech-
nologiesandto provide thebasisfor a productshift; however,historyhasshownthat the competing
technologiesusuallyemergefrom theoutside.
Complicationsalsoarisebecauseof theU.S.fundingapproach.Manyproblemsareintroducedas
a result. Predominatingis the stretchingof fundsand schedulesthat transfersissuesfrom design to
operations,greatly increasingoperationscostanddecreasingflexibility, etc.This meansthat thedesign
in the end is always a balancebetweenthe multitude of conflicting parametersand requirements.
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Figure 3. The organizational requirement for product success.
Gordon, in "Structures," says: "All structures will be broken or destroyed in the end. Just as all people
will die in the end. It is the purpose of medicine and engineering to pos, tpone these occurrences for a
decent interval; the question is: what is to be regarded as a decent interval. 1
Pye, in "The Nature of Design, ''8 discusses the source of problems and these compromises. He
talks about the source of problems dealing with the manifestation and transfer of energy. He says: "Any
of these forms of energy is capable of producing changes, changes in things; more exactly, redistribution
of matter... Now whenever a change is made by the passage of energy and a result is left, this event
takes place in a group of things. Things are always together. They do not exist separately and they can-
not act separately... When you put energy into a system you can never choose what kind of changes
shall take place and what kind of results shall remain... All you can do, and that only within limits, is to
regulate the amounts of the various changes. This you do by design." He talks about the compromises in
the design for failures. "The requirements for design conflict and cannot be reconciled. All designs for
devices are in some degree failures... The designer or his client has to choose to what degree and where
these shall be failures .... "
Pugh, in "Total Design, ''9 discusses in detail how the design problem is approached. He sepa-
rates the task into parts where the concept selection and the design activities are the lynch pins of
success. He states that outstanding design engineering can never right the shortcomings of poor concept
selection, while the best concept selection can be destroyed by poor design engineering.
Petroski, in his book "Design Paradigms, ''lo relates that design usually starts to analyze a
problem in the middle based on past experiences and scaling, forgetting to start at the beginning. "Every
solution of every design problem begins, no matter how tacitly, with a conception of how to obviate
failure in all its potential manifestations." He further discusses how changes are made without consid-
ering other effects that solving the immediate problem creates• Any design change can introduce new
failure modes or bring into play latent failure modes. Changes must be analyzed with the objective of the
original design, including all potential failure modes. Senge, in his notable work on systems, 6 says that
"If any small change is made to a system, the whole system must adjust to that change."
As space exploration progresses into the future, the compromises will, in all likelihood, be mag-
nified• Design of these systems will be based on processes that include much of what is embodied in the
principles of total quality management (TQM), concurrent engineering, or their equivalent. This means
not only a change in attitude, leadership, management, but also a change in methods such as the applica-
tion of quality function deployment (QFD),I 1 Taguchi, 12 robust design,13 simultaneous engineering, 14
and just-in-time manufacturing. 15 The key is the change in management and leadership, the others are
merely tools to help the process. The challenge of the future, plus the promise of these new attitudes,
new leadership, tools, and principles, creates excitement and interest as well as challenge and motiva-
tion. It should be seared into one's mind, however, that the design can be no better than the knowledge
and skills of the people brought to these systems. No organizational structures, tools, or facilities can
supplant that. This means that even with concurrent engineering teams, TQM, etc., the team membership
is critical, as well as both the team and institutional leadership. Leadership serves at least two functions:
(1) to bring out the best creativity, knowledge, and design the team is capable of; and (2) to lead institu-
tional setting of mission/vision, not the least of which is the development of the "total person" of every
employee. Therefore, training and development of the key resource people is the answer. The strategic
bomb of the future is the leveraging of knowledge. Aerospace and aeronautical engineering has the edge
here.
Deming, the "guru" of quality, emphasizes that knowledge and theory are key ingredients to a
better product. "You cannot see anything without knowledge.., need theory to interpret data and learn
•.. cannot observe what is right or wrong without theory and knowledge.., what organizations need is
not just good people, but people who are improving with education.., knowledge increased advances in
competitive positions have their roots in knowledge.., theory is the basis for interpreting data, etc., and
is the foundation of an organization.., there is no substitute for knowledge of the system.., tampering
without knowledge creates problems (PS solving)."16
Drucker says in reference 17, "Management is about human beings. Its task is to make people
capable of joint performance, to make their strengths effective and their weaknesses irrelevant. Man-
agement must also enable the enterprise and each of its members to grow and develop as needs and
opportunity change. Every enterprise is a learning and teaching institution. Training and development
must be built in on all levels.., training and development that never stops:"
Depree writes in reference 18, "Leaders owe people space, space in the sense of freedom•
Freedom in the sense of enabling our gifts to be exercised. We need to give each other the space to
grow, to be ourselves, to exercise our diversity."
As a project unfolds from concept through development, problems develop during the design, the
development, and the operations of space systems. These problems have both a real-time and a long-
term effect• Many times, in fact most of the time, analysis techniques and tools, testing techniques and
tools, materials development and characterization, and manufacturing techniques and tools are not ade-
quate to understand and solve the problem. Large efforts are expended to expand these technologies,
understand the problems, and design fixes so that a successful program occurs. The next program
assumes this same complexity, building more tools, criteria, and requirements instead of simplicity and
robustness. We need to use this technology to emphasize robustness in the future systems. 19 One of the
most interesting aspects of the evolving culture (still present in aerospace engineering) was the
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innovation/creativity engineers brought to the understanding and solution to problems that occur. This
was particularly true before high-speed, large-capacity computers, when they could not brute force the
computational analysis, but had to rely on sound physical principle and innovative ways of dealing with
the problems. Numerous examples of creativity and innovation will be given throughout the paper.
As was discussed in other reports and papers by the author, because of high-performance
requirements and programmatic constraints, the design, development, and implementation of these
requirements have led to many development and operations problems. In addition, operational costs
have sky-rocketed as decisions were pushed downstream. The question that arises is: "is the high cost
due to major design process errors?" Probably not in the early days, since space was a complex evolving
technology. Space exploration by its nature involves risks, costs, failures, etc. However, the industry has
matured to the point where things can be done to reduce (not eliminate) costs. A better approach would
consider all cost/program phases concurrently in order to reduce total cost. Figure 4 illustrates this
concept that should be striven for.
Constraints
Oeve,opmeotOperations
Performance
Requirements
Figure 4. Systems approach.
Looking back at the history of aerospace, the evolution of the technologies commensurate with
the evolution of space systems is apparent. Electronics have made quantum jumps in capability increase,
size reduction, and reliability. Materials have evolved with high strength, fracture toughness, etc.. Manu-
facturing has made major advances through castings, composites, robotics etc. Structural analysis has
moved from equivalent beam modal analysis to finite element models augmented by substructuring and
modal coupling techniques. Computational fluid dynamics (CFD) and computational mechanics (CM)
was necessary to solve complex flow and structural problems. Cross-discipline-integrated analysis tools
have evolved, as well as have complex probabilistic approaches for controlling quality and assessing
reliability. Fatigue and fracture control has made quantum jumps, as have thermal heat transfer analysis,
pointing control techniques, structural control interaction, smart structures, and induced environment
definitions. Criteria and standards have followed (in many cases becoming excessive and over con-
straining). Testing techniques from modal, vibration, electrical, thermal vacuum, flow, and aero-
dynamics have kept pace with many unique facilities developed. Inthe individual project sections,
portions of this development will be discussed. As any new project moves through the development
phase, new problems will occur. How these occurrences are handled determines success or failure. The
tool that has evolved for coping with failures/problems is the use of concurrent engineering teams. Using
formalized fault trees, logic diagrams, and action item closure has proven best. 92t 22 The authors have
been members or leaders of several of these failure teams and can attest to the merits of the approach. It
and the use of failure effects modes analysis (FEMA) in design are two common-sense innovations
growing out of space exploration, and should be the working knowledge of every engineer.
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Not only have engineers been innovative in solving technical problems, their innovation and
creativity has taken many forms. It behooves management, as well as engineers, to utilize and enhance
all these various expressions. The major one obviously is the innovative and creative engineering
solutions just discussed and will comprise much of the rest of this report; however, the other expressions
of creativity not only add humor but are many times better forms of communication than our formal,
logical, analytical, scientific formats. To be associated with these expressive, atypical engineers who
choose to use humor or descriptive titles and acronyms is one of the great highlights of our careers. Rich
Holmen at McDonnell Douglas used humor through cartoons to capture personalities as well as
engineering concepts during the Apollo and Skylab projects. McDonnell Douglas published some of
them in a booklet titled "The First Five Years Are the Hardest or It Only Hurts At Resonance," nicely
drawn by Rich Holmen. The cartoon (fig. 5), "It Only Hurts at Resonance," captures a problem we had
on the Saturn rocket third stages (SIV B), as well as all subsequent projects in dynamics and control in a
way we cannot forget. With dynamic resonances, you either understand and solve them or the price is
very high. Design compromises to solve problems are a constant struggle. Holman's cartoon (fig. 6)
shows a design complication in order to get rid of a feedback pot, pictorially giving us the message.
In the Saturn Apollo days, Honeywell published yearly calendars with Bill Eddy's cartoons
highlighting each month. There are two bound books of these cartoons, which are not only humorous but
give great messages in unforgettable ways. Two of my favorites deal with specifications (fig. 7) and
accuracy (fig. 8). "So that decimal point was a fly speck!" brings home a poignant point, as did all the
other calendars that not only made us better engineers technically, but also made us laugh a little, which
relieved work pressures. Remember, each of these lessons was displayed on our office walls for a whole
month, speaking to us. Then came the next month. Today we see planes, ships, electronics, etc., trying to
sell us on a product.
The other area of creativity that could be either humorous or illustrative, or both, has been the
naming of parts or acronyms. Figure 9 lists a few selected for illustration. In general, the name either
describes the geometry or the physical characteristics of the phenomenon. The rest of the creative illus-
trations of this paper will deal with the creative engineering contributions made while addressing major
design problems.
Figure 5. It only hurts at resonance.
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Figure 6. Design compromises.
Figure 7. So that decimal point was a fly speck!
9
"I haven't the heart to tell him that the specs have changed"
Figure 8. Change in what specs'?
Lessons in Propulsion System
Design
SSME Buzz Words
• "Stee_orn"-- Nozzle down comers
• =Baby pants"-- Heat exchanger bifurcation joint
• =Sea world"-- EDNI deposit bath for MCC's
• =Ski slope"-- HPOTP turbine end
• "Pop"-- Type of engine detonation in oxidizer and fuel preburner
• =Fir tree"-- Region of disk which blades are mounted, also region at base of blades
• =Kaiser hat"-- HPFTP turbine end entrance to turbine blades
• "Pony foot"-- Bottom of down comers
• =Coolie hat"-- HPOTP turbine end
• "Band weld"-- Nozzle jacket repair (EDNI)
• =Fish mouth"-- Seals in the pump
• =Fish mouth"-- Repair of the nozzle hot wall coolant tubes
• "Mixture bowl"-- Nozzle
• "Hot dog"-- Lox inlet manifold for Iox dome
• =FRI"-- Flow restriction inhibitor for G15 seal
• "Turnaround duct"-- HPFTP turbine exit duct
' "Belly band"-- MCC throat shell
• "Pogo"-- Longitudinal vehicle oscillation due to propulsion system coupling
• "DOLIU"-- Day of launch I-loads update
• "Hex"-- Heat exchanger
• W-bolts"-- Bolts to hold shields on Iox post
• "Whirl"-- Rotary instability in turbo machinery
• "Z-baffle"-- Baffle in pogo accumulator
• =Buzz"-- High frequency vibration in SSME system
• "Beer cans"-- Jupiter anti-slosh devices
• =Crossbow seal"-- Seal in SSME turbo pumps
• "Grub worm"-- External Tank to launch vehicle connection
Figure 9. SSME "buzz" words.
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B. Classification of Problems
Space vehicles and spacecraft are very complex; many are one of a kind. This complexity and
uniqueness produces a variety of problems that occur during development and operations. Many of these
problems have been published in technical papers or failure reports, with some given at professional
conferences. Design reviews and flight readiness reviews also contain many examples. Reusability
further complicates the design concerns; therefore, vehicles such as the space shuttle not only had devel-
opment problems, but must deal with lifetime, maintenance, and operations problems that occur because
of lifetime issues and other factors. 2 In attempting to summarize all these different problem sources,
taking into account the project individual characteristics, it was decided to group the problems by project
instead of by problem cause, as was done in reference 1. The problem causes or manifestations can be
generally classified as one of the following:
1. Aeroelasticity
2. Instabilities (control, flow, structural, Pogo, etc.)
3. Fatigue, fracture mechanics, and wear
4. Environments (winds, contamination, temperature, etc.)
a. Natural
b. Induced
5. Response (forced and transient)
6. Modeling discrepancies
7. Acoustical tuning
8. Structural, control, fluid, modal tuning
9. Manufacturing/quality (process control).
10. Procedures.
The projects covered are:
1. Saturn Apollo, Saturn V Apollo
2. Skylab
3. Titan Viking
4. Jupiter--military and aerospace
5. Redstone--military and aerospace
6. Space shuttle
a. External tank (ET)
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b. Solidrocketbooster/solidrocketmotor(SRB/SRM)
c. Advanced solid rocket booster/advanced solid rocket motor (ASRB/ASRM)
d. SSME
1. Baselining
2. ATD
7. Hubble Space Telescope (HST)
8. Tether Satellite System (TSS)
9. High Energy Astro Observatory (HEAO)
10. Spacelab
a. Multipurpose Experiment Support Structure (MPESS)
b. Office of Space Technology Applications Experiment No. 1 (OSTA-1)
c. Spacelab-1
d. Spacelab-2
e. Spacelab-3
f. D--1
g. Astro-1
h. Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology Experiment No. 1 (OAST-1)
I. Orbiting Materials Science Laboratory Experiment No. 1 (OMSL-1)
11. Upper stages
a. Inertial upper stage (IUS)
b. Transfer orbit stage (TOS)
12. Advanced X-Ray Astrophysics Facility (AXAF)
a. AXAF-I
b. AXAF-S
13. Space Station Freedom (S.S. Freedom)
14. National Launch System (NLS)
15. Furnaces (experiments)
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16. IPS
17. BurstandTransientSourceExperiment(BATSE).
C. Pictorial of Problems
1. Pictorial of Projects. NASA has had an evolution of projects since its inception in 1959.
MSFC has been involved in most of these efforts. Figure 10 shows the Marshall project involvement,
while figure 11 depicts the project evolution. Marshall's experience base involves science, upper stages,
satellites, tethers, launch vehicles, propulsions systems, telescopes, manned stations, etc. These are
encompassed by the outline given in section B. In the following sections, more information will be given
on each of the projects.
2. Problem List. The appendix lists, by project and title, the various problems collected and
studied. This should serve as a handy reference. Not all problems listed will be summarized and
discussed in this document because they were documented in references 1 through 4. Some will be
repeated in order to provide continuity and clarity.
It should be pointed out that not all problems, which are important to study and become lessons
learned for the development phases, are failures. Many were discovered in the analytical and trade
phases. In fact, it is better to find them in these phases and thus design out the problem. Some problems
of this type are included. Also, the process of design provides lessons in terms of philosophy,
approaches, and criteria inherent in successful projects. In general, it is left to the reader to develop his
or her own list in these categories.
IlI. AEROSPACE PROJECT/PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT
A. Redstone and Jupiter
1. Characteristics. The Redstone was a military vehicle designed to deliver a nuclear warhead
200 mi downrange. It burned kerosene and lox and was designed to be a significant improvement over
the German rocket V-2 technology, yet was basically a derivative of the V-2 designed by the German
team transported to the United States after World War II. Dr. Wernher von Braun was the famed leader
of this team, which contributed greatly to the U.S. Moon race by developing the Saturn launch vehicle.
The airframe was integral with the propellant tanks. Figures 12a and 12b are pictures of the basic vehicle
showing its general characteristics. Control was accomplished using jet vanes in the thrust exhaust
stream, augmented with movable fins or rudders during the aerodynamic portion of flight.
The basic vehicle was modified to accept an upper stage for launching the first U.S. satellite, and
later, to launch man in a lob flight as a part of the Mercury program. This program was called the
Mercury Redstone. Also, this vehicle, in a flight testing reentry nose cone, launched a nose cone over
3,000 mi downrange. This launch created a furor and led to the Army being restricted to 200-mi
vehicles. Therefore, the vehicle was very robust and successful.
The Jupiter was an intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) designed to deliver a warhead to
a target 200 mi away. Figure 13 shows the basic vehicle and its characteristics. The Air Force developed
comparable vehicles, namely Thor and Atlas. The Jupiter was modified and flew several satellite
missions under the code name Juno. The technology of the Redstone and Jupiter was combined to build
the first Saturn vehicles, which is discussed in the next chapter. Propulsion, tankage, tooling, etc., was
adapted to the Saturn I and IB vehicles.
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Figure 12a. V-2 configuration.
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Figure 12b.Redstoneconfiguration.
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Figure13. Jupiterconfiguration.
2. Evolution/Creativity/Innovation. During the Jupiter and Redstone programs, there was a
struggle/trade of how best to deal with aerodynamically unstable missile systems, including performance
loss due to winds, guidance, and loads. The aerodynamic stability question could be solved by putting
large static aerodynamic fins on the aft end, and optimizing the external shapes and mass distributions
(propellant tank locations). In many cases, the fins were too large, thus thrust vectoring was brought into
play along with movable fins. In the case of the Redstone, movable vanes were put into the thrust
stream. The Jupiter vehicle gimbaled the nozzle, driving the design of the gimbaling thrust bearing and
actuation system. There were still the performance, guidance, control, and loads problems associate with
the winds/aerodynamics-induced drift and loads.
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Werner K. Dahm,whoseexperiencespansthe GermanV-2 throughthe present,provideshis
assessmentof thisareaof developmentin thefollowing sections.
Control Development of Rocket Vehicles:
a. During the time of the V-2 (World War II in Germany) and Redstone (figs. 12a and 12b)
(after World War II in the United States), the control technology could neither cope with aerodynamic-
ally unstable vehicles, nor with aerodynamically unstable control surfaces. The vehicle had to be stabil-
ized with fins of sufficient size to keep the center of pressure behind the center of gravity at all times,
and the center of pressure of control surfaces had to be downstream of the hinge line. Primary control
was exerted by jet vanes (aerodynamic controls require dynamic pressure to be effective, and are thus
useless near lift-off and cut-off). Jet vane size had to be minimized to reduce the thrust loss from their
drag. In addition, jet vanes are close to the single-engine-vehicle's longitudinal axis and provide only
weak roll control. The effect of side winds on the fins creates "rolling-moments-due-to-combined-pitch-
and-yaw" proportional to the dynamic pressure. The jet vanes could not overcome these moments.
Therefore, aerodynamic control vanes were added at the fin tips of both missiles. These vanes were cou-
pled with the jet vanes, and were driven by the same actuators. The Redstone had about the same range
and payload weight as the V-2. However, the payload was a nuclear bomb, and the circular probable
impact error was reduced to 450 m through terminal guidance of the separated entry body, i.e., the
biconical nose of the missile. The circular probable error of the V-2 was about 10 times as large. The
terminal guidance required:
(1) Attitude control during the exoatmospheric flight of the separated warhead, to keep the con-
trol gyros from hitting their stops and losing their alignment. This control was accomplished
with cold gas control jets located at the roots of the warhead air vanes. The jet controls were
hard-coupled with the air vanes.
(2) An aerodynamic design of the warhead and its air vanes for minimum center of pressure shift
with Mach number, in order to minimize control system size and weight. This had to be
accomplished on paper, and methods for this had to be developed along the way, since super-
sonic wind tunnels were not operational during the initial years of the Redstone design. The
first warhead test data became available about 4 months before the first Redstone launch
(August 20, 1953). The paper design was successful; no design changes were subsequently
required.
The Redstone was really two missiles. The initial +¢ersion, dubbed the "Experimental Redstone," was
designed for a large, spherical payload; its design started in early 1951. In 1953, that payload was
replaced by a more slender, cylindrical shape, which forced a redesign of the warhead and led to the
"Tactical Redstone." That vehicle was eventually deployed in the field.
b. Hermes II: First Attempt to Fly an Unstable Launch Vehicle. The Hermes II project 9f the late
1940's was supposed to test fly a wing ramjet vehicle at Mach 2.7 and an altitude of about 30 km. The
vehicle was a modified V-2. The tip up to the aft end of the instrument compartment was converted to a
second stage, with a large wing ramjet, a pitch control canard, and two vertical control vanes at the rear
end for lateral and roll control. In spite of the enlarged tail fins, the large ramjet wing rendered the
launch configuration unstable. An accelerometer control was supposed to stabilize the vehicle. That
control system worked well in bench tests, but failed in flight because the mechanical vibrations of the
vehicle structure swarmed the accelerometer. The vehicle lost control somewhat into the flight. The
launch took place at White Sands. Due to the severe limitations of the telemetry of that time, the flight
vibration environment was largely unknown. The Hermes II project was canceled in early 1950.
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c. Jupiter. IRBM. etc.: Swivel Engine Control of Unstable Vehicles. By about 1955, when the
design of the Jupiter and Thor IRBM's and the Atlas and Titan Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
(ICBM's) began (all having the common Atlas developed engine), the propulsion community had
managed to design swivel engines for thrust vector control. This powerful control authority, together
with advances in control technology, permitted us to design and fly aerodynamically unstable missile
configurations. Fins could by and large be abandoned. Jupiter became a simple blunt cone-cylinder
body; the forward part of the cone was the reentry body, with the rear part being the instrument
compartment. The control system included four cylindrical angle-of-attack meters sticking out from the
surface of the instrument compartment, two each in the pitch and yaw planes. They compensated for the
instability of the basic configuration. The system was successful and reliable. Jupiter roll control was
accomplished by using the thrust of the engine's turbine exhaust, discharged through a swiveling pipe
knee at the flank of the engine compartment.
The first breakthrough was the development of a drift minimum control logic that balanced the
system between control, guidance, and performance in terms of a rigid-body system. This did not solve
the induced loads problem. A rigid-body load relief scheme was developed that required schemes to
sense the induced angle of attack. During th.ese programs, two approaches were used. (1) Small vanes on
the vehicle nose that turned to follow the aerodynamically induced flow were used, with transducers to
measure the angular deflection. (2) Delta pressure sensors were placed on each axis of each side of the
vehicle to provide a means of detecting angle of attack. In order to really work these issues, a good
understanding of the atmospheric winds and density was required. The Air Force and the Army started
programs to measure these atmospheric characteristics, requiring development of sensing systems, data
evaluation, and modeling technologies.
Liquid propellant sloshing became a problem due to the loss of the second Jupiter vehicle.
Analytical and experimental data and approaches were not available to characterize the problem. The
first attempt was to place the full-size propellant tank on a railroad car then bump it against the rail end
stop as an excitation mechanism. In terms of today's standards, this was not a well-controlled experi-
ment. Large perforated cylinders with sealed spheres (commode floats) were floated in the tank and
again tested, showing their good damping characteristics. The next Jupiter was flown successfully using
this system. New technologies resulted as the program moved forward:
1. Analytical representation of fluid dynamic characteristics
2. Equivalent mechanical analog of the complex analytical equations (pendulum or mass spring
slosh model)
3. Scale model testing techniques, instrumentation, and data evaluation
4. Development of slosh baffles that became an integral part of the structural stiffening ring,
saving weight over the floating (beer) cans.
Because the warheads (payloads) had to reenter the Earth's atmosphere at very high speeds,
aerodynamic heating and protection against it were major technology developments. During this time,
the ablative protection attached to the structural metal was developed, verified, and used, and serves as a
base technology for many future systems.
Plume heating of the vehicle base, both convection and radiation, was an additional technology
issue. The first Jupiter was destroyed due to plume heating that destroyed the control wires, thus causing
it to lose attitude control. Two technologies had to be developed and verified: (1) environment
prediction, and (2) protection/control of environment.
Structural dynamic testing of the full Jupiter vehicle was attempted, but was not very successful
,lue to improper boundary conditions (suspension systems); however, this served as a solid foundation
for testing technology developed for Saturn.
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During the Jupiterdevelopment,the interactionbetweenthe thrustvectorcontrol (TVC) servos
andthesecondbendingmodewasa majoreffort. Thepotentialproblemwasbroughthomein force on
thefirst flight andsubsequentlyfixed.
According to HaroldScofield,"Somepeoplewereneverconvincedthat thesecondJupiterlost
wasdue to sloshing.We had only primitive modelsbeforethe loss in flight. It is difficult to make
definitiveconclusionswithout somegoodanalyticalmodels.This problem(lackof definitive models)is
still with us in someareastoday, thus,exists thedependencyon testdataalone for thoseareaswhere
modeling is inaccurate.The lessonskeep repeating.We must pay attention to history or repeatit.
Theoriesandanalysisarealwaysneededwherebyto interpretthetestandflight data."
All of this wasdonewith very little computationalcapability,which points out the innovation
and practicality of the engineersin dealingwith complextechnologies.Thosewere the daysof slide
rulesandMarchantandFriedendeskcalculators.
As wasmentionedpreviously,graphitejet vaneswereusedin thecombustiongasstream(thrust
stream)to control the thruststreamandthusthevehicle.However,severeerosionlimited its effective
control duration.This led to gimbalingthethrustchamber.Gimbalingthethrustchamberwith thehigh-
pressureductsfrom thepumpsinput very largeactuatorloadsandshortduct life. This led to gimbaling
theentire enginewith the pumpsattachedto the engine.Balancedbellow ductswereincorporatedfor
longerlife, loweractuatorpower,andlargergimbalangles.
TheRedstonethrustchamberwascooledthroughthedouble-shelledconstructionof 1/8-andl/4-
inch platesandcontainedseveralexpansionjoints. The shell plateswere replacedby very long, thin
tubesthat significantly reducedtheengineweight,eliminatedthermalbuckling problems,andallowed
high-rategimbalingat reducedactuatorloadsandpower.Alcohol andhydrogenperoxidefuel systems
gaveway to acommonkerosenelox propellantsystemfor propulsionandpumpturbinepower.
It shouldbe rememberedthat,initially, the Redstonewasto beessentiallya GermanV-2 built to
American standardsby the Army with the Germansbrought to this country after World War II. The
enginestartedout as an Air Forcedevelopmentprogramwith a three-phaseinitiative: to understand
liquid propulsion,derive the physicsformulation in all associateddisciplines,and apply the derived
physicsof aV-2 typeengineusingAmericanstandardsandadvancedphysics.Thefinal resultswere50-
percentlessweight and 50-percentmore thrust.This work was transferredto the Army team,which
developedthe Redstone.In theend,dueto theinnovationsapplied,it evolvedto a truedefensemissile
with a largewarhead.
3. Problem Examples.
a. Redstone Potentiometer Feedback. The first dynamic problem experienced occurred early
in the Redstone rocket program. A Redstone vehicle was in checkout and verification in a horizontal
position in its transportation cradle. These early vehicles were manufactured at the Redstone Arsenal,
checked out, then transported to Florida for launch. In this case, the control system was activated for
checkout. The control sensors had a potentiometer pickup; due to some light shock, the wiper arm was
moved from one wire to another, which resulted in a control signal. As a result, the jet vanes moved,
exciting a structural mode. The structural mode in turn caused the wiper arm to move back, creating a
new signal. The result was a closed-loop limit cycle instability between the sensor (pickup) jet vane
(inertia), and structural mode, ringing out at the first mode frequency. The noise of this closed-loop
resonance was very loud, vividly demonstrating closed-loop instabilities. The fix was simple in that a
filter was incorporated in the loop that filtered out the frequencies associated with the modes and sensor
pickup, breaking the loop and stabilizing the system. A later design also changed the pickup to a con-
tinuous magnetic type, adding margin to the problem solution.
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b. Jimspheres (Atmosphere Sounding Balloons Erratic Response). Atmosphere environments
are key to predicting space vehicle response during the ascent phase. Atmospheric winds are the key
parameter to loads, flight mechanics, and control prediction. As a means of developing a statistical
quantification of these winds, a balloon radar tracking system was developed by MSFC's atmospheric
group under the leadership of Dr. William Vaughan. The goal was to not only measure large-scale or
mean environments, but to get an accurate quantification of the wind gust down to 25-m wavelengths.
The attempt to measure these small gust effects met with frustration. The smooth skin balloons were
unstable (type of flutter or vortex shedding). In a controlled, no disturbance environment, a rising sphere
would oscillate (fig. 14). A classical problem most would say. Dr. Jim Scoggins found the solution by
observing the golf ball, then instead of small dimples, he added many conical spikes to the sphere's skin.
The problem was solved. The sphere was stable (fig. 15). The resulting data base used throughout
NASA is evidence. As a result, this modified sphere was named Jimsphere (after Jim Scoggin) as well
as the data base (fig. 16). Many people have a small tie clasp with a miniature Jimsphere as a reminder
of the agony one sometimes must go through to achieve the innovation required for solution to
unexpected problems.
Time lapse trace of Jimsphere ballon released
at 11:54 p.m., August 2, 1963 during stable
atmospheric conditions and light winds.
Figure 14. Unstable Jimsphere time history.
Time lapse trace of rose ballon release at
11:25 p.m., August 2, 1963, during stable
atmospheric conditions and light winds.
Figure 15. Stable Jimsphere time history.
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Figure 16. The Jimsphere balloon wind sensor.
c. Jupiter Sloshing Instabilities. A closed-loop control instability occurred on the early Jupiter
firings. The Jupiter was a liquid propelled military vehicle. Sloshing propellant coupled through the
control system and became unstable. This instability saturated the control system, and the vehicle went
out of control during the maximum dynamic pressure regime of launch and broke up. The results were
dynamic, with beautiful fireworks high in the sky, but very costly to the program. The instability was
aggravated by the trajectory tilt program. The tilt program was a series of discrete steps instead of a
continuous functional change that started the oscillation and reinforced the amplitudes of the wave
through a forced oscillation. At this early phase in the rockets and space age, models did not exist for
analyzing problems of this type. As a result, several things happened. Propellant sloshing data had to be
obtained quickly. No analytical solutions were readily available. A test program was started that
included both scale-model and full-scale testing. A slosh suppresser had to be found before the next
launch. In order to meet this goal, a full-size propellant tank filled with water was placed on a railroad
car. The railroad car was bumped against the track end stop as an excitation source. The first test was
without suppression devices. Water was used to simulate propellant to establish frequencies, etc. Vari-
ous devices were tried next as suppressers. The one chosen was called beer cans, which consisted of
long perforated cylinders with flotation spheres at the top. The entire surface of the propellant was
covered with these devices (fig. 17). The test showed more than adequate suppression was achieved, and
the next launch was slosh free. In the meantime, other solutions were pursued, including development of
analytical characterization of the sloshing propellant. This resulted in the development of slosh baffles
(rings inside the tank that became part of the structural stiffness (fig. 18)), as the most effective
analytical means of suppressing slosh, and parametric test data were acquired for oscillating propellants
in both zero- and high-gravity (g) fields. Today, all space vehicles are analyzed and designed with this
phenomenon in focus as a potential problem. The lack of analytical and experimental data prior to
launching, as well as lack of experience in these type problems, led to the failure of the Jupiter missile
due to propellant sloshing control system coupling. The fix was fairly easy and did not impact flight
schedules drastically. This is not always the case, and repeats of this type instability should be avoided if
possible. The innovative way special tests were conceived and conducted to meet launch schedules
should be a lesson in this age of precise testing.
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Figure 17. Beer cans, Jupiter anti-slosh devices.
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Figure 18. Slosh baffles, Jupiter missile.
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B. Saturn/Saturn Apollo/Skylab Launch Vehicles
The Saturn family was a unique experience in the evolution of space technology. 23 Being a
family, it provided a building-block approach that led to the successful Moon landing and the Skylab
space station program. It was all built on the foundation of the successful Redstone and Jupiter vehicles.
The Skylab space program had two distinct parts: (1) the launch systems used to launch both the station
the manned visits used modified Saturn V and Saturn IB vehicles, and (2) the operations of the Skylab
space station and Apollo telescope mount (ATM). The Skylab launch vehicle is put in this section
because of the commonalty of the launch systems. The Saturn family is shown in figure 19a.
1. Characteristics. The Saturn I was envisioned as both a test-bed and a launch vehicle built
using available technology and manufacturing tooling. The first stage was derived using a cluster of
eight Redstone size and one center tank of Jupiter size propellant tanks and a cluster of eight of the
Jupiter engine system. Figure 19b gives its characteristics. The lower ends of the tanks were attached
rigidly to a large thrust frame. The engines were attached to the other side of this frame. The upper ends
of the tanks were attached using a spider beam that also attached the second stage SIV. The tanks
containing the cryo propellants had to have longitudinal slippage to account for thermal contraction, thus
the load paths from the first stage engines were through the center tank and the four fixed fuel tanks. The
sliding joint on the lox tanks were at the upper end as a connection to the spider allowed for the thermal
expansion.
The second stage, SIV, was a liquid hydrogen/lox stage powered by a cluster of RL-10 engines.
A very interesting story occurred relative to the first launch of the Saturn I vehicle. The SI was
dynamically tested full scale to validate its complex dynamic characteristics. In order to simulate the
flight conditions of free-free, the vehicle was suspended on bungy cords (elastic supports) where the
vehicle suspended frequency was well separated from its first free-free frequency. In attempting to
remove any residual effects of this suspension system on the free-free modes, an analytical technique
(filtering of data) was attempted. Due to round-off errors in the data, instead of removing any unwanted
effects, the process introduced three false modes in addition to the actual modes. Incorporating these
modes into the control stability analysis indicated an unstable vehicle. The initial launch was held up for
2 weeks to sort out the problem. This problem got played in a Fortune magazine feature article. During
the 2 weeks, it was possible to show that the modes were indeed false. In a big meeting with Von Braun,
the decision was made to launch. The launch was totally successful. Testing approaches and data
evaluation are a key element to the success of any program, as was so strongly illustrated here.
The Saturn IB was a derivative of the Saturn I with improvements to the structural and
propulsion systems, including performance upgrade (fig. 20). The second stage SIVB had a new single
liquid hydrogen/lox engine replacing the cluster of RL-1 O's in order to get more performance and higher
reliability. The Saturn IB was used as the technology and operations demonstrator for the Saturn V
Apollo. In fact, they both used the same SIVB stage and essentially the same guidance and control
system. The Saturn IB became the launch vehicle for the manned launches to the Skylab space station.
There were two versions of the Saturn V: (1) the vehicle that launched all Apollo Moon missions
and (2) the version that launched the Skylab space station. Saturn V Apollo was a three-stage propulsion
vehicle plus the manned command and service module and the lunar excursion module (LEM). On
later flights, it also contained the lunar rover stowed in the LEM. Figure 21 shows the overall
configuration and its characteristics, while figures 22 through 24 are the configuration and
characteristics of the three propulsion stages. In the case of the Saturn V Skylab, the SIVB stages were
replaced with Skylab space station with only the first two stages being propulsive. This changed the
external geometric configuration and thus its ascent loads. Figure 25 shows this configuration and its
characteristics. The Skylab itself contained the living features with life support for the crew, a docking
module, the ATM, and solar arrays on both the ATM and the workshop for power to operate all
the systems. Skylab was a very successful program. After the four science missions were over, it
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stayedin orbit for severalyears.If the shuttlehad madeits original operationsgoal (launch),Skylab
would have been reboosted and used as a forerunner to the planned larger space station. However, this
did not happen and Skylab reentered the atmosphere, landing in Australia.
2. Evolution/Creativity/Innovation. During early development, many trades were done as the
approach to use for going to the Moon, i.e., trans-lunar versus Earth-orbit rendezvous and docking. As
history bears out, this heated debate ended with general acceptance of the trans-lunar injection. During
this time, requirements indicated that four F-1 's on the S-1C stage and four J-2's on the SII stage would
meet performance requirements. However, it was decided to equip the S-1C with five F-1 's and the SII
with five J-2's. This was a very good stroke in that it compensated for weight growth, addition of mar-
gins, and the added missions using the Lunar Rover and the Skylab mission.
The Saturn and Saturn Apollo programs saw the maturing and harvesting of many technologies.
This was due, in part, to the focus of landing a man on the Moon within the decade of the 1960's, the
evolving of faster large computers with more mature codes, and the increasing education of engineers.
The control community developed and implemented the load relief technology using acceler-
ometers instead of external flow-mounted angle-of-attack meters. Elastic body (modal) response and
stability was a major issue and required the development of approaches to integrate structural dynamics
and control. A natural extension was the development of modal suppression (in the aeronautics side, this
was called ride control) techniques that, in conjunction with rigid-body load relief, not only reduced the
basic aerodynamically induced loads, but also reduced the response due to elastic-body dynamics and
wind gust and turbulence excitation. Years later, this technology evolved into active flutter suppression
and aeroelastic tailoring.
The long, slender configurations raised many questions in terms of this control, structural, aero-
dynamic systems due to potentially strong couplings (aeroelasticity). Technology evolved based on air-
craft experience to deal with static aeroelastic effects, gust penetration, and the hammerhead effects. The
technology involved not only analysis, but also scale-model wind tunnel testing.
While on the launch pad, vortex shedding was a real problem. This was solved through the use of
a dynamic damper between the vehicle and the launch pad service tower, which had a disconnect for
launch. This led to a wind constraint for launch in order to not have vortex shedding during the short
time the damper was disconnected. One very innovative technique used to understand the vehicle struc-
tural dynamics characteristics while on the mobile launch platform (MLP) was the so-called tennis shoe
test. The full-scale assembly of the mated test vehicle was assembled on the MLP in the vertical assem-
bly building. Engineers wearing tennis shoes went to the platform near the Apollo capsule and excited
the first bending mode by pushing with their tennis-shoe-clad feet. Modes were obtained with and with-
out the modal suppression damper. This verification was accomplished with very little paper documen-
tation and cost.
Wind biasing technology matured and became a viable operational tool for adding flexibility and
increasing margins. All these technologies required developing and maturing technologies in several
additional areas.
1. Measuring and quantifying the atmospheric characteristics in terms of wind speed, shears,
gust, and turbulence
2. Statistical data evaluation techniques, tools, and models
3. Structural dynamic characterization of complex systems.
In the atmospheric characterization arena, the Jimsphere balloon and better radar tracking tech-
nology developed, allowing the description of the winds down to gust in the 25-m range. During this
time, the synthetic wind profile matured to incorporate not only wind speed, but also shear and gust.
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Three approaches were developed to handle the gust: (1) a 9-meter square wave that was tuned to match
the vehicle lower mode frequencies, (2) tuned sine wave gust where amplitude varied with frequency,
and (3) power spectral density formulation of turbulence.
A month-by-month statistically significant sample of what were called real wind profiles were
developed through a comprehensive wind sounding program. These wind profiles were used to run
Monte Carlo elastic vehicle control response analysis using a high-speed repetitive analog computer.
This was a new analog computer that was developed for this analysis by a group of MIT professors. This
system not only allowed a statistical characterization of the vehicle wind response; but also produced
valid quantification of the synthetic profile approach for vehicle wind simulation. Additionally, it pro-
vided a technique to determine a probabilistic statement of the wind-induced vehicle loads. This prob-
abilistic statement was key to the Saturn V Skylab launch statement.
One aside in terms of the synthetic wind profile development was the question of how to prop-
erly combine the wind speed, shear, and gust and how to do a conditional probability assessment.
Putting together three-sigma (3 o) values of each was obviously too severe. Helmut Horn came up with
the idea of conditionally dealing with a 3 o wind speed root-sum-squaring (RSS'ing) the 3 o shear and
gust. William Vaughn was fundamental in this also, as well as in developing the wind sounding technol-
ogy. Because the atmospheric (winds) had preferred monthly directional and speed characteristics, the
technology evolved for biasing the launch trajectory to the monthly mean wind, reducing wind induced
structural loads and increasing the launch probability/flexibility. Some performance loss occurred due to
the path errors introduced in order to reduce angle of attack.
The synthetic wind profile approach did present one problem in that the vehicle response to
winds had to consider variation of other vehicle parameters (control, aerodynamics, propulsion, struc-
tures) in addition to winds, and also the stress analysts and designers needed time-consistent data in
order to perform adequate analysis. Judson Lovingood developed the A-factor approach, which took the
RSS'ed responses from sensitivity analysis to produce scalings of the parameter variations that, when
applied, produced a time response analysis with the same peak as the RSS'ed sensitivity analysis.
The development of structural dynamic characterization tools, their accuracy and validation, was
fundamental to many of the design analyses and solution of problems discussed previously, as well as
others such as pogo. Finite element structural analysis computational tools were developed late in the
Saturn programs. SPAR was started, which was more of a process or procedure, as was NASTRAN,
which started and matured during this time. Computer speed and capability precluded extensive use,
thus the Saturn I (clustered tanks) was analyzed using 20 equations that were coupled through energy
(generalized coordinates, Lagrangian approach) to get the overall system modes. This was a form of
what is now called modal coupling. Full-scale dynamic, as well as scale-model dynamic test technology
was initiated, and these analytical system modes were verified or correlated.
Suspension approaches/systems were key to dynamic testing of full-scale vehicles in the simu-
lated free-free conditions. Criteria for these systems evolved along with configurations. Hydraulic or oil
support bearings at the base of the total vehicle replaced bungy cords. Air bags were used on some con-
figurations to isolate the suspension cables. Other innovative tests occurred such as the tennis shoe test
discussed earlier was an example. Another was the use of 2-by-4's for damping the suspension system
during dynamic test of the SI and SI-B by tying the suspension lines to the test stand with the timbers. It
worked very effectively by changing the dynamic lateral mode of the line. It was demonstrated during
this time that scale models had to have the manufacturing tolerances reduced by the scale factor or
exaggerated deadband play would change the dynamic characteristics. Computer technology for both
modal data acquisition, evaluation, and the excitation systems greatly simplified and started the process
of automation. This computer technology used on Saturn model testing was a first. The hardest problem
to model was the nonlinear fluid analysis of the J-2 which was needed for the SII and SIVB pogo
analysis and their solutions. The data were finally obtained from flight results and some hot-fire ground
tests.
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It was learned and demonstrated during this time that in scale-model testing not only the materi-
als had to be scaled, but also the manufacturing tolerances or else the nonlinearities of the gaps biased
the dynamics. Modeling for pogo (S V) was even more complex due to the hydroelastic coupling. Tank
bulkheads had to be modeled in detail. Propellant ducts had to have both their structures and acoustics
determined as did the cavitation compliances of turbopumps. Verification required testing for many
modes and instrumenting both the fluid and the structure. Single-point random structural dynamic test-
ing technology was developed and applied to the lox tank/bulkhead hydroelastic testing. Defining and
ensuring correct and known test boundary conditions were also major issues.
Technology in dynamic analysis evolved very fast during Saturn/Apollo development and
required nonlinear simulations in order to characterize the cavitation effects, etc., associated with prob-
lems such as pogo that occurred on Saturn V. Analog and hybrid computers were the main tools used
because it was easy to represent the nonlinearities if they were understood. Great physical understanding
was required in order to implement the system on these computers as well as deciding what nonlineari-
ties were essential. Capacity limited what could be described. This meant most of the describing equa-
tions could be linear and implemented on the digital portion of the hybrid. The nonlinear elements were
implemented on the analog side.
Multidisciplinary analysis was becoming a major technological development, as the above dis-
cussions imply. The coupling between the propellant utilization system (optimizing propellant usage and
lower residuals) and the guidance system of the SIVB stage was a major step in simulation. It was more
than just propulsion and guidance. We called it (Harold Scofield's quote) "the world's longest closed-
loop system: slosh/propulsion utilization/engine/guidance/control." These various problems were the
beginning of the major multidisciplinary technology development that would continue to develop
throughout aerospace history.
The development, qualification, and certification of the various components were major tech-
nological developments. Analytical techniques were not too adaptable to developing the vibration cri-
teria arising from mechanical and acoustical sources. This led to the development of data banks from
both the environment and response side based on component masses and mounting configurations.
Scaling technology was developed for taking new environments and new components and scaling new
responses from this in order to develop the vibration criteria. The testing side developed force and con-
trol technologies and hardware for qualification of these components to these vibration criteria on shake
tables.
The Saturn V vehicle was the first launch vehicle that took the developing linear elastic fracture
mechanics technology into the initial design phase. The phenomenon of structural failure by catastrophic
crack propagation below yield stresses had been known for many years. The Saturn V propulsive system
tanks were the first space structure where critical flaw lengths were calculated and a proof test pressure
was implemented on all production tanks to ensure that any undetected cracks or crack-like defects
would not cause failure during the cycle life of the mission.
The author was not involved personally in other technological developments; however, many
were just as innovative as these discussed. The development of the right materials, particularly the
welding technology for the large propellant tanks that not only contained the liquid but also were the
load carrying structure for thrust loads, is a good example.
C. HEAO
1. Characteristics. The sophistication of the tools of high energy astronomy has increased
dramatically over the past 2 decades, culminating in the HEAO program, which put three satellites into
orbit, each carrying over 3,000 lb of experiments. This program has transformed high energy astronomy
from an interesting tributary or side branch to one of the main channels of astronomical research. The
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HEAO experimentshavemadeit abundantlyclearthatif wewantto understandanastronomicalobject,
wemustlook at its radiationat all energies,notjust in thenarrowopticalband.24
HEAO wasactually threedifferent satellitesdesignedto explorefar spacefrom orbitingsystems
using x-ray telescopes.The threedifferent missionscarrieddifferent instrumentsand programobjec-
tives.The first wasascanningmissionto surveyandmapx-ray sourcesthroughoutthecelestialsphere
overawide rangeof.x-ray energies.Theothertwo missionshadmoreSpecificobjectives.HEAO A was
launchedAugust 12, 1977,andceasedoperationsJanuary9, 1979.HEAO B was launchedNovember
13,1978,andceasedoperationsApril 26, 1981.HEAO C waslaunchedSeptember20, 1979,andceased
operationsMay 30, 1981.
ThelaunchvehiclewastheAtlas-Centaurocketbuilt by GeneralDynamicsConvairAerospace
Division, with theenginesprovidedby RocketdyneandPratt& Whitney.Thetotalheightof theHEAO
Atlas-Centaurvehicle readyfor launchwas39.9m (131 ft), with a total launchweight of 165tons,of
which of thespacecraftplusexperimentsfirst of threeandhalf tons,includingoneandahalf tonsfor the
experiments(fig. 26).
,
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---° 2ur--Atlas Stage
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Schematic of AItas-Centaur D-1A, The Launch Vehicle For HEAO.
Figure 26. HEAO Atlas-Centaur.
The spacecraft that carried the HEAO experiments was built by TRW Systems. Their role was to
design and develop the HEAO spacecraft, to integrate the mission, to support launch operations and to
perform flight operations of the in-orbit observations. The basic HEAO A is sketched on figure 27. A
sketch of HEAO B is shown on figure 28, while HEAO C is shown in figure 29. The program was very
successful, adding greatly to science and our understanding of the universe.
2. Evolution/Innovations/Creativity. There were many innovations in the HEAO program;
however, most were in the instruments and science, which the author was not involved in at the time.
Reference 24 covers these extremely well, as it also does for the evolution the program through its ups
and downs, including one program cancellation that forced a total reassessment and redesign of the pro-
gram from four large spacecrafts to the three smaller ones actually flown. This is a story within itself
and deserves contemplation before embarking on new programs of this scope.
3. Problems. One problem associated with HEAO will be discussed briefly, the launch vehicle
had a pogo problem. Pogo occurred to some degree on each Atlas flight near the end of the main stage
burn. It was never viewed as a problem for most launches since the payloads could easily handle the
loads. The concern for HEAO occurred because on the last two or three launches the amplitude
increased. The concern was that this increase signaled a potential blossoming of pogo to the extent that it
would be damaging to HEAO spacecraft. Much analysis of flight data and pogo studies were made in
order to understand this potential problem. It was finally decided that it was an acceptable risk to launch
HEAO without any pogo fixes. This was done with no problem occurrences and without further pogo
amplitude increases.
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D. IUS/PAM-S_OS
1. Characteristics. The IUS was an upper stage vehicle under Air Force management that NASA
bought for several of its missions, including the launching of the tracking data relay satellites (TDRS). It
consisted of a solid propulsion stage and an inertial unit for guidance and control. For planetary
missions, it was modified by adding an additional stage named payload assist module (PAM-S), built by
McDonnell Douglas. The IUS was designed and built by Boeing. Figure 30 shows the basic IUS
configuration as used by NASA for its different missions. It weighed 32,000 lb and was designed to fit
into the shuttle cargo bay with the payload attached to the IUS nose. The configuration with the PAM-S
attached with its payload is shown on figure 31. One additional part of the design had to do with the
support cradle that had to raise the IUS perpendicular to the shuttle payload bay, then eject out of the
bay. The first stage was not ignited until the orbiter had moved a safe distance from the IUS system.
This cradle, with the IUS attached in the orbiter bay, had to have a special design to move the resulting
scissors mode away from the shuttle lift-off dynamic modes, or pay a huge weight penalty. For safety
reasons the expulsion system was energized by springs instead of pyros. Figure 32 shows the cradle
design.
2. Creativity/Innovations. Several innovative design features were incorporated in the IUS
design (fig. 33). It used an extruding nozzle extension in order to conserve space in the transportation
mode. Pyro initiated time instead of electronics was used for timing of separation, etc., as was also done
on the PAM. The design of the cradle and separation system was unique and of a safe weight, and it was
safe for manned flight. The simplicity made for a robust system.
3. Problems. The main problem that occurred with IUS was early in the program when it was
being launched from Air Force missiles for their payloads. The extruding nozzle extension failed,
causing a loss of mission. Teams of Air Force, NASA, and industry were formed to evaluate the
problem and come up with a fix. This was accomplished and no further problems have occurred other
than the normal changing out of parts as they aged on the shelf between uses.
• Length: 17 ft
• Weight: 32,500 Ib
• 3-Axis Stabilized
Spacecraft
Interface
Plane
Equipment Support Section
Solid Rocket Motor
Interstage Structure
Solid Rocket
Motor
Figure 30. Basic IUS configuration.
40
ULS/PAM-S/IUS Configuration
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Figure 31. IUS PAM-S configuration and IUS-PAM-S Ulysses configuration.
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Figure 32. IUS PAM/Ulysses sequence of events.
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INERnAL tPPPER STAOII
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E. Skylab, America's First Space Station
1. Characteristics. "The vast accomplishment of Skylab--in solar and stellar astronomy, in
detailed study of our planet from the incomparable vantage of orbit, in using the exciting new laboratory
tool of weightlessness, and in proving man can work productively in space for extended periods--are
almost too profound to grasp. The legacy of Skylab to be passed on to planners and operators of future
manned space programs is best stated in two words: can do!" according to Rocco A. Petrone. 25
The Skylab space station evolved into a configuration composed of (a) docking adapter; (b) solar
observatory; (c) airlock module; (d) workshop solar wings (solar energy for electric power) (was
launched with two solar wings, but operated with one since the other was lost during launch); and (e)
workshop and living quarters (fig. 34). Cutaways of the living and working quarters are shown on figure
35 and include all the life support system shown on figure 36. Table 1 lists the basic subsystems, the
manufacturers, module name, function, length, diameter, and habitable working volume. The heart of
the science mission was the solar observatory (fig. 37), which had its own fine pointing control system
with ATM instruments, solar power system (four solar arrays), and EVA access. A typical mission
profile is shown on figure 37.
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Figure 35. Cutaway of Skylab living quarters.
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Figure 37. Skylab parasol canopy.
The space station was launched using the Saturn V first two stages, with the workshop replacing
the SIV B third stage and the command and service module (CSM). The CSM was launched separately
using the Saturn I B launch system. Three visits (missions) were carried out with three different crews
over the span of approximately 6 months, with a total manned orbit days in space of 1,171 days,
dictating the need to provide the crews with comfortable living quarters and a healthy and safe living
and working environment. This meant that not only did the system have to depend on the internal active
thermal control system, but it also had to be shaded from the direct Sun rays.
A table of the missions of Skylab is shown in table 2, providing duration, EVA's, observations,
etc., and showing the outstanding success achieved in the presence of major problems. The ability of the
human innovation and creativity to solve major problems with work around demonstrated the "can do"
attitude effects.
2. Evolution, Innovation, Creativity. It is not possible in a report of this type to even hint at the
scope of the evolution, innovation, and creativity accomplished in order to ensure the successful
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Table 1. Skylab configuration.
A B C D E
Module CSM Docking adapter Solar observatory Airlock Workshop
Manufacturer Rockwell Martin Marietta MSFC MDAC-Eastern MDAC-Western
International
Module name CSM Multiple docking ATM Airlock Orbital workshop
(development) adapter module/fixed
airlock shroud
Function Docking interface Solar observation
Controls and
displays
Crew ascent and
descent
Earth observation
Stowage
Power source
Attitude control
Power control and
distribution
Environmental
control
Data center
Extravehicular
activity hatch
Caution and
warning
Primary living and
working area
Laboratory
Power source
Stowage
Length 10.45 m (34.3 ft) 5.27 m (17.3 ft) 4.05 m (13.3 ft) 5.36 m (17.6 ft) 14.66 m (48.1 ft)
Diameter 3.96 m (13.0 ft) 3.04 m (10.0 ft) 3.35 m (11.0 ft) 3.04/1.67/6.70 m 6.7 m (22.0 ft)
(10/5.5/22 ft)
Habitable working 5.95 m 3 (210 ft 3) 32.28 m 3 17.66 m 3 (624 ft3) 295.23 m 3
volume (1,140 ft 3) (10,426 ft3)
Table 2. Skylab missions.
Manned Periods First Second Third Total
Launch
Splashdown
Duration (day:h:min)
Revolutions
Distance (million miles)
SEVAa
EVA lb duration (h, min)
EVA 2 duration (h, min)
EVA 3 duration (h, min)
EVA 4 duration (h, min)
Total EVA's
Solar observatory photos
Earth resources photos
5/25/73 9 a.m. EDT
6/22/73 9:49 a.m. EDT
28:0:49
404
11.5
0:37 (5/25/73)
3:30 (6/7/73)
1:44 (6/19/73)
7/28/73 7:10 a.m. EDT
9/25/73 6:i9 p.m. EDT
50:01:9
858
24.5
6:29 (8/6/73)
4:30 (8/24/73)
2:45 (9/22/73)
11/16/73 9:01 a.m. EDT
2/8/74 11:17 a.m. EDT
84:01:16
1214
34.5
6:33 (11/22/73)
7:01 (12/25/73)
3:28 (12/29/73)
5:19 (2/3/74)
22:21
171:13:14
2,476
70.5
5:51 13:44 41:56
30,242 76,600 75,000 182,842
8,886 14,400 17,000 40,286
a. Standup (in spacecraft hatch) EVA.
b. EVA (completely outside of spacecraft).
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missionsof Skylab. This is particularly true in light of the major damage done to the station during the
Saturn V launch, which led to major on-orbit repairs, etc. Skylab was an observatory, a zero-g
laboratory, and living quarters for three men, with all that implies in terms of power, life support,
science, observation requirements, etc. If one has an interest in the Skylab space station, first read NASA
SP-4000 edited, by Leland Belew. Other information is also present in references 26, 27, and 28, and
other NASA historical publications.
Skylab started out as a "wet workshop," which was an active SVB stage outfitted on the ground
with laboratories, etc. After the SIV B burn, the stage would be purged and made ready as a workshop.
The observatory, ATM, was launched separately and was first to be a free flyer or docked with the spent
SIV B stage, the workshop. As the program evolved, these concepts were dropped, with the basic SIV B
stage being remanufactured to being a dry workshop. In other words, it was built and launched as a
combined ATM and workshop with the docking adapter. The first two stages of the Saturn V could
effectively launch this combined system into orbit by replacing the CSM with a protective aerodynamic
shroud that shielded the ATM and docking module during ascent and was then ejected in orbit, exposing
the ATM and MDA. For this approach to be effective, the ATM and its solar arrays and the workshop
solar wings had to be stowed during launch and then deployed on orbit. This allowed efficient use of
launch vehicle space and maintained essentially the same aerodynamic configuration for the Saturn V
launch vehicle. Using the dry workshop concept allowed the development of adequate living quarters,
laboratories, supplies, etc., to be stowed and launched together, saving much on-orbit assembly.
Innovations and creativity were clearly evident in all aspects of the design. The meteoroid shield
was also a thermal shield. Mixtures of gold and white paint further enhanced the ability to receive heat
(gold) or reject heat (white). Combined with this system were refrigerator cold plates, radiant heaters,
radiators, etc., which got rid of heat generated by heat-producing equipment as well as the Sun's rays
and, thus, maintained a balanced temperature. Exercise equipment for the crew was provided, as was
carbon dioxide removal, waste management, etc.
In order to stay on orbit for 9 months, power had to be generated using the Sun's energy. The
station had to be controlled as to its position in space, as well as maneuvered, and the ATM had to point
accurately at the solar system. Control moment gyros were used for pointing and stability, while the
reaction jet control system maneuvered and maintained basic position. The ATM had a fine pointing
vernier system relative to the basic Skylab orientation. As stated above, read NASA SP-4000 to get a full
impact of this expression of creativity.
Probably the greatest innovation and creativity occurred due to the problems created during the
Skylab launch on the Saturn V. The next section on problems will also discuss these great recovery
efforts.
3. Problems
a. Meteoroid Debris/Solar Wing Failure. During the launch phase at around 60-s flight time, it
was observed that problems had occurred with the micrometeoroid shield as evidenced by the rising
temperature; however, the launch continued flawlessly and the Skylab was injected into orbit. In orbit,
when the workshop solar wings were being deployed, it was clear that a mooring problem had occurred.
Data indicated that one wing was gone and the other only partially deployed. Also, the temperature of
the workshop was rising to dangerous levels, threatening medical supplies, etc. The workshop
equipment was not designed for these high temperatures. The crew flight scheduled for the next day was
delayed 10 days in order to understand the problem and design fixes. There was also a concern that the
high temperature would cause the internal insulation to give off life-threatening gases. With much
ingenuity, ground control was able to orient the workshop to balance the temperature around 130 °F.
Since the workshop had very little solar power, most of the power to maintain the station was obtained
from the ATM's four healthy solar arrays. The system was designed to pass power from one system to
the other. The cause of the failure of the meteoroid debris shield and the solar wing was an improper
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venting design of the box that contained the wing, which caused it to trap the 14.7 lb/in 2 ground
atmospheric pressure that in near vacuum ripped the wing loose and destroyed the debris shield,
exposing the gold covering of the workshop.
NASA Centers worked around the clock to understand the problem and to design fixes. The
missing solar thermal/debris shield had to be replaced. Many options were looked at, with two being
designed, built, and verified. Their installation was practiced extensively in Marshall's Neutral
Buoyancy Simulator tank, designed to simulate zero gravity working conditions for astronauts. One
lesson is clear: "one must have in place the technologies needed when problems occur." The two solar
thermal systems were: (1) a fold-up parasol type shield that could be deployed off the workshop airlock
viewing port by the crew (this was accomplished on the first mission and went a long way in stabilizing
the temperatures, which dropped to 90 ° (fig. 38)), and (2) a twin-pole sail, which was deployed by the
second crew using EVA by the astronauts (fig. 39). The second shield was more effective and lasted the
life of the station.
Figure 38. Skylab twin-pole Sun shade.
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Figure 39. Skylab typical mission profile.
The second critical problem was to try to deploy the remaining solar wing in order to get enough
power to run the workshop and free the ATM power system for solar observation. It was envisioned that
some strap or debris from the failed debris shield was holding the wing. Various types of extendable
tools, like those used by ground electrical crews, were designed and tested in MSFC's Neutral Buoyancy
Simulator facility, as well as the crew was trained in the tank on how to use them. The simulator proved
an extremely valuable means of approximating zero gravity, allowing training and understanding the
system.
The crew, when on orbit, flew the command module around the workshop and observed the
hung-up wing. They first flew the spacecraft in close and, using a pole out the window, tried to pry the
wing loose with no success. They then tried to dock with the workshop but were unsuccessful. The next
day they put on space suits and depressurized the spacecraft, then they disassembled and reassembled
the docking adapter, after which they successfully docked.
The next day they entered the workshop and worked the damage, then deployed the parasol Sun
shade as stated above. The ground personnel at Johnson Space Center (JSC) and MSFC continued to
work out ways of releasing the solar wing. Fellow astronauts worked with the tools they had carried to
orbit with the simulated problem in the Neutral Buoyancy tank.
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On June2, ConradandKerwin openedthehatchon theair lock moduleandmovedout on the
airlock shroudto assembletheir toolsandequipment.They triedwithout successto cut the straploose
that washoldingthe solarwing. ThenConradmadehisway out to thestraphungwing with thecutter
jaws. As he reachedthe scissors-typemechanism,the cutter severedthe strap,moving suddenly,and
throwinghim awayonly to besavedby his tether.Theynexthadto move thebeamout a full 90°. This
theydid with a tetherthat Kerwin pulledandConradlifted in themiddle (mechanicaladvantage),thus
moving the beam out to the deployedposition. Thejolt knockedboth of them away,but the tether
containedthemandtheyreenteredtheworkshop.Onceinsidetheworkshop,it waspossibleto warm up
the actuatorsandfully deployandlock in thesolar wing. The systemcould now bebalancedandthe
solarobservationandlaboratorywork begun.
At the startof the secondmission,the secondSunshadewasdeployedduring astronautextra-
vehicular activity (EVA). They attachedthe poles,thenunrolled theshade,attachingit to the poles.
Severalconcernsassociatedwith this Sunshadewereworked,andincludeddynamicexcitationfrom the
reactionjet control systemfirings, which potentiallycouldcauselargeSunshadedeflections.All these
problemswereworkedandput to bed.ThenewSunshadeworkedin anexcellentmanner.
With theseinitial problemssolved,the Skylab missions continued providing much science as
well as information of long-duration space work by humans. Skylab set the foundation for the upcoming
space station.
b. ATM Dynamic Response. A very interesting problem occurred due to the angles of orienta-
tion of the ATM during pointing relative to the MDA/workshop. The various observation angles
changed the dynamic modes in a nonlinear manner, creating unusual demands on the control system
logic. In order to work this logic problem, dynamic modal analysis was made for each generic telescope
orientation. These mode shapes and frequencies were used by control analysts to change the control
logic and verify it, allowing ATM pointing without bending mode instability. The result of this effort
was a control system that operated for the three Skylab missions flawlessly as evidenced by the teleme-
tered data, science gathered, etc.
F. Space Shuttle
The space shuttle, NASA's reusable launch vehicle/space platform, is one of the greatest design
and operational achievements. Being both a manned spacecraft and a launch vehicle, with all but the
external propulsion tanks being reusable, introduced many conflicting requirements and thus design
trades. The problems that resulted and their solutions are the subject of this section. They will be dis-
cussed under the headings: (1) Space Shuttle Systems, (2) Space Shuttle Main Engines, (3) Solid Rocket
Boosters and Motors, (4) Orbiter, and (5) Spacelab/Spacehab System.
1. Space Shuttle System
a. Characteristics. The space shuttle vehicle is composed of an expendable external propulsion
tank (lox and hydrogen), a reusable orbiter with liquid main propulsion engines (SSME's), the orbiter
maneuvering system (OMS), two SRB's (partially reusable), and the various payloads (fig. 40). The
payload maximum size is 15 by 60 ft. The maximum weight depends on the desired orbit. The orbiter
has a stay time on-orbit up to 2 weeks with a crew of up to five. The total weight is approximately
4.5x106 lb as shown on the schematic in figure 40. The liquid propellant capability is 1,391,144 lb
19,571 ft 3 lox and 233,431 lb 52,908 ft 3 hydrogen (fuel).
Payload usability is enhanced through the development of the Spacelab system, which has both
habitable modules with experiment racks, thermal conditioning, etc., and platforms in nonhabitable
regions for mounting experiments (section III-H). The remote manipulator arm allows working on or
retrieving a satellite. The life support system, although important, is not addressed in detail. Extensive
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Figure 40. Space shuttle configuration.
assembly, launch processing, checkout facilities, equipment, processes, tools, and launch facilities exist,
but are not a major part of this paper.
Work accomplished during phase B of shuttle demonstrated the strong interdisciplinary coupling
of the shuttle system. Early trade studies (fig. 41) indicated areas that needed attention, such as trajec-
tory, thermal, loads, control, performance, and launch operations interaction. Many developmental
issues and problems surfaced (appendix) that required the use of multidiscipline teams (a pseudo type of
concurrent engineering team) for resolution. Technology made many advances from the time of phase A
until the present time. The two major technology drivers were the orbiter reentry thermal protection
system and the high performance reusable liquid SSME. The evolution of the technology, processes,
analysis, and tests accomplished on the shuttle are very informative.
Typical trajectory and mission profiles are shown in figures 42 and 43, which show the basic
event sequences and the pertinent parameters.
The shuttle is, and has been, a marvelous machine. It represents the best in a multiple-purpose,
finely-tuned, complex space system designed to meet very demanding requirements. Although its cost
per launch did not meet expectations and the operations are more complex than desired, its 60-plus
manned missions illustrate its capability. A recent one was the capture and repair of the Hubble Space
Telescope. What a feat that turned out to be! Now the repaired HST meets or exceeds most of its
original goals.
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Figure 42. Space shuttle typical mission profile.
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b. Evolution/Creativity/Innovati0n. The development of such a complex machine required the
best in engineering innovation, creativity, and common sense. Management of such a complex
government-industrial teaming also required the same innovation, etc. At the same time, the shuttle
marked a degenerative-trend use of suboptional off-the-shelf equipment, rather than special devices
designed to specification. The Saturn computer was, for example, many times more reliable than the
collection of processes used to guide and control the shuttle. However, in many ways the shuttle tasks
were easier than many Saturn tasks. Stabilization and control and structural interaction differences were
much more mobile for Saturn.
The two driving technologies required and developed for the space shuttle concept were the
orbiter reentry heating protection system and the high-impulse reusable liquid engine. Other tech-
nologies also matured. Dynamic testing technology moved into the multirandom excitation, as well as
the time domain, as an enhancement to the frequency domain. Scale-model technology was enhanced
through a ]/4-scale testing of the total shuttle system. Integrated/multidisciplinary analysis was a key
technology, i.e., control, performance (flight mechanics), loads, and thermal were highly coupled. Many
innovations to accomplish this task were developed to support the program.
Understanding the physical phenomena of ignition overpressure and designing a suppression
approach was not only a key technology area, but the innovation used in arriving at a fix. Testing of a
6.4-percent scale-model shuttle propulsion model (fig. 44) and its enhancement allowed both the physi-
cal understanding and the assessment of the water spray suppression and water troughs. This scale-
model hot-fire propulsion model was started as a technological development for shuttle during phases A
and B, and became the tool for fixing the STS-1 overpressure problem. Innovative water curtain testing
was developed and showed that water blocks overpressure waves, thus the baselining of water troughs as
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Figure44. Spaceshuttle6.4-percentpropulsionmodel.
an insurancesolution to thewatersprayinjections(fig. 45).Thesolutionof this problemalsoillustrated
thecomplextechnicalmanagementproblem.During thedevelopmentof thefix, it was thoughtthat in
theclosevicinity of theSRB'spermanentsteelplatescouldbeinstalledto block theoverpressurewave.
After moving alongwith thedesign,waterspray,troughsin the drift holes,andsteelplatesaroundthe
SRB's, the team leaderskept questioning the feasibility of the steel plates.Eventually during this
repeatedquestioning,datawereuncoveredthatshowedthatthesteelplateswould reflect theSRM thrust
and destroy the aft heat shield. Small water troughsreplacedthe steelplates,averting a loss of the
vehicle.Innovativeleadership/managementis arequirementcommiseratewith thetechnical.
The SSME, with its high-performancerequirements(454-sspecific impulse (Isp)) and a 55-
mission life coupledwith geometricandweightconstraints,developedfatigue andfractureissuesthat
led to the developmentor enhancementof severaltechnologies.Dealingwith hardwarelife capability
issuesrequireda detailedcharacterizationof both structuralmodelsandenvironments,which pushed
developmentof computational fluid dynamics technology.This technology started, evolved, and
maturedin 10years,greatly enhancingthe maturity of the SSME.Finite elementstructural analysis
matured during this time. Verification of environments required the development of special
instrumentationfor flows, acoustics,andvibration. Internalandexternaldiagnosticinstrumentationhad
to be developed.Data diagnostics(particularly dynamic) developedrapidly as well as databasing,
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Figure 45. Space shuttle water troughs.
providing the ability to screen hardware and put a quantifiable maintenance and refurbishment program
in place. This was true for both flow and mechanical vibration. Automation of the vibration data base
allowed application of the established data base, with its excitation forces to new environments,
processed components quickly through sealing and similitude laws automatically in the computer code.
New criteria for shock and vibration testing can be generated in hours, where it used to take weeks.
Health monitoring systems and engine shutdown systems were also based on these data bases. Cold-
flow testing for berichmarking the CFD models and verifying environments reached a high level of
sophistication. These facilities/technologies are both air and water. Normal fracture control technology
evolved to include high-cycle fracture mechanics and an assessment approach for residual life.
Combining low- and high-cycle fatigue was a maturing technology. In order to handle the high
temperatures and pressures, new materials as well as processing techniques evolved. Castings that
eliminated welds solved many fatigue and fracture problems before they occurred. The problems
experienced on the engine required indepth understanding of very technically complex problems, which
required formal approaches for studying the problem. Fault tree analysis complemented with logic
diagrams and formal action items matured into a very useful tool or process.
Thermal protection systems in addition to the orbiter were major challenges. Hand-applied glue
used on parts and the spray-on insulation for the ET were big adventures. The heat shields for the SRB
and orbiter boat tail had to accommodate gimbaled nozzles and were an extension of Saturn technology.
Plume heating was still an issue, but was in the realm of predictability using prior data, wind tunnel
tests, and hot-fire solid and liquid engine ground tests.
Aerodynamic predictions were a major problem due to the unsymmetrical configuration between
element-to-element tunnel flow and propulsion system plume interaction. The aerodynamic loads were
excessive and had to be reduced. This led to elevon load relief and cross-coupled load relief using pitch,
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yaw, androll control. The asymmetryof the vehiclealso requiredthe developmentof a vector wind
syntheticprofile to accountfor both shearand gust and the changingwind direction with altitude.
Detailed measuredmonthly wind ensembleswere enhanced,as well as the ability to accomplish
measuredwind MonteCarlovehicleresponseandloadsanalysis.
A big technologythat wasdevelopedwastheday-of-launchI-load update(2 h prior to launch)
that biasedthe trajectory to the last measuredwind profile to increaselaunchprobability andreduce
loads.To accomplishthis, the wind soundingsystemdevelopeda new technologycalledLIDAR to
achievethe wind dataand analysistools requirements,andto deal with requiredfailure modes(for
example,engine out) in conjunctionwith otherparametervariations.An innovative techniquewas
developedto use1crvariationsof theotherparameterswith anenginefailure occurring5 s prior to the
wind gust of the syntheticprofile. Therefore,the combinedprobabilitiesof the failure and parameter
variationswere near3or.For lift-off loadscalculations,certainparametervariationschangedthe time
sequenceof thesystem,precludingtheuseof theA-factor approachdevelopedfor Saturn.To overcome
this, all parametersthatdid not affect timing wereRSS'edin conjunctionwith a 1crvariationworse-on-
worseof all parametersthataffecttiming.
Performancesensitivitiesof theone-and-a-half-stageconceptto parametervariationsled to the
useof the wind data in a mixed fashion. Fifty percentof the wind shearsand gusts were treated
deterministically, while the effects of the other 50 percent were RSS'ed along with the system
parameters.Becausewind direction changewasalso importantto thevehicle response,a vector wind
syntheticprofile wasdeveloped.
Thespaceshuttlewasthefirst vehiclethatwascoupledin thepitchplanedueto centerof gravity
(cg) andthrustoffsets,precludingthenormalpoint masstrajectory/performanceoptimizationprograms.
An innovativemomentbalance(programmedcontrol forces)wasdevelopedthat alloweda simplified
approachfor trajectoryoptimization.
Becausetheshuttleis a wingedvehicle, thehighdynamicpressureregimewasa major analysis
problem to adequatelypredict rigid-body vehicle responseto winds and thrust-generated,vehicle-
induced loads, which included all systemparametervariationsas well as wind statistics.This was
accomplishedin anefficient mannerthroughthecreationof squatcheloids(Tom Modlin's work) which
was q_ and q/_ plotted continuously for nominal parameters as the wind direction varied. These
squatcheloids are generated for each Mach number. A set is also generated for 3or system parameter
variations and becomes the basis for the design criteria (figs. 46 and 47). This work has been extended to
the use of alpha, beta, and "q" combinations instead of the rigid boundary of the squatcheloid, providing
more freedom in trajectory shaping and the tailoring of the day-of-launch I-loads updates to increase
launch probability.
Many other innovations and technologies have evolved such as the use of animation graphics to
enhance understanding of dynamic response; colored graphics to pictorially show stress, flow, and
thermal fields; CAD/CAM systems to automate design and manufacturing; information systems/
electronic data transfer; and finally, the evolution of probabilistic/risk assessment technologies to the
point where it is impacting design, verification, and operation space systems.
The shuttle went beyond proof testing of propellant tanks, etc., to total fracture control. In the
ET, one-half mile of welds required pre- and post-proof testing inspection. Observed flaws had to be
dispositioned for flight use by analog testing. The SSME evolved along a different path. High-strength
material was required to meet the high-performance requirements which were:
- Two-stage combustion and pump system producing high pressure and temperature
- High Isp thrust coupled with minimum weight and volume requirements.
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These resulted in weld problems. To save cost, formal fracture control was initially not a design
requirement; following the pattern of the Saturn engines, F-1 and J-2. The early problems resulted in
critical components having fracture assessment. Additional problems resulted in more components being
added, later followed by a weld assessment. This effort has resulted in residual life assessment,
probabilistic/risk assessment, and the extension of fracture control to include high-cycle fracture in
addition to low-cycle fracture. Rocketdyne and its fracture control leader have made major technology
contributions in fracture control state-of-the-art. The first major use of damping seals, invented by
George Von Pragneau, NASA, had its first use in the turbopumps, which were used to damp whirl
problems (fig. 48). This seal concept later evolved by Rocketdyne into a hydrodynamic bearing for the
lox pump and was successfully tested six times.
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Figure 48. SSME lox turbopump damping seals.
Highly redundant TVC systems and APU power systems were developed. As fickle as hydrazine
systems are, the four that fly on the SRB on every flight have worked perfectly. Parts of these systems
are quad redundant, while others have only dual parts. It turned out to be an example of good system
engineering.
Performance sensitivities led to several weight-saving programs. The ET made a major effort to
reduce the weight approximately 10,000 lb, producing approximately the same level of payload per-
formance improvement.
The innovative design of the total shuttle system used a unique load split or load path where the
SRB loads were taken out at the forward attach point of the SRB to the ET. This was through all the
I-beams in the tank inner stage (lox tank forward of load fuel tank to the rear), while the SSME thrust
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was taken out at the rear of the ET, producing a net load of the difference. The 1-beam also tied the two
SRB's together. In addition, the hydrogen tank skin thickness was tailored circumferentially and
longitudinally to the stress field. A portion of the ET that was designed by well-defined loads was based
on a safety factor of 1.25 instead of the normal 1.4. The cryo shrinkage of the ET when filled created
two problems. First, the radial shrinkage loaded the SRB (held down firm to the launch pad) against the
tank (punch load). The SRB-to-ET aft struts were pretensioned to relieve this problem. The longitudinal
shrinkage also increased loads. Second, if the tanks were perpendicular before filling, they became 7 ° off
perpendicular when filled. Therefore, the struts were biased 7 ° off perpendicular before tank filling so
that they were perpendicular during operations. The lox tank was located forward to reduce the c.g.
tracking excursion by the thrust vector and reduced thrust loss due to the cosine effect of the thrust vec-
tor angle.
The innovative use of timing delay of SRB ignition allowed the minimization of the twang
energy stored in the vehicle due to the SSME's being at full thrust. Further, the SRB design loads were
chosen to be worse-on-worse, building robustness and precluding downstream redesigns as loads
changed. This was a good system choice because the performance loss was only one-twelfth. All other
elements used time-consistent loads due to the one-to-one performance impact of weight. Also, the SRB
was not initially designed for water impact. A 5-percent attrition was accepted, thus no large weight
impacts.
The programmatic management of the complex technical interaction was an extension of the use
of working groups and panels started in the Saturn program. The discipline interaction was much more
pronounced and sensitive than the prior vehicle, creating the need for strong integration of the various
disciplines, subsystems, and elements. As this need became more and more apparent, various integration
approaches were tried. The integration working group approach was chosen. In terms of the launch
vehicle and the propulsion system, this was a group consisting of all the NASA centers' interacting dis-
ciplines, leads, elements, chief engineers, and contractor equivalents. The groups working the launch
vehicle were named the ascent flight system integration group and the propulsion system integration
group. The key philosophy was that the groups were to be exchange forums and recommending
groups--not project decision groups. Problems were to flow down to the groups from the projects, up to
the groups from their members supporting engineers, and from the groups themselves. Although
structured through co-chair leads and formal action items that could be assigned to any group or
individual, it was completely open. This created excellent communication and exchange, bringing many
issues to resolution. This type of working group is obviously not the same as the Product Development
Teams (PDT) in vogue today, although it carried out many of the concurrent engineering functions and
also established excellent communications between NASA Centers and their contractors because all
were a part of the working group and their supporting discipline panels. Whether the use of PDT's in
their concurrent engineering focus eliminates the need for this type of working group or its equivalent is
an open question. For large complex systems, however, some means of integrating and coordinating the
system focus across the product developments is mandatory. For the shuttle, this approach was very
effective in resolving the major multidisciplinary system issues inherent in this type vehicle.
c. Problems. As the space shuttle evolved, reality overcame dreams and visions, thus perform-
ance problems developed. These were of a wide variety, including payload to orbit capability, cost,
operational complexity, refurbishment, and maintenance. When a project is faced with a performance
issue (payload to orbit), there are three options available for dealing with the problem: (1) weight
reduction (structures, consumables, propellant reserves etc.), (2) performance enhancements (thrust, Isp,
launch site, burn time, etc.), and (3) operational procedures and constraints (reduced requirements,
environment reductions, etc.). As has been discussed in this section, the shut.tie employed all three
techniques in order to meet performance requirements. This was accomplished in a very innovative and
balanced manner from the reduction of safety factors on the ET for well known loads to the high-
performance motor (HPM) SRM (3,000 performance enhancement, to the 104-percent power level
SSME. Table 3 is a matrix of the problems that caused performance degradation and the average hit
followed by a listing of the solutions used to gain performance.
60
Table3. Shuttleperformancedegradation/performanceenhancements.
1. Orbiterdesignagainstrealrequirementsleadsto not meetingweight
requirements 30,000lb
. Environments (loads) increases due to employing quartering high q winds.
Several impacts resulted:
- Baselining monthly mean wind biasing for design
- Three-axis and elevon load relief baselined
- Increased analysis and testing
- Aerothermal/thermal protection system impacts (SRB and ET)
- Performance loss from path deviations
5,000 Ib
3. SRM fixed nozzle was redesigned to a flex gimbaled nozzle for adequate vehicle
control.
. Lift-off loads increases
- Staggered SSME start and shutdown
- Ground winds constraints
- Weight increases/redesign shuttle elements --+
(individual payload impacts not documented)
- Pre-tensioned SRB/ET struts
1,200 # eq payload
5. Missed aerodynamic predictions/STS-1 lofting
- Trajectory constraints q, SRB separation, a trim
- Performance loss ---)
- TPS impacts ET and SRB
- Protuberance (ET) redesign/rectification
- Reduced launch probability winter months ---)
- Orbiter wing mods (leading edge)
- Day of launch I-load updates
- Flight-derived dispersions
5,000 II
65 percent
6. Isp not meeting design goals
- SSME --+
- SRM --+
21/2 s
ls
7. STS-1 SRB ignition overpressure
- Modified water injection system (into thrust buckets)
- Water troughs over drift hole
- Payload loads increases (limited redesign/revivification)
8. Orbiter tile debond and debris damage
9. Other
- Landing gear and brakes
- Engine upgrades
- SSME fatigue and fracture
- ET fracture control
- Isp loss for plugged lox post
- SRB recovers
• Water impact damage
• Acoustic (reentry)
• Thermal (reentry)
Is
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Table3. Shuttleperformancedegradation/performanceenhancements(continued).
PerformanceEnhancement
1. SSME
- 104-percentthrustnominal 3,000lb
- 109-percentabort
- Redesignweightreduction 1,000lb
2. ET
- Safetyfactorreductionto 1.25
- Redesign(superlight weighttank)
10,000lb
8,000lb
3. SRM
- High-performancemotor 3,000lb
- Bum rateincrease 1,500lb
4. Orbiter
- Weight reductiondesignchanges =10,000lb
5. Flight-derived dispersions
In addition to these performance type issues, several other major problems occurred during
development not the least of which were the orbiter tile debond, debris damage to the tile, SRM ignition
overpressure, and aerodynamic deviations.
d. Future Implications. Any future system will have to deal with realities of performance in the
same three categories. It is prudent, however, that up front the systems sensitivities be understood and
robustness designed into the system 19 in order to eliminate, as much as possible, the impacts.
Although the space shuttle is a marvelous and successful machine, there are some downsides.
For example, as a result many sensitivities of not only the shuttle system, but also its elements and
components as well, have led to costly launch delays, maintenance and refurbishment issues, operational
hands-on labor (touch labor), and cost. A list of the shuttle flight data and an in-flight anomaly list is
published by JSC in JSC-19413 and is revised periodically. A similar report is published at MSFC in
MSFC-1600 Rev C. They list the mission, Space Transportation System (STS) number, orbiter number,
event, impact, and remarks. The problem list goes from winds aloft to auxiliary power unit (APU)
failures to hydrogen leaks. A study was done by Analex Space Systems, Inc., Kennedy Space Center,
FL, of the "Ability of Space Shuttle to Launch on Time." This is a comprehensive report, again dealing
with all the launch delays resulting from weather to sensor failures and everything in between.
The shuttle as a system is, therefore, very complex, requiring much touch-labor to operate, and is
limited in performance by its constraints; yet it is indeed a remarkable machine, a marvel, a wonder.
Future systems, however, need a different approach that is reliable, cost efficient, and, therefore, robust.
The appendix summarizes the set of problems the author has dealt with in the space shuttle arena.
The development of space shuttle provided many technologies that have application elsewhere
and in the future. The following is a partial listing:
1. Solid rocket motors gimbal nozzle (flex seal)
2. SRM ablative, refurbishable nozzle
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3. Lightweightorbiterthermalprotectiontiles
4. Acousticsandignition overpressuresuppressiontechniques
5. Day-of-launchI-loadupdateprocedures
6. Active multiaxis loadrelief
7. Tailored/adaptiveSSMEthrottling
8. ET spray-oninsulation(propellanttanks)(robotics)
9. Roboticwelding
10. High-strengthmaterials
11. Hydro-staticturbopumpbearings
12. Siliconnitrideball bearings
13. SRBrecovery
14. High-cyclefracturemechanicstechniques(residuallife)
15. High Ispliquid hydrogenengines
16. Simulatedlife fracturetesting(analogtesting)
17. Digital control
18. Computerassistedesign/manufacturing(CAD/CAM)
19. CFD
20. Computationalmechanics/rinitelementmodeling
21. Microelectronics.
Thenextsectionwill dealwith theshuttleelements.
2. Space Shuttle Main Engine. The following section is a collection of materials, data, charts,
etc., from several sources associated with the SSME. These sources are (1) MSFC and Rocketdyne fail-
ure investigation reports, (2) Rocketdyne presentations, (3) MSFC/Rocketdyne special problem resolu-
tion teams, (4) MSFC and Rocketdyne studies and reports, and (5) MSFC and Rocketdyne technical
society papers and professional journal articles. The engine design work, testing, and operations were
Rocketdyne's responsibility. MSFC was the responsible NASA Center.
a. Characteristics. The SSME is the highest efficient liquid propulsion engine ever built. Its
complexity and performance are unequaled. It is an example of the degree of craftsmanship possible in
the design and operation of a high-performance system. As discussed in previous publications, these
characteristics, in conjunction with the external leveled constraints, produced problems, many of which
were unexpected because of the high-performance requirements. Bob Biggs, Rocketdyne, wrote an
excellent paper tracing the evolution of the engine, providing much insight into the engine and the pro-
gram. Others have dealt with various aspects of its development and problems. 29-34
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The SSME is a high-performance,throttleable,liquid oxygen/hydrogenspacevehicle engine.
The high Isp and thrust is achievedthrougha stagedcombustionpower cycle, with high combustion
chamberpressureusing a dual-stagepump andcombustionprocess.The engineoperatesat a mixture
ratio (lox/liquid hydrogenof 6:1 anda chamberpressureof approximately3,000 lb/in2 absolute)to
producea sealevel thrustof 375,000lb andavacuumthrustof 470,000lb. The enginesarethrottleable
over a thrust rangeof 65 to 109percentof designthrust level. This .allowshigh thrust initially with
throttle down capability to control maximumvehicledynamicpressure(max q) and maintainvehicle
accelerationat a 3-g limit for crew safety.In the stagedcombustioncycle, thepropellantsarepartially
burnedat high pressureandrelatively low temperaturein thepreburners,providing powerto drive the
high-pressurepumps. They are completely burned at high temperatureand pressurein the main
combustionchamberbeforeexpandingthroughthehigh-area-rationozzle.Liquid fuelor oxygenis used
to cool all combustiondevices.Thehydrogen-richhotgasfrom thepreburnersis usedto drive thehigh-
pressurepumps.To put thisenergyconcentrationin perspective,thehigh-pressurefuel pumpis a three-
stage liquid hydrogen pump driven by a two-stagegas turbine rotating up to 38,000 r/min, and
producing70,000h.p.,all containedin a spaceof approximately18inchesin diameterand2 feet long.
The outputfrom thehigh-pressurelox pumpis a pressureof 4,600lb/in2 absoluteat a flow rateof 795
lb/s, producing very high dynamic pressures.It is clear from this brief descriptionthat this system
producesvery harshenvironments.Temperaturesrangefrom 1,700to 30°R;pressuresupto 7,500lb/in2
absolute;anddynamicpressures60 timesthosenormallyexperiencedon theshuttlewing duringascent.
Figure 49 is a picture of the engine,while figure 50 showsthebasicflow andtypical values.This, in
conjunctionwith hydrogenenvironments,leadsto susceptibilityto corrosion,hydrogenembrittlement,
high-cycle fatigue, and fracturemechanicsissues.Problemshavebeenexperiencedin all theseareas
duringtheenginedevelopmentprogram.
b. Creativity/Innovation. Some of the innovation and creativity brought to bear during the
history of the SSME was discussed briefly in the shuttle paragraphs. The development and use of
damping seals to damp turbomachinery instability and high-cycle fracture mechanics are examples.
The main oxidizer valve (MOV) 7,000-Hz vibration problem was a classic example of
acoustical/structural dynamic tuning and also how innovation can be used to solve a problem. The
problem was a resonating edge tone of the valve/sleeve housing gap as the high speed lox flowed across
_t, exciting the sleeve and causing the seal to rub and catch on fire. In order to find where the excitation
was coming from, a buzzing valve was put in the lox cold flow facility at MSFC and tested to duplicate
the vibration experienced on the engine. Once the buzz was established, wax was put in the various
cavities, one at a time to determine which was the excitation source. When the sleeve/housing gap was
filled, the vibration stopped. The solution was to tailor a washer to fill the cavity. No vibration has
occurred in the MOV since 1980.
Turbomachinery and its ancillary field, rotordynamics, has had to make quantum jumps in
analysis, testing, and data basing. Instabilities such as whirl, bearing life degradation, rogue force, and
excessive vibration are evils waiting to happen in high-performance, high-density turbomachines. The
creative use of damping seals, an invention of George von Pragenau, basically solved the whirl problems
and reduced the forced vibration levels. Extrapolating from the damping seal concept, Von Pragenau, in
conjunction with Rocketdyne, developed and demonstrated a hydrodynamic damping seal bearing that
not only provided adequate damping but also was the rotor support bearing. This damping seal bearing
concept was demonstrated for the SSME lox pump in the MSFC engine testbed. A total of five hot
engine firings was used to demonstrate this approach. The bearing lifted off early in the start sequence,
eliminating the concern of rub in gaseous oxygen (gox) during startup and shutdown. An innovative
technique for balancing the spinning parts had to be devised because it was generally not possible to
balance the parts assembled into a pump. Rotordynamic analysis with many rotor and case modes
became routine. Nonlinear rotordynamic analysis tools were developed and used extensively.
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Figure49. SSMEconfiguration.
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Many other innovations were apparent as various problems occurred. The numerous major hot-
fire development problems were studied and resolved using Government/contractor concurrent
engineering teams, usually called failure investigation boards. Although the word "concurrent
engineering" was not in vogue, the operating approach and team makeup were part of the characteristics
of the "current" definition. (See reference 20 for a discussion of the approach.) The teams, in general,
used fault trees or FMEA's in a formal way to resolve very complex technically induced hardware fail-
ures. The use of these failure boards or teams was very effective and innovative. The use of concurrent
engineering or ad hoc teams (tiger teams) has evolved to deal with complex technical issues such as
fatigue problems, weld problems, and special problems such as 4,000 Hz, turbine blade cracking, bear-
ing wear, and manufacturing issues. Major technology breakthroughs have occurred in the development
of special materials and materials processing, such as the development and use of silicon nitrite ball
bearings to solve the turbomachinery bearing wear issues, 65 and single-crystal _turbine blades to solve
blade cracking issues. The development of CFD analysis techniques to predict the internal fluid and gas
flow environment was also a major accomplishment. Parallel to this was the development of special air-
and water-flow facilities to benchmark these CFD models. Detailed finite element dynamic and stress
modeling reached its pinnacle for meeting accuracy requirements and performance in order to under-
stand and solve the many fatigue issues. The extreme thermal environments and thermal gradients
required the same level of sophistication. Materials characterization had to reach new levels due to the
use of exotic materials, and the extreme environments created very small critical flaw sizes that drove
many innovative, as well as more accurate, nondestructive evaluation (NDE) approaches. X ray, dye
penetrant, ultrasonic, etc., were a part of these NDE advances. Internal instrumentation was developed to
measure and quantify environments. Large advances were made in hot-fire data acquisition, data
evaluation, and data banking; and electronic data transfer became standard practice. The engine system
performance data and the high-frequency turbomachinery (vibration data) are good examples. The
approach collects and evaluates vibration data from 0 to 4,000 Hz. Spectrums, ISO plots, RMS plots,
mean and variances, etc., are produced and data banked. The historical data banks of physical data
formulated in a probabilistic and reliability sense are used to manage hardware maintenance and to
ensure flight safety. Data exist now for over 2,000 ground tests and 80 shuttle flights (three engines each
flight). As a result of this large data base, decisions are made for flight based on expected demonstrated
levels and hardware successes. In general, a piece of SSME hardware will not be flown with more
accumulated time than one-half the ground demonstrated levels.
c. Developmental Problem Examples. SSME problems have taken many forms, some of which
have been major failures. 35-66 The flight history program is shown in figure 51. Figures 52 and 53 show
the flight redlines required to safely shut down malfunctioning engines. In addition to the flight pro-
gram, there has been an extensive ground development and verification test program involving 60+
engines and 2,000+ hot-fire SSME ground tests (individual engines), accumulating more than 748,000 s.
This does not include the 10+ MPT engine cluster test and more than 80+ flights of three engines each.
To date, there have been 36 major failures, all of which were investigated by an official investigation
board with a self-contained report depicting the problem resolution and other recommendations. Figure
54 shows the 36 major failures as a function of calendar year. As the program has matured, major
failures have decreased. Figure 55 is an engine schematic showing where the failures have occurred.
Table 4 lists the 36 failures with other pertinent data such as cutoff parameters, failure cause, and
resolution. Dennis Gosdin created these charts together with the assistance of Rocketdyne and MSFC
engineers to serve as a historical data base. Many other problems have occurred that were not classified
as major failures. One occurred in proof tests, some in vibration testing, and others were self-contained.
Many were found analytically, others are the inherent problems of high-performance systems. In the
sections that follow, appendices, and references, many of these problems are discussed--not to point
fingers, because all have performed very well--but to teach what can be expected in developing high-
performance systems and to point to areas for penetration and problem avoidance (total design) in new
programs. All in all, these liquid propulsion systems provide great complexity and challenge. This can
be understood by the range of technical areas these system encompasses such as: rotordynamics,
thermal, flow, control, transients, stability, fracture, fatigue, combustion, exotic fuels, manufacturing,
FMEA's, testing, analysis, simulations, breadboards, tractability, etc. A few examples of these
challenging problems follow; the complete documentation is reserved for the appendices.
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FIGURE 1. SSME FLIGHT REDLINES
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Figure 54. SSME major failures.
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(1) SSME 4,000 Hz. Flow instabilities have been the classical problem of structural systems.
They have taken many forms, occurring unexpectedly, taking human life. Many textbooks and technical
papers focus on the phenomenon; aircraft flutter garners the bigger emphasis. Internal flow in fluid
systems experiences the same instabilities. An instability is generally defined as an increasing amplitude
structural response where the fluid force is a function of the structural deflection causing the problem.
The SSME lox system fits the characteristics required to produce instabilities, high density-large
flow velocities, thus, a very high dynamic pressure. Many problems have occurred in this system. The
inlet tee to the lox dome of the main combustion chamber (fig. 56) is a classic example of what can
happen. The tee has a two-blade splitter (flow between, and on each side of, the two vanes) designed to
more evenly distribute the lox flow to the powerhead. On most engines (90 percent) nothing happened.
However, on 10 percent of the engines, a high-frequency, high-amplitude (4,000 Hz, 100 g's) oscillation
occurred. If run long enough, the vanes crack, detuning the structure from the flow, eliminating or
greatly reducing the response. Two types of structural elastic flow interaction are possible: (1) vortex
shedding, and (2) flutter-type instability. Extensive effort was expanded to understand the problem
through a team effort by MSFC and Rocketdyne for approximately 3 years. These efforts included (1)
structural dynamic and static modeling, (2) scale-model and full-scale flow testing, (3) computational
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Table4. SSMEmajorincidentoverview.
Incident
No. Date Test Engine Failure Cutoff Method Damage
31 7/1/87 902-428 2108 OPB injector element braze HPFT redline lower Cont.
crack limit
30 3/27/85 750-259 2308 MCC outlet manifold weld crack HPFP accel Uncont.
29 2/4/85 901-468 0207 FPB manifold crack Power amb. temp. Uncont.
16 7/12/80 SFI0.001 0006 FPB liner and housing burn Observer Uncont.
through
2 8/27/77 901-133 004 FPB housing burn through Observer Uncont.
28 2/14/84 901-436 0108 HPFP coolant liner failure HPFP turbine disch. Uncont.
temp.
23 10/15/81 901-340 0107 HPFP turnaround duct failure Cont.
27 8/27/82 750-175 2208 NPOP discharge duct failure HPOP PBP radial accel. Uncont.
(ultrasonic FM)
26 5/15/82 750-168 0107 OPOV leakage during cutoff Program duration Cont.
25 4/7/82 901-364 2013 HPFP kaiser hat nut failure HPOP PBP radial accel. Uncont.
24 2/12/82 750-160 0110F Fuel injector blockage (ice) PFP turbine disc. temp. Uncont.
8 6/10/78 902-112 0101 Eng. inlet fuel supply blockage HPFP SPED Uncont.
(N2)
22 9/21/81 902-249 0204 HPFP turbine blade failure HPFP radial accel. Uncont.
5 12/1/77 901-147 0103 HPFP turbine blade failure HPOP radial accel. Uncont.
4 11/17/77 9020095 0002 HPFP turbine blade failure HPOP radial accel. Uncont.
21 9/2/81 750-148 0110 MN injector lox post failure HPOP turbine Cont.
discharge temp.
20 7/15/81 901-331 2108 MN injector lox post failure HPOP turbine Cont.
discharge temp.
17 7/23/80 902-198 2004 MN injector lox post failure HPOP turbine Cont.
discharge temp.
7 6/5/78 901-183 0005 MN injector lox post failure HPOP turbine radial Cont.
accel.
6 3/31/78 901-173 0002 MN injector Iox post failure HPOP turbine Cont.
19 1/28/81 901-307 0009 FPB injector Iox post failure Prog. C/O Cont.
18 7/30/80 901-284 0010 MCC PC Lee jet failure HPOP PBP rad. accel. Uncont.
15 11/4/79 SF6-003 2002 Nozzle steerhorn failure during Cut by eng. 0008 HPOP Uncont.
C/O turbine sec. seal pr.
13 5/14/79 750-041 0201 Nozzle steerhorn failure HPFP turbine disch. Uncont.
temp.
14 7/2/79 SF6-001 2002 MFV housing crack HPFP turbine temp. Uncont.
12 12/27/78 901-225 2001 MOV fire due to fretting HPFP turbine disch. Uncont.
temp.
11 12/6/78 901-222 0007 Hex coil failure Hex disch, temp. Uncont.
9 7/18/78 902-120 0101 HPOP capacitance probe rub HPOP PBP axial accel. Uncont.
1 3/24/77 901-110 0003 HPOP prim. seal failure HPOP speed Uncont.
3 9/8/77 901-136 0004 HPOP No. 3 bearing Facility Uncont.
10 10/3/78 902-132 0006 MOV improperly installed MCC PC lower limit Uncont.
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Figure56. SSMElox domeinlet tee.
fluid flow analysis,(4) fatigue and fracturemechanicsanalysis,and (5) structuraldynamicandstatic
testing.Theseefforts led to the conclusionthat the basicinstability wasessentiallyvortex shedding.
Figure57 showsa typical responseof buzzingandnonbuzzingengines.Thefirst is a spectrumshowing
thevery sharpnarrowbandresonancepeakindicatingan instability. Conductinga correlationanalysis
showsthattheresponseis single-frequencysinusoidal.Thefix consistedof scallopingtheleadingedges
to allow more flow betweenthe bladesand tapering the trailing edgeto eliminate vortex sheets.In
addition, the frequencyof the vanewasraisedslightly, helpingto detunethesystem.Figure 58shows
thefix. Figure57 is a plotof theresponsebeforeandafterthefix.
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One very interesting problem occurred during the investigation. It was thought that by putting a
structural collar on the powerhead dome, the frequency shift would detune the system and, in addition,
provide damping, further reducing the response. The collar was hot-fired on a buzzing engine resulting
not in a reduced response, but a greatly increased oscillation. The dynamic detuning, in reality, became
more finely tuned, creating the increased response.
These lessons stand out: (1) do not allow dynamic tuning in structural flow systems, (2) design
out instabilities, and (3) realize that dynamically tuned systems are very sensitive to very small changes.
In retrospect, it was the very small differences in the trailing edge of the vane, coupled with some
thinning in the duct, that created the buzzer versus the nonbuzzer modal tuning. These differences were
so slight that they were essentially undetectable through normal inspections.
(2) ATD Lox Pump Bearing Wear and Vibration Problem. The ATD lox pump is a replacement
of the currently used Rocketdyne turbopump with a goal of greatly reduced maintenance and operational
cost through redesign using advanced technologies and greatly reducing the number of structural welds.
During early developmental testing on the E-8 hot-fire pump test stand, and later full-engine ground
testing, vibration problems occurred leading to test cutoff or engine shutdown. These vibrations
occurred as a sharp rise in synchronous vibration triggering the health monitoring shutdown systems.
Figure 59 shows a typical high-vibration response in g's of acceleration. With the solution of the high-g
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Figure 59. SSME high-vibration ATD lox pump.
vibration problem, long-duration hot-fire engine testing could commence. As this testing began,
excessive ball bearing wear occurred, exemplified by a rise in the bearing cavity temperature (fig. 60).
With the solution of the bearing wear issue, long-term developmental testing resumed. Initially, some
changes made in attempts to solve the bearing wear resulted in a reintroduction of the high vibration for
one pump. The problem was solved by going back to the original solution for high vibration (tolerances,
etc.). Additional testing uncovered some undesirable vibration sensitivities (not of the high-q engine
cutoff type) that required additional solutions. The next three sections will give a brief summary of the
high vibration, bearing wear, and vibration sensitivities issues that occurred during early ATD lox pump
development. They illustrate the complexity of high-performance machinery development and the
system issues that usually occur. The approach used to solve all these problems utilized a
Government/contractor concurrent engineering team. The team used the standard fault tree approach
with special subteams designed to investigate special legs of the fault tree. Formal action items and logic
diagrams were used to keep the activities focused. About one-third of the total team's time was spent at
Pratt & Whitney. The rest of the effort was worked at the home offices, with a twice-a-week telecon to
track actions and report programs. Concurrent engineering teams using fault trees are an excellent
approach for handling these types of complex problems. See reference 65 for details.
74
0 6
.=4
o_ ,,ulf'_-'"'- J_" _'--" ,- "-•_
°2
"r
S .... i ........ i .... i .... i ....
0 200 400
Time from Start Signal Sec
Normal Bearing
Temperature Rise
8
L_.d J
_4
A T Event
0_2;
-r
8! .... , ........ , ........ , ....
0
with rotor (+.016")
,..-mf=-_...
6o0 • Preload spring; /f eLF
Provides axial load /
needed to produce J
radial stiffness --_
• Damper seal: ,_ _////
Attenuates rotor | __.///"
vibratory response, i
Also produces radial 7'1 _Ji--''_=-
stiffness like a bearing.-/ /
• Ball bearing: provides j
200 400 600
Time from Start Signal Sec rotor radial support.Desired cross-corner
High Heat Ioadpath shown.
Generation Event
• Radial deadband:
clearance that allows
bearing to move axially
i_l • ]l utl _
_ Bearing ----_
ATandAP
10
8
0
0
Stennis History of PEBB Delta-T Spikes
1 _ 03-1C 904-154 2 "'rr-:]'°'02-3 904-156 3-'_'-05-2C 904-157
4 _ 03-1D 904-159 5 --t'_-"05-2B 901-718
904-157 V
(05-2C)
904-159 ._,
(03-1 D) 904-156
=_ (02-3)
,'=m_ .... .
50 100 150 200 250
!
904-154
(03-1C) i_ _ '
I II,= I,
: 901-718
(05-2B)
I
300 350 400 450 5OO 550
Time sec
Figure 60. SSME ATD lox pump temperature excursions.
?5
(3) ATD High-G Vibration. Initially, thesourceof the vibration problem was unclear. The pump
end of the lox pump had a damper seal in parallel (adjacent) to the ball bearing support (fig. 61). The
damper was installed to prevent whirl; however, in achieving the damping, a stiffness level of
approximately 400k lb/in was produced. This kept the ball bearing from contacting the housing until
forces developed that would overcome the damping seal stiffness. This split in rotor support stiffness
created a split force between the damper seal and the ball bearing. Several items were proposed: (1) loss
of damping in the damper seal, (2) loss of stiffness in the damper seal, (3) nonparallel housing producing
bearing tilt, and (4) beating clearance.
ATD-HIGH PRESSURE OXIDIZER TURBOPUMP
piston
PEBB dea( dynamics
PEBB
pre
Damper seal
Inducer cavitation
Figure 61. SSME ATD lox pump damper seal/bearing.
As work progressed, it was decided that the bearing sleeve had to be tapered such that the bear-
ing did not tilt negatively. Figure 62 shows how the stiffness of the bearing is greatly reduced as a func-
tion of negative bearing tilt. Also, it became clear that the bearing clearance was too tight, possibly cre-
ating bearing axial hang-up. A pump was modified to ensure a flat bearing-to-housing contact and wider
clearance to prevent hang-up. This pump ran vibration-free until it was pushed slightly outside its
operational parameters by varying the net suction specific (NSS) pressure (increasing hydrodynamic
forces). When pushed hard, this pump also experienced high synchronous vibration.
While this activity was progressing, a parallel activity was being pursued in the MSFC flow
facility to see if a reduction could be made in the impeller hydro forces through inducer changes. The
results showed that a change in clearance had a major effect on the forces, reducing them by up to an
order of magnitude. In addition this change was incorporated in a pump that also had the tilt and
clearance change. This pump configuration had margin for the high-g vibration. Figure 63 is a plot of
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several different pump configurations showing acceleration versus NSS. Notice that the first two fixes
helped the vibration characteristics of the pump; however, the major fix included was the inducer
change, which reduced the hydro forcing function substantially. Later, a pump housing redesign was
made that eliminated the requirement of tapering each bearing sleeve (called stiff housing).
As mentioned previously, after the bearing wear problem was solved one other high-g pump
occurred. Figure 63 shows this response. This high-g response was caused by reducing the bearing
clearance as a potential bearing wear fix. Increasing the clearance back up to the previous value fixed
the problem.
(4) Bearing Wear. With the solution of the high-g vibration problem, bearing distress became an
ATD program-threatening issue. Some bearings were lasting several test with small wear, while others
were wearing within 50 or 100 s. This was exemplified by a rise in bearing cavity temperature. Figure
64 is a plot of the bearing cavity discharge temperature showing the temperature increase when the
bearing starts to wear. Figures 65 and 66 are pictures of a bearing race showing the wear tracks. The
balls become so hot that they turn dark. After many attempts to isolate the wear cause, a pump was built
with silicon nitride balls while keeping the steel races. This pump showed no bearing wear. As a margin
enhancement, special inner-race cooling and outer-race-guided cages were added. No bearing wear has
occurred since making these changes. The story of interest is how the solution did evolve. This problem
dramatically illustrates the many interacting factors/parameters in a complex nonlinear dynamic prob-
lem. Bearing sets have accumulated 20,000 s of hot firings without any apparent balls or race wear.
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Figure 65. SSME ATD lox pump bearing wear.
Figure 66. SSME ATD lox pump bearing wear.
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There are two generic sources of bearing wear: (1) heat generation and (2) heat dissipation.
There is always heat generation. The concern is excessive heat generation. Not enough heat dissipation
will allow even a nominal heat generation bearing to overheat. Thus, the fault tree, or failure tree, had to
list all the potential causes under each from lubrication, materials, to coolant. To illustrate how fault tree
analysis can lead down blind paths until the data are collected and understood, the pump that ran the
longest period of time had a different prelubrication treatment and still had lubrication present when the
pump was disassembled. As a result, lubrication experts were called in and many tests were conducted
on lubricant application before it was ruled out as a cause. A second blind alley occurred because the
bearing rig test had demonstrated long life. These tests did not have the damper seal and had parallel
bearing support with good bearing loads. It was thought that the damper seal caused the bearing to
unload or that the bearing was tilting due to lack of load. The damper seal acted as a rotor support. Two
pumps were built, one with no damper seal by the bearing and the other with a small clearance and an
eccentric load. Both bearings wore quickly. By then, time was running out so the advanced-technology
silicon nitride balls were installed in a pump. This pump ran many tests'without ball wear. The team was
simultaneously working on heat dissipation and, therefore, also added jet cooling (lox) to the bearings at
the contact point and outer-race-guided cages. Both designs theoretically increased the bearing wear
margins.
Silicon nitride balls alleviated the heat generation and heat dissipation aspects of the problem.
From the heat generation standpoint, the balls are 70 percent lighter, hence lower centrifugal forces
occur. These balls have a lower coefficient of friction, therefore, heat dissipation is better. Theoretically,
to date, the total improvement of silicon nitride balls cannot be explained; however, approximately 10
pumps have been assembled and hot-fire tested without ball wear. Two pumps have over 20,000 s each
without bearing balls or race wear. 65 66
(5) ATD Vibration Sensitivity. When the problem of bearing and high vibration of the lox turbo-
pump was solved, extensive full-duration and margin testing of the turbopump on the shuttle main
engine were accomplished. During this testing, vibration level shifts occurred that were a concern; how-
ever, these levels have not led to any early engine cuts or caused any known hardware damage. There is
more than one category of these responses; however, the main concern has been the category II
(vibration step increases by a factor of two or more) and category III (vibration step decreases of the
same magnitude).
Figure 67 shows a typical category II type response. Notice the step in g level from less than 1 g
to greater than 2 g's. These steps are not present on every test. Figure 68 is the end-to-end plots of
several tests showing the variability of the phenomenon. There have been two major thrusts as potential
causes. As discussed previously, the pump-end damper seal supports the shaft for a certain range of
forces before the pump-end ball bearing stiffness becomes effective. Until then, the pump mode (one of
the rotor criticals) is near the pump operating speed. This would make the pump sensitive to force per-
turbations until the ball bearing clearance is reduced to zero. The second thrust has to do with the roller
bearing and its support structure on the turbine end. Hot-fire data have clearly shown that the hot gas is
causing the structure to snap. Figure 68 shows the temperature rise in the cavity, indicating a structural
shift. Also, impedance of the roller bearing hardware indicates that the roller bearing is slipping. If the
stiffness of the support is greatly reduced, the turbine mode will reduce in frequency and tune with the
pump speed, resulting in high g's of vibration. A simulation was developed that showed this potential.
How the loss of stiffness occurs is still an unanswered question. With these changes, the vibration sensi-
tivity has been eliminated. The lox pump now has over 100,000 s of ground testing and two shuttle
flights without any bearing wear or vibration.
(6) 2308 Failure. A different kind of structural flow interaction occurred on engine 2308. In this
case, the hydrogen inlet tee to the main combustion chamber, which provides liquid hydrogen for nozzle
cooling, developed a crack resulting in loss of the engine. A movie camera trained on the engine during
static firing clearly showed the whole sequence. This was not a flow instability, but a classical forced
oscillation resulting in fatigue failure after 20,000 s of hot fire time in a total of approximately 100 tests.
Figure 69 shows the tee splitter arrangement and the failure location. The failure contour plot shows the
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Figure 69. SSME hydrogen inlet tee 2308.
sharpness of the stress concentration. Stress risers occur from weld beads, sharp corners, etc., and can
lead to problems. This failure focused attention on fatigue failures and stress risers, resulting in a struc-
tural audit of the total engine system, the next topic. In order to totally understand the 2308 failure,
several activities were accomplished: (1) 3-D structural static and dynamic models (original analysis
was 2-D), (2) static and dynamic testing, (3) strain gauging of the splitter in hot fire static test, (4)
materials testing, (5) improved flow analysis, and (6) special flow testing, water table, and special full-
scale hardware. As was evidenced in this problem, 2-D analysis is not sufficient to account for the stress
distributions and concentrations. Although expensive to conduct, 3-D analysis of these kinds of
geometry is required, as well as detailed static and dynamic testing and hot fire test stress instrumenta-
tion.
(7) SSME Structural Audit. The 2308 failure showed that many areas such as splitter duct tee
interfaces were susceptible to fatigue. Most of these hardware areas had inadequate analysis/test predic-
tions. The failure investigation team recommended that a structural audit be conducted with a focus on
long-term durability through identifying generic structural weaknesses (analysis, test, etc.) and to insti-
tute the corrective actions necessary to enhance the confidence in flight reliability by accurate life pre-
dictions. This effort was started prior to the STS-51L accident. After the accident, greater emphasis was
placed on its completion to satisfy the total recertification of the shuttle, including a complete reanalysis
of FEMA/critical items lists (CIL) and hazards.
The audit process was carried out by a full-time independent team of Rocketdyne engineers with
oversight review by an MSFC team. Initially, the two teams separated the engine parts into categories of
risks according to parameters affecting hardware life. Essentially, three broad groupings were obtained:
(1) parts that were criticality 1 on FEMA/CIL with potential short-term life issues, (2) parts that had
long-term life issues, and (3) parts with no concerns. Obviously, category (3) parts were eliminated from
the audit process. Category (1) had high priority, with category (2) to follow after completion of
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category(1). The processwasclear for category(1) and(2) parts.The total analysis/testreports,etc.,
would be reviewed indepth to determine the adequacyof hardwarelifetime predictions, etc. This
includeda review of thematerialsproperties,environmentsdefinition (flow, thermal,acoustics,vibra-
tion, etc.) dynamicmodel,dynamicanalysis,stressmodels,andstressanalysis.It wasrecognizedearly
by the SSME project that a large numberof weldson the enginewas a prime concernin the areaof
flow-cycle fatigue,high-cyclefatigue,andinspectabilityand,therefore,lifetime description.This area,
weld assessment,wasassignedto a specialteamandwasnot includedin the audit(it will bediscussed
in thenextsection).
As an aid to the auditengineers,check-offsheetsweredevelopedfor eachdiscipline review. A
copy of thesecheck-off sheetswasavailableat both RocketdyneandMSFC.Formal actionitems and
action closureswere installed.Deviation approvalreports(DAR) were written for all parts that were
founddeficient.Severalareaswerefoundwith inadequate(1) materialspropertiesdata,(2) environment
definition, (3) dynamicanalysis,and(4) stressanalysis.Thisresultedin materialtestingto obtainprop-
erties, environmental testing, special hot-fire measurements,new 3-D dynamic and static analysis,
redesigneffortsof critical parts,andDAR's limiting useof certainpartswereissued(sevenducts).
Are structuralor otherauditsnecessaryto obtaingoodhardware?In mostcases,theyprobably
are;however, theprocesscould begreatlyreduced,if not eliminated,with proper in-line reviews.The
check sheetscould be used by all disciplines. Systememphasisis important. Understandingkey
parametersandtheir sensitivitiesthoughanalysisandtestismandatory.
A Rocketdynedocumentwas publishedthat describesthe audit processin detail, the parts
audited,action itemsassigned,andgeneralrecommendations.64The auditwasvery useful. It wasused
as a refresherfor FEMA/CIL activities. Updatedproceduresand criteria manualshave resulted.The
individual auditsareexcellentreferencematerial for materialsreviews(MR's), etc.,occurringduring
manufacturingbecausedrawings,analysis,etc.,areall collated together.The materialscharacteristics
updateandredesignto eliminateproblemareasarestill in work. Theresultsof the structuralaudit and
thereturnto flight activitiesfollowing STS-51Lledto areassessmentof theFMEA/CIL andtheneedto
assessthestructuralweldsof theSSME.
(8) Weld Assessment.The weld assessmentwas accomplishedby a Rocketdyneteam with
reviewsby aMFSC team.Theareasof concernwere:
1. Weldoffset
2. Weldnotchfactors
3. Materialspropertiesdegradation
4. Root-sideinspectability
5. High-cyclefatiguecritical flaw sizeinspectability
6. Manufacturing
7. Failuresandlessons.
Becausemanyof theseweldswereidentified ascriticality 1 failures, it wasnecessarythat the
risk associatedwith eachweld be understood.This meant that each weld (criticality 1) had to be
analyzedandunderstoodtheareasof:
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1. Processcontrol
2. Materialsusage
3. Inspectability
4. Fracturemechanics
a. Low cycle
b. High cycle
5. Environments
a. Thermal
b. Corrosion
c. Loads.
The SSMEdesignevolvedfrom baselinedesignrequirementsto minimize weightandleak paths
while producing the Isp and thrust required for performance. This baselined design philosophy was:
1. Lightweight plus minimum leak paths
2. Wrought, welded structure versus castings
3. Manufacturing technology plus cost
4. Subassembly welds versus numerical machined.
The baselined design had no "fracture control" requirements. A fracture mechanics requirement
plan was established in 1973 after the basic design was complete and released. In this plan, 71 parts (150
welds) were identified as fracture critical. Instead of redesigning parts, the plan was implemented by
NDE improvements. In addition, prior to STS-51L, welds were selectively reassessed, including (1)
weld wire control and verification, (2) electron beam weld design, (3) vendor welding and inspection
processing, (4) residual stress in as-welded welds, (5) geometric variables-mismatch and local stress
risers, and (6) material properties upgrades. The CIL was expanded after STS-51L to identify all critical
welds. A weld assessment program was established as a systematic, comprehensive evaluation of all
critical welds to support the CIL and evaluation of future changes.
Teams were developed at Rocketdyne to carry out the activity with a review team designated at
MSFC. The scope of this activity was major. The program objectives were: prepare rationale for reten-
tion for all welds prior to flight resumption based on reassessment of structural adequacy, fabrication
process, and supporting NDE; identify and implement corrective actions as required; and establish
a weld data base of selected design, analysis, fabrication, NDE parameters, and operation conditions as
a rapid screening tool for future weld issues. It is not possible to convey the real magnitude of the
effort. All the risk assessments were completed and results documented. The approach used is shown in
figure 70.
The total number of welds by weld type, root side access, and high and low fatigue NDE for each
subsystem are shown in figure 71. The results of the study, which was the most comprehensive and
detailed assessment in the history of any program, showed that all welds were acceptable for flight
resumption. The assessment provided relative ranking of most critical welds so that remedial efforts
could be focused at the highest payoff.
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Weld Assessment Program Objective
• Prepare rationale for retention for all welds prior to flight resumption based on reassessment of
structural adequacy, fabrication process, and supporting NDI.
• Identify and Implement corrective actions as required.
• Establish a weld database of selected design, analysis, fabrication, and NDI parameters and
operating conditions for all welds as a rapid screening tool for future weld issues.
• Define FMENCIL welds-part name, part number, weld number, weld type, class, material, filler, and
heat treat.
• Review and summarize structural analysis-- operating conditions, factors of safety, proof factors,
and life.
• Review and summarize fabrication process_automatic, manual, single or muItipass, and
other special conditions.
• Review and summarize NDI processes, related detectable flaw size and requirements flowdown--visual,
penetrant, radiographic, and ultrasonic. Specifically identify welds without root side penetrant inspection.
• Calculate critical initial flaw size for all FMEAJCIL critical welds-compare to NDI detectable flaw size.
• Summarize operational test history--units, starts, and seconds.
• Photographs of sectioned hardware (if available).
• Summarize other supporting data_lab tests, hot-fire data, and UCR or MR history.
• Identify and implement corrective action--NDI, and planning or design changes.
• Prepare rationale for retention.
• Review and approve in-house and with NASA team.
• Documented results in the SSME weld assessment report--RSS-8756 CIL summary includes weld type,
class, and root side accessibility for penetrant inspection and detectability of critical flaw size
Figure 70. SSME engine welds and NDI.
The high- and low-cycle fatigue welds with unverifiable roots were cleared for flight by one or
more of the rationales shown in figure 72.
Figure 73 is an example of one weld to show the complexity of the problem. Notice that critical
flaw sizes for low- and high-cycle fatigue are shown, along with the inspection technique and detectable
flaw size. A drawing of the part is included. Documented in conjunction with these summary sheets is a
several page write-up of process control, inspections, fracture mechanics, etc., and the rationale/risk
assessment that allows the hardware to be used if the critical flaw size is not inspectable. The total
documentation is approximately 20,000 pages.
The audit has resulted in some redesigned parts having better environmental definition, improved
inspections, and improved processing. Clearly, fracture control should be implemented in future high
performance systems and indeed was implemented on the ATD program. Welds are a potential problem
requiring design (1) inspectability, (2) reduced stress fields (thicker weld interfaces), (3) elimination
where possible, and (4) robotic processing, etc.
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FMEA/CIL Weld Statistic
Root Side
Accost;
i J
LRU Total GTAW EBW Other Yes No HCFCIFS LCFCIFS
(1) NDE NDE
Comb devices
Turbomachinery
Pneu controls
Prop valves
Actuators
Igniter, sensors
Lines, ducts
POGO system
Joints
Total
Percentage
Percentage without
LOX posts
Notes:
1,288 588 I 93 607( 2) 232 1,056
801 662 I 117 22 313 488
1 0 I 1 0 0 1
65 24 I 38 3 8 57
5 0 I 5 0 0 5
186 25 I 149 12 0 186
701 611 I 89 1 210 491
115 115 I 0 0 1 114
3 0 I 0 3 0 0
3,165 2,025 I 492 648 767 2,398
64% I 15% 21% 24% 76%
79% I 19% 2% 30% 70%
1. Includes castings, optional welds and allowable alternate configurations
2. Main injector has 600 inertia welded LOX posts
Figure 71. SSME fatigue rationale.
840 732
187 43
0 0
26 4
0 0
68 51
310 64
3 1
0 0
1,434 895
45% 28%
33% 12%
Rationale For Retention
• Welds where the largest undetected flaw size > CIFS were cleared for flight by the
integrated weld assessment which included
- The probability of detection, if less than 90% reliability and 95% confidence
- Size, Type, and location of critical flaw
- Surface, LCF CIFS assessed as more critical than subsurface, HCH CIFS
- CIFS relative to typical weld pass thickness
- Proof test
- Process controls
- Design validation
- Factor of safety and life
• Operational history
- Number of units/total starts/totel time
- Fleet leader
- Number of units greater than 50% fleet leader
- Hardware sectioning/inspection results
- UCR history
• Engineering judgment (review process)
- What is our experience with this material, process, and configuration from a
fabrication and operational viewpoint?
- How well do we know the operating environment?
- What is the credibility of the worst case consequence of failure?
Figure 72. SSME example summary sheet.
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Figure 73. Example weld.
(9) Engine 2206 Low Pressure Fuel Duct Bellows Failure. Engine 2206 was an engine with 90
starts, 31,853 s, and the equivalent of 1,054 gimbal cycles. During hot-fire testing, the low-pressure fuel
duct ruptured and started leaking. Figure 74 shows the duct, the engine duct configuration, and the
location of the 4-in by 1-in fracture. The low-pressure fuel duct contains bellows installed to allow the
engine to gimbal for control. The input to this duct is the low-pressure fuel pump rigidly affixed to the
orbiter, therefore, the requirement for the bellows. The bellows have internal tripods mounted to the two
duct attachment ends of the bellows and connected together with a ball and socket type arrangement
(fig. 75). This allows a conjunction with the bellows and the duct to gimbal without extension due to
internal pressure.
Engine 2206 LPF
Duct Bellows Failure
a_. 1/2"_ EyeFul
e,J_" _fpU'e InO_t
Figure 74. SSME duct.
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_Flow Path Section
Figure 75. SSME bellows/gimbal.
The preliminary failure was a high-cycle fatigue failure of one of the legs of the tripods. The
failed tripod allowed the bellows to expand and the failed part to break a piece loose. This part flowed
down stream, impacting the line elbow cresting the rupture and thus the leak. After impacting the duct,
the failed part came to rest on the fuel flowmeter (figure 76). Though the bellows had passed 71/2 h of
vibration testing to the 97-percent level in each axis (each independently run) without fatigue failure, the
Figure 76. SSME impact failure zone.
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part failed in hot fire. Onepossiblecausewasdueto thevibrationcriteriausedfor the vibration testing
thatdid not includeinternal flow excitationbecauseit wasbasedonhot-fire-measuredmechanicaldata
at the ductendsandother locationson the enginesandits parts.This is onelimitation of mechanical
testingbecauseit is not practical to simultaneouslytest flow and mechanicalvibration environments
simultaneouslyin componentverificationtestprograms.Otherpossiblecauses,suchasexcessivegimbal
angle,etc.,werebasicallyruledout.Therealcauseturnedout to behigher-than-predictedstressdueto a
doglegradiusthat wassmallerthanthe specificationrequired,compoundedby a reducedcrosssection
and higher stressconcentration(Kt) due to discrepantfabrication. One other failure of the gimbal
occurredduring DVS testing.The ball and socketsgalled,and one tripod failed. This problemwas
correctedfor the flight bellows.All bellowshavestraightshieldsinsidethebellows to eliminateflow-
inducedinstabilities.Criteria weredevelopedduring the Saturnprogramfor theseshields,thusno flow
instabilitiesof bellowshaveoccurredon theSSMEprogram.
Anotherlessonlearnedfrom theSSMEauditwasthat environmentsshouldbewell understood,
which is not alwayspossibledueto complexities.In this case,everythingwasdonebasically correctly
otherwise.Obviously if thesystemcouldhavebeendesignedwith robustness,manyproblemswould not
haveoccurred,but thiswasprecludedby weightconstraintsandperformancerequirements.
References29 through 66 discusssomeof the aboveand other resulting problems. Other
problemsarecoveredin theappendix.It is clearthatearlydecisionsandarbitraryconstraintsdetermined
the design, its operationalperformance,and cost, reducing the potential for flexibility in design.
Coupling that with the high-performancesystem,costly marginal systemsevolve. A study of the
numerousproblemsdocumentedin the matrix (by projects),the itemsselectedexamplesin references
29 through 66 and this report,demonstratesthehigh costand limited marginsof the hardware.Very
little flexibility existsbeyondthestandardmissionsuntil theredesigneffortsshownarecompleted.How
oneis to achieverobustoptimizedsystemsin thepresentaustereenvironmentis notclear;however,one
canevaluateanypart of the processfrom a systemviewpoint and make improvements.That is the
minimumthatmustbedone.
(10)SSME Conclusions.The SSME is clearly one of the Nation's outstandingengineering
achievements.Although it hasexperiencedmanydevelopmentproblems,they arenot out of proportion
to thetechnologyreadinesslevelat thebeginningof theprogram,coupledwith theextremeperformance
requirementsit wasdrivento achieve,includingoperatingat 109percentof theoriginal designthrustin
order to makeup for someof the performancelossescreatedby othershuttleelements.Through this
evolutionaryhistory, the enginehasbeengreatly ixnproved.A goodexampleof this is shownby the
trendinganalysisof thehigh-pressurepumpsvibrationlevels.Figures77aand77b showtheRocketdyne
lox pump responses,clearly showingtheeffectof thedampingsealintroduction.Figures78a and78b
are the sametype plot for the Pratt & Whitney pump. Notice the sharpchangewith the vibration
problemfix in mid-1992.Thesamebasictrendshaveoccurredfor theflight pumps(figs. 79aand79b).
The final SSME,including its newhigh-pressureturbopumps,shouldbecompletedby theendof
1997andwill eliminatemanyof theproblemsandconcernsof thiswonderfulhighperformanceengine.
Using SSME,the valueof a soundgroundtestprogramhasshownreal merit. Futureprograms
will haveto havesmartergroundtestprogramsthathavelesstestsbut garnersthe information through
betterinstrumentationandmoreinclusivetestparametersbasedon designof experimentstypestatistics,
andsoforth.
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Figure 77a. SSME Rocketdyne lox pump 100-percent trend data.
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3. Solid Rocket Motors/Boosters
a. Characteristics
(1) Baseline. The SRM has evolved to the current configuration, through two earlier versions
that actually flew on the shuttle for several flights, plus two configurations (the filament wound case and
the ASRM) that were canceled before completion. The original motor that flew early space shuttle
flights was replaced with the lightweight, high-performance motor (HPM) in order to gain vehicle
payload capability to orbit. This motor flew until the STS-51L failure when it was replaced by the
redesigned solid rocket motor (RSRM) to eliminate the O-ring problem that caused the STS-51L
accident. The HPM is shown in figure 80. It is 146 inches in diameter, 1,500-inches (125-feet) long, and
has a dry weight of 149,000 lb. Fully loaded, it weighs 1,260,000 lb and has a maximum thrust of
3,600,000 lb, with a maximum internal pressure of 980 lb/in 2. It is composed of 11 steel segments,
including forward and aft domes. The segments are joined using tang and clevis factory joints at the
factory in Utah to form four approximately equal-length segments. The four casting segments are
shipped by rail to the launch site. The motor is assembled at the launch site using the field joints and is
then assembled with the SRB parts, then with the other shuttle elements. The SRB parts include at least
the aft skirt, the forward skirt, the recovery parachutes, control gyros, SRB-to-ET attach struts, and
separation motors. The total system is shown in figure 80 and the combined dry weight of the SRM and
SRB is 193,000 lb.
The RSRM was essentially the same as the HPM, but had features added that solved the prob-
lems that led to the STS-51L failure. The thrust profile (same as the HPM's thrust profile) is tailored to
maintain maximum dynamic pressure constraints and maximum acceleration during the latter part of the
burn time. The first redesign change was in the field joint configuration, which went from a single clevis
to a double clevis and an additional O-ring (fig. 81). It also had J-flaps designed in the insulation for the
field joint that provided additional joint sealing. This J-flap was made by extending the propellant-to-
motor insulation and changing the end configuration (fig. 82). Other improvements were made during
the down time such as the nozzle configuration, and the ignitor.
The SRB system was designed to be recovered using a parachute system composed of a pilot,
drogue, and three main chutes. The main chutes went through two disreefings in order to ensure opti-
mum performance and to reduce deployment loads. The concept was not to impact the prime SRM/SRB
hardware design for recovery loads, but to accept hardware attrition if excessive damage occurred. Fig-
ure 83 shows the recovery system package for flight. Once recovered, the system had to be thoroughly
cleaned of the salt water and other impurities, inspected for damage and flaws, proof tested again for
flight safety, and then refilled with the solid propellant. This was necessary due to the harsh reentry
thermal and acoustic environments, water impact, and towing loads, etc.
During the 1980's, with the need to increase performance, the SRM programs started the design
and development of a filament-wound case. This program went through extensive development, includ-
ing a structural test of many specimens and the case. Various problems, including cost and a field joint
design susceptible to the STS-51L failure mode, led to program cancellation.
(2) ASRM. Based on the recommendation of the Rogers Commission following the STS-51L
accident, the development of an alternate SRM was started. Advantages of the new start were used to
enhance shuttle performance. This program was canceled for two basic reasons: (1) the RSRM reliabil-
ity was demonstrated to be high, and (2) the NASA budget needed the ASRM funds to meet goals and
conduct other programs.
The ASRM (fig. 84) was also 125-ft long and slightly larger in diameter than the RSRM at 150
in. With a weight of 1,220,000 lb of propellant and 134,000 lb of structure, the total weight was
1,350,000 lb. It had a longer burn time and higher performance. The thrust profile was tailored, as was
the RSRM, and burned for 140 s. The field joint was a different concept, being a bolted configuration
(fig. 85). The gimbaled nozzle was also redesigned to solve some of the problems associated with the
RSRM nozzle, such as erosion pocketing.
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b. Evoloti0n/Creativity/Innovation. Designing the SRB/SRM to maximum/minimum loads
instead of time-consistent loads was an approach that saved redesigns and cost as the shuttle system
evolved and loads increased. This approach early in the program was optimal since the dry weight of the
SRM/SRB to payload to orbit was approximately 8 to 1. This meant that approximately 8 lb of structural
weight would only penalize the performance 1 lb. Late in the development program as loads increased,
time consistent loads could be used to reduce stresses, thus no redesign or weight increases were
required as the loads increased.
In the process of reducing operational costs, it was decided to recover the SRB's. Recovering
these elements meant that several technologies had to be expanded and applied to this mission phase.
Reentry aerodynamic heating drove many aspects of the thermal protection system (TPS). Special test-
ing techniques were required to quantify the induced environments and verify the TPS. Reentry aero-
dynamics were in the same category due to the large and fast-changing angle of attack. Reentry acous-
tics, due to the tail-first reentry and the long cavity coupled with the large varying angle of attack, were
in the same category. Water impact on the booster was a major technological challenge due to both the
speed and angles of impact. Additionally, the water entry angle created air pockets around the motor that
collapse with large forces. Understanding and characterizing the sea state was a fundamental part of the
water impact loads. Various type drop-test programs were created, including the need for pressure
scaling to handle the cavity collapse. The Naval Ordnance Laboratory (NOL) pressure facility was used
for this. The system problem of dealing with various initial conditions, from SRB separation (shuttle
trajectory variations, separation motor variations, etc.) coupled with the SRB mass properties variation,
the atmosphere characteristics, and the parachute system, led to the Monte Carlo techniques to define the
conditions for parachute deployment, acoustic and thermal. A technique (innovation) was developed for
accomplishing the reentry aero acoustics testing in a continuous-flow wind tunnel where the angle of
attack could be varied (swept) real-time. Spectral analysis was accomplished, dictating the angles of
attack where the acoustics were tuned and amplified. Once the designed angle of attack was determined,
the system dwelled on that angle of attack and produced the design data.
Describing the dynamics of solid propellant was just as technically challenging in that its char-
acteristics were very nonlinear (viscoelastic) as a function of propellant temperature, bore pressure, and
oscillation amplitude. For application in analysis, a mechanical analogy was developed based on pro-
pellant coupon testirtg.
The ablative nozzle of the RSRM presents a major technological challenge in that it is a poly-
meric composite that chemically decomposes from thermal and structural response. This problem is
nonlinear, interactive, and multidisciplinary in nature, which requires a totally new innovative approach
to formulate the problem that couples the equations of energy, mass transport, and momentum, and to
solve the equations simultaneously.
The use of the double clevis field joint along with the third O-ring for the RSRM was unique and
practical since it allowed the use of all the case material already bought for the program and provided a
joint that opened no more than 5 mils, whereas the SRM joint opened up to 35 mils. The case-to-pro-
pellant J-seal over the field joint was also innovative.
Dynamic modeling of the redesigned solid rocket booster (RSRB)/RSRM was very complex due
to several factors: (1) nonlinear propellant stiffness, (2) high internal pressure stretching and ballooning
the case, (3) pressure effects on the radial case stiffness, and (4) interface constraints (SRB-to-ET and
SRB-to-MLP). Numerous nonlinear viscoelastic propellant tests were run to characterize the propellant
modulus. Not only was the motor tested as a part of the full-up and 1/4-scale dynamic test, but it was
tested 1/4 scale in three different configurations as an element: (1) free-free; (2) horizontal on the SRB-
to-ET attach struts and forward thrust post, unpressurized; and (3) configuration No. (2) pressurized.
c. Problem Examples. Many problems occurred during the development of the SRB/SRM,
RSRB/RSRM, and the ASRM until program cancellation. A few were unique and will be highlighted
here.
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(1) ReentryProblems.Theseparationof theSRB'sfrom theshuttlevehiclethroughtherecovery
in theoceanhasexperiencedmanyproblems.Thisphaseof theSRBis verycomplexandhasnumerous
interactionswith the launchportion of the shuttle flight. In fact, this is a classical systemsinterac-
tion/designproblem.TheSRMwasnot designedfor thereentry/recoveryeventsin aclassicalsense,but
is assessedfor attrition againstlaunch(ascent)designrequirements.This allows pushingthe margins
close,acceptingsomeattritionandrefurbishmentfor reflight aslongasit canbeshownto besafefor the
next flight with a factor of four on life. The separation,reentry,water impact,andrecoveryare funda-
mentalto successfulrecoveryandreuse.
Problemshaveoccurredin the areasof reentry acoustics,reentry thermal, parachutetiming,
parachuteloads,parachutedeployment(extractionfrom the nosecone),water impact loads,and SRB
tow back.The mostextensivelosswasflight STS-4wherethewaterimpactparachutereleaseg-switch
separatedoneleg of eachchuteat noseconeseparation.Both SRB'swerelost dueto the resultinghigh
impact velocities.Themalfunctioningof the switchwasdueto externalshockloadsfrom thepyrotech-
nics for separationcoupledwith marginalg-switchsettings.
As hasbeenmentioned,thereentryphaseis highlycoupledto the launchphase.To illustratethis
coupling, severaldifferentareasandproblemsthathaveoccurredduring flights arepresented.In order
to do this, variouscomponentsof the SRBneedto beunderstood.The SRBis composedof the SRM,
which includesthe ignitor, thenozzle,andthepropellant.The motor is built up from 11different seg-
ments,4 of which are assembledat the factory (factory joints) into 4 resulting segments.These4
segmentsareassembledat the launchsite (fig. 86). The SRBis composedof all the additionalparts
integratedwith theSRM to produce the thrusting elements,etc. (fig. 86). The additional parts are
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parachutes, aft skirt, APU system, rate gyros, separation motors, range safety system, tunnels, SRB-to-
ET attachment struts, forward skirt, nose cone, and SRB-to-launch pad attachments and separation bolts
for the shuttle system. In addition, a thermal curtain is attached between the aft skirt and nozzle to
protect all components contained in the aft skirt during ascent flight. This curtain is designed to break
away during water impact in order to lower loads and not damage the nozzle.
The thermal curtain design has been interesting. In wind tunnel testing to derive reentry acoustics
environments, it was discovered that the curtain would flutter and break up. During development flights,
it was decided not to design a fix for this problem, due to complexity and cost, but to accept the failure
during reentry, as long as ascent could be verified to be safe. The curtain has failed during reentry on
every flight, evidenced by the jump in internal temperatures that are measured inside the cavity between
the skirt and nozzle. Insulation is used to protect these parts for this environment increase. The heat loss
is a function of angle of attack and the separation apogee. Due to the variation in the SRB separation
conditions, angle of attack, and H (altitude), there have been three flights with hydrazine fires caused by
reentry environments failing the hydrazine line. This fire increases the normal reentry thermal
environments, damaging specific components. The ASRM further aggravated this problem due to its
higher performance, longer burn time, increasing velocity at separation by 20 percent. Since this is a
factor of 2 in terms of thermal environments velocity cubed, major concerns existed for redesigning the
system to handle these environments.
Figure 87 attempts to capture this coupling between the various events. It starts with the ascent
trajectory and its variations due to mission differences and to parameter uncertainties. These data
become input data for the reentry trajectory analysis. This is usually accomplished using a Monte Carlo
statistical analysis approach. The reentry trajectory determines the loads during parachute deployment,
reentry, and water impact. Reference 39 discusses the water impact loads problem.
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The parachuteshavehad loadsproblemsassociatedwith sequencing,reefing, anddeployment
out of the forward skirt. Reentryacousticswere a major designconcern.The reentry acousticsare
causedby an edgetoneacrossthe nozzlethat resonateswith the motor cavity. The SRB reentersthe
atmospheretail first andbroadsided,with varying anglesof attackthat induce theseedgetones.Two
distinctareasof thermalenvironmentsexist,theexternalandtheinternalafterthethermalcurtainfailure
dueto flutter.Severalflights havehadinstrumentationthathasquantifiedthesedata.
(2) Nozzle O-Rings. In the summerof 1995,the ablativenozzlesectionswere found to have
bluedor scorchedO-ringsbetweenthenozzlesegments.Figure 88 is a crosssection/schematicof the
RSRM nozzle showing the assemblypoints andthe O-rings.The assemblypoints arecalled nozzle
internaljoints. Whenthesebluedor scorchedO-ringswerefoundduringdisassemblyandrefurbishment
after a shuttleflight, it wasdecidedto delaythenextshuttleflight until theproblemwasunderstood.A
team was formed to investigate, understand, and recommend a solution to the problem. This was accom-
plished in record time.
Throat Support Assembly
_Bearing Assembly
_ _l_llrd _tll Cone Assembiy
Figure 88. SRM nozzle configuration.
The problem was caused by compressed air trapped during the close-out/transition process in the
vicinity of the sealant backfill (RTV) close-out/transition locations. It was believed to have been
aggravated by a process change to deeper RTV back fill, which increased the gas path incidence and
severity. Where the air was trapped created a blow hole in the RTV that provided a gas path to the
O-ring (fig. 89).
The team came up with a procedure change that would eliminate the problem on future builds;
however, nozzles were already assembled and in the field and on the shuttle that needed repair. A proce-
dure was developed and certified to take out the original RTV and reinstall it, eliminating the close out
blow holes above the joint inflection points. This repair was implemented for shuttle vehicle STS-69
RSRM's on the MLP.
(3) Aft Skirt. One major problem that has occurred on the SRB was two failures of the aft skirt
during structural testing at approximately 1.28 times limit load, thus not meeting the 1.4 safety factor
criteria.
The space shuttle SRB aft skirt failure illustrates the limitations of analysis/modeling. Early
shuttle loads analyses conducted, using simplified models of the launch pad and the SRB skirt, produced
a set of loads thought to be accurate for the prelaunch SSME thrust buildup phase of launch. It was
understood that a major skirt load would arise from the vehicle weight combined with the SSME
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thrust-induced load (figure 90). At full thrust, the four holddown posts away from the orbiter are loaded
in compression, not only from weight but also from the vehicle bending due to the SSME thrust. What
was not understood was the sensitivity of the local weld stress near the holddown post to the pad stiff-
ness. Figure 91 is a stress field plot of stress amplitude versus circumferential location for one-half of
• Aft Skirt Post With Axial, Radial & Tangential Load
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Figure 90. SRB aft skirt.
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the symmetrical skirt showing the large peak at the weld for different load variations. Figure 92 is a
detailed finite element stress analysis localized around the weld failure point, showing the large stress
intensity at the weld near the bottom of the skirt.
Part of the loads sensitivity of the aft skirt is due to the holddown mechanism, which is com-
posed of the spherical beating, bushing, and aft skirt shoe. The bushing is offset so that the mating of the
SRB to the pad could be enhanced. Since the aft skirt load is a function of the radial displacement of the
skirt due to the post deflection, this symmetry can be used to prebias the skirt post inward, reducing the
effect of the applied load and thus increasing the structural margin. The approach is currently being used
on shuttle flights to increase the margins.
In addition, a lot of effort has been expended by United Boosters Technologies, Inc. (USBI) and
MSFC engineers to design and verify a fix to relieve the stress concentration caused by the radial bend-
ing at the forging weld interface. The load concentration, as seen on.figure 92, shows that the radial
movement of the very stiff holddown post forging causes the bending in the skin at the weld near the
post. In order to distribute this load through more of the skin and bridge, the weld (a simple bracket) was
designed and built to accomplish this task (fig. 93). A bone yard skirt was taken and cut into four seg-
ments to verify the design. Figure 94 shows how a test segment was cut from the skirt including the test
setup. The first segment was tested to failure without the fix to verify that the segment would indeed
match the two total skirt test failures. With this accomplished, two segments had the fix installed and
tested to failure. The fix reduced the stress locally by a factor of two, thus restoring and surpassing the
safety factor requirement. To date, the fix has not been implemented for flight but is ready if needed.
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(4) Parachute Release G-Switch Failure. A very interesting problem occurred on STS-4. The
parachute G-switch activated early on both SRB's, releasing the chute from each SRB, resulting in a loss
of both the SRB's. The G-switch was installed to release one of the two parachute risers at water impact,
enchancing SRB recovery. In this case, the switches were activated during the time of frustum severance
before chute deployment during the atmospheric reentry phase. The severance is accomplished using a
linear-shaped charge. Figure 95 shows the frustum chute package and linear-shaped charge. The
G-switch was mounted to the SRB skirt after the linear-shaped charge on the leA firewall, which was
mounted on the forward skirt reaction ring (fig. 96). The problem occurred in this manner. The linear-
shaped charge caused a shock wave in the SRB skirt, which excited the reaction ring in its first canti-
lever mode of 85 Hz. This drove the IEA, hence the G-switch. The G-switch natural frequency was near
70 Hz and should have been critically damped. The G-switch response triggered the chute attach bolt,
hence the loss of the chute performance and the SRB' s. The first three shuttle flights (six SRB' s) had no
problem; however, STS-4 had the same problem on each SRB. Why the difference? It turned out after
much testing (pyro and G-switch response) that all flights were near a problem. These two SRB's
exceeded limits because of two factors relating to G-switch damping. The temperature decreased the
damping, and the switches were fabricated on the low damping side, but not outside the specifications.
This, combined with the expected variation in pyro shock response, led to the problem. No one thought
that the G-switch of such a low frequency would respond to the shock, based on the qualification test
run without the resonant mode of the support ring, hence the problem was missed. Many months of
investigation time were required to find the culprit, although all pieces of data existed prior to the
failures. The problem was putting the pieces together in the proper manner. No other G-switch problems
have occurred in the other 70 plus shuttle flights.
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4. External Tank. There were three designs of the ET; the first two have been operational, with
the third to fly for the space station missions in order to meet the payload requirements of these
demanding missions. The standard ET flew on six of the first seven space shuttle flights. It was replaced
with the lightweight tank (LWT) in order to gain approximately 10,000 lb of payload lost in misunder-
stood phenomena of the system. This tank has successfully flown more than 80 missions. The third tank,
super lightweight tank (SLWT), is under development using aluminum-lithium (A1-Li) to gain another
8,000 lb payload in order to accomplish the space station missions.
a. Characteristics
(1) Standard and Lightweight Tank. Since the LWT tank has been the workhorse for the shuttle,
the characteristics of the standard tank will not be presented. The major differences in characteristics
were the skin thickness. The ET is a major element of the liquid propulsion system. Since it essentially
goes to orbit, its weight uncertainties and impacts are a direct impact to vehicle performance; therefore,
it is very critical that excessive criteria and margins not be used. It has two tanks and an intertank (fig.
97), consisting of a lox tank that is designed to contain 1,394,891 lb of oxidizer. It measures 655.5
inches in length, with an outside diameter of 331 inches, and it has a volume of 19,563 ft 3, with an
empty weight of 12,350 lb. It has internal slosh baffles to dampen the propellant sloshing that couples
with the attitude control system and antivortex baffles to dampen the vortexes of the flowing (draining)
liquid. The tank is insulated with external insulation sprayed on the tank with an automatic system other
than for close-outs. The hydrogen tank (fig. 98) is designed to contain 257,500 lb of liquid hydrogen.
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DESCRIPTION
The L02 tank is a fusion-welded assembly of
preformed, chem-milled gores and panels, and ma-
chined .fittings and ring chords.
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Figure 97. ET lox tank configuration.
109
STA SIA SI'A SIA 51A
2058 t87_ 162.] B0 |3?735 11299
T T T
/ _---_ ; \ I I I,oooo,*cAP,-PN
1785 24045 ' "_
1,4 315--_ ,-" ' _F_LA.C_[S, 91200---_ 8 ,N,,H.EDIAI,
L'-- ........ lib() 15 ' _ RING I_RAMES
_ I]ARI][L S[CTION 141 LH? TANK PROFIL[
INT[RMtOIAT2 RING FRAM[ (
I.Ill TANK F'ROFIL_
Figure 98. ET hydrogen tank configuration.
It measures 1,160.78 inches long, with an outside diameter of 331 inches, a volume of 53,518 ft 3, and an
empty weight of 28,000 lb. At the rear section, a large ring frame is installed inside the tank. It takes
orbiter thrust loads from the thrusting engines and the SRB moment reaction and transfers them into the
tank wall. In addition, there are longhorn stringers in this section, 187 inches long, to further handle the
orbiter-induced thrust loads by distributing them throughout the tank skin.
The intertank (fig. 99) is the ET structural connection that joins with both the lox tank and the
hydrogen tank to provide structural continuity between these assemblies. Its primary function is to
receive and distribute all thrust loads from the SRB's and transfer loads between the propellant tanks.
This is accomplished using a massive box beam across the tank diameter, with SRB forward attachments
on each end of the beam. The intertank also functions as a protective compartment for housing the
operational instrumentation and range safety components. In addition, it provides an integral ET inter-
tank carrier plate assembly that interfaces with the fluid, electrical, and pneumatic system ground facili-
ties, a nonstructural access door, two pressure vent openings, and aerodynamic fairing for the lox
feedline, the gaseous hydrogen (GH 2) pressurization line, and two electrical cable trays.
The intertank cylindrical structure consists of eight 45 ° mechanically joined panels (two thrust
and six external stringer-stiffened skin panels), a main ring frame, four intermediate ring frames, and the
SRB beam assembly with two forged thrust fittings. It is 220 inches long, has a 331 inch outside
diameter, and weighs 12,200 lb.
The pressure tank is made essentially of 2119 aluminum (A1). The process takes the forgings and
rolls them into large panels, which are then machined to the basic stress field in order to save weight.
The panels are shaped then welded, using large forms to maintain shape. There is over one-half mile of
welds in the total tank.
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DESCRIPTION
The intertank is the ET structural connection
that joins with.both the L02 and LH2 tanks to pro-
vide structural continuity between these assemblies.
Its primary functions are to receive and distribute all
thrust loads from the SRB's and transfer loads be-
tween the propellant tanks. The intertank also func-
tions as a protective compartment for housing the
operational instrumentation and range safety compo-
nents. In addition, it provides an integral ET inter-
tank carrier plate assembly that interfaces with the
fluid, electrical, and pneumatic systems ground facili-
ties, a nonstructural access door, two pressure vent
openings, and aerodynamic fairings for the LO2 feed-
AFT FLANGE
line, the GHz pressurization Line and the two electri-
cal cable trays.
The intertank' cylindrical structure consists of
eight 45-degree mechanically joined panels (two
thrust panels and six external stringer-stiffened skin
panels), a main ring frame, four intermediate ring
frames, and an SRB beam assembly with two forged
thrust fittings.
The use of the intertank makes it possible for
the ET to have separate propellant tank bulkheads,
avoiding the design complexity and added operation-
al constraints associated with a common bulkhead
configuration.
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Figure 99. ET intertank.
(b) Super Lightweight Tank. The decision to join with the Russians for the design of the
International Space Station (ISS) created the need for a 511/20 orbit inclination. The shuttle, in its present
configuration, cannot deliver the complete ISS elements into that orbit without performance
enhancements. A major step in performance enhancements can be made by substituting aluminum-
lithium (AI-Li) for the current 2219 AI in most of the tank structure. 'Also, further gains can be made
through the use of an orthogrid structure milled into the tank panels. Approximately 8,000 lb of payload
enhancement can be achieved with the SLWT. The tank's basic geometry does not change; however, the
material does, as well as going to the orthogrid as mentioned above. Figure 100 shows the changes in the
fuel tank. Figure 101 depicts the intertank. Figure 102 shows the lox tank changes. The critical design
challenges for SLWT have been: (1) welding and weld repairs, (2) achieving a proper fracture
toughness, and (3) ratios of ultimate to yield materials properties. All these will be discussed.
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As stated previously, the tank is a prime part of the liquid propulsion system in that it contains
level sensors, the pressurization system, etc., as shown on figure 103. It also contains the tumble valve
for ensuring that the ET tumbles and breaks up as it enters the atmosphere and that resulting pieces stay
within a safe footprint in the Atlantic Ocean and do not impact land.
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Figure 103. ET pressurization system.
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b. Evoluti0n/Innovation. Many innovative processes, as well as design concepts, had to be
developed in order to meet the stringent performance goals without compromising safety since the space
shuttle is a manned vehicle. The first of these was the fracture control plan and its implementation,
which is required to ensure that no failure (tank rupture) would occur during flight. There are several
aspects to this plan. (1) NDE techniques had to be verified for this application and expressed as a typical
probability of detection (POD). The welds are dye-penetration inspected and x-rayed. (2) Each tank is
proof-tested at ambient, which not only screens for critical flaws in the structure, guaranteeing a flight
without failure with a life factor of four, but also tests the structure to near ultimate when the cyro prop-
erties are taken into account. (3) The tank is designed for leak-before-burst for nearly all welds. Where it
is not, or where it is not properly proofed, the rewelds are x-rayed again. (4) Substantial analog testing
of each skin thickness with welds, where a flaw is grown by fatigue to critical flaw size, then is tested
through mission profiles until failure. At least a factor of four must be obtained for the lowest of the
family tested. (5) A Government and contractor fracture control board, composed of stress, fatigue,
materials, and NDE experts, reviews each reported flaw for flight safety. (6) All flaws found during
manufacturing (x ray and dye penetration) are repaired before final assembly and proof testing.
Probably the most innovative design feature of the LWT was the reduction of the standard safety
factor from 1.4 to as low as 1.25. The reduced factor was based on the degree of knowledge of the loads,
i.e., longitudinal acceleration and internal pressure loads. If the load included all these loads, then a
factor of 1.25 was used. If the load was mixed with 90 percent well known and the other 10 percent not
well known, then a factor of 1.29 would be used. This approach, along with milling the skin to
approximate the stress field, increased vehicle performance by 10,000 lb.
Robotics automation of spraying the insulation on the tank produces a more uniform coverage
and less potential for debonding. The same uniformity has been achieved for much of the average weld-
ing using robotics.
c. Problems. A tank problem matrix that lists many of the problems experienced is given in the
appendix; however, a few of the major and typical ones are discussed below.
(1) One problem was the aft hydrogen tank rear section oil canning during dynamic testing.
During full-scale dynamic testing of the all-up shuttle vehicle to verify the dynamic modes calculation,
the rear of the hydrogen tank started oil canning as the SRB's rolled against the struts that connected
them with the tank. The cause, when understood, was quite benign and would cause no problem. Prior to
filling the tanks with cryo fuel, the overall tank is several inches longer than it is when loaded with cryo
and it shrinks due to'the lower temperature. In orderto compensate for this shrinkage, the SRB struts are
canted 7 ° so that when the tank cyro shrinks, the struts are perpendicular to each element. This 70 angle
was enough to roll the large ring frame in the aft of the tank. When perpendicular, the rolling does not
take place.
(2) A problem related to the above is the pinch load introduced by the cyro shrinkage radially
and longitudinally putting a large load into the tank structure. Early in the program, the struts were pre-
tensioned to reduce and balance this load. Later, the tank was designed to handle the load. The thermal
deformations are stored in the structure as potential energy, which is released as a part of the lift-off
dynamics.
(3) To save cost and handling, it was decided to replace the tank nose cone made of A1 with a
composite nose cone. Two problems occurred with this design. The first was caused by a lack of under-
standing of the coefficient of expansion difference between the composite and the A1 to which it was to
be mated. The loads introduced would fail the nose cone when propellant was loaded. The second had to
do with mating the holes with the top of the lox tank. In both cases, it was a breakdown in systems
focus, where each discipline did its own thing without communicating with the others.
(4) A very interesting problem occurred during dynamic testing of the lox tank with various
levels of propellant fill. When the tank was full to two-thirds full, the damping of the dynamic modes
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was basically zero; however, for less full tanks the damping was above I/2 percent, which is typical for
this type structure. Figure 104 shows the observed damping versus fill level. The cause was a tuning
between the fluid and structures modes--a true hydroelastic effect. This modal damping was used in the
control/sloshing analysis that sized the antislosh baffles.
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Figure 104. ET hydroelastic mode damping.
(5) Another problem was buckling. Development of propellant tanks has generally had to deal
with buckling instability. Buckling is a very difficult problem to analyze since small eccentricities
greatly magnify the instability in a nonlinear manner. The ET development, although keenly aware of
the buckling potential, had a buckling occur during testing. This was due to the tank having to trim as
much weight as possible to gain shuttle performance (1 lb of tank equals approximately 1 lb of payload
to orbit). The first occurred during the mated ground vibration test program (MGVT). It occurred while
draining the lox tank (water) in order to simulate a flight condition (fig. 105). Operational procedures
have been changed so that this buckling is never experienced on the pad during launch operations.
Figure 106 is a sketch of the buckled area.
(6) Two major problems have occurred on the SLWT during development: welding and weld
repairs, and achieving the fracture toughness desired for fracture mechanics safety. Special techniques
have had to be implemented for the welding and weld repair processes that include not only speed and
proper forms and clamping, but also the use of backside purging, weld sequencing, and weld planishing
to reduce residual stresses. Planishing can, however, be a problem in that it can also cause the weld to
crack. Today, the fracture toughness is achieved by a very strict process control that deals with the
material's chemical makeup and the heat treating, along with a lot acceptance of each ingot/panel. All
panels that do not meet fracture toughness requirements are discarded.
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(7) SLWT Verification Program. Since the basic difference between the LWT and the SLWT
was a material substitution with no changes to the basic components, it was felt by the technical
community that a shortened test verification program could be achieved. Particularly, it was highly
desirable that an all-up cyro tank test to failure be eliminated due to schedule impacts and excessive
costs. The elimination of the cyro test program was challenged by two oversight committees, one of
NASA origin, the other of Martin Corp. sources. In order to deal with the issue, a blue ribbon team of
experts from the various NASA Centers and the Martin Corp. were formed to study the challenge and
recommend to the program a cost-effective safe program to proceed with.
The team performed an indepth review of the proposed SLWT test program and compared it
with the standard weight and LWT programs. In conjunction with this verification plan, a comparison of
all tank panels and parts was made of the thickness, milling, etc., for each in order to determine where
prior testing was applicable. Figure 107 shows a comparison of these three test programs (the SLWT
program is the one available at the time of the teams formation). The team then established a modified
SLWT test verification program. The SLWT structural verification team developed the following
philosophies that it used in forming the verification program.
• Verify by test, for each structural element, the integrity of the structure
• Test demonstrate structure will withstand ultimate loads; or test demonstrate structure will
withstand limit load and validate analysis accuracy and conservatism used to extrapolate to
ultimate load
• Test can be omitted if the factor of safety (FS) > 2.0
Structural Verification
ET Structural Test Evolution
;WT LWT SLWT
• Major Development Tests
- 10% scale slosh
- Forward and aft SRB attach fittings
• Subassembly Strength Tests
- ET/Orbiter interface hardware
- LO 2 slosh baffle
• STA Program
- Intertank static strength
- LO 2 static strength
- LH 2 static strength
- LO 2 Modal survey
• Ground Vibration Test Program
- Full scale ET
• Components Qualification
- Static strength
- Vibration
• Secondary Structure Verification
- Static strength and capability
- Vibration
• Proof Tests
- LO 2 tank
- LH 2 tank
- Propulsion lines
• Development/Verification Tests
- LH 2 skin stringer panels
- 2058 frame stability
• Interface Hardware Bench Tests
- Forward and aft SRB fittings
- Forward and aft SET/Orbiter hardware
• Lw-r-1 Influence Coefficient Test
- 2058 frame Stiffness
• LWT-2 Limit Load Test
- Aft LH 2 barrel and frame
• New/Changed Components Qualification
- Static strength
- Vibration
• Secondary Structure
- Static strength and capability
• Proof Tests
- LO 2 tests
- LH 2 tank
- Propulsion lines
• Element Component Tests
- Orthogrid panels
- Frame webs
• ALTA Verification Tests
- Flight equivalent loads
- Flight configuration barrel
- LH 2 orthogdd panel stability
- Proof test
• SLWT-1 LH 2 Limit Load Test
- Similar to LWT-2 test
- Influence coefficient test
- Barrel panel stability
- Aft dome pinch load stability
• New/Changed Components Qualification
- Static strength
- Vibration
• Secondary Structure
- Static strength and capability
• Proof Tests
- LO 2 tests
- LH 2 tank
- Propulsion lines
Figure 107. ET structural test evolution.
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• Test not required if similar, more critical, structural element has been tested or LWT flight
verified
• Test article will be built on production tooling with production processes
• Test article will be fabricated from material acceptable for production hardware
• Test completion is precursor to flight
• Cyro effects will be verified by material coupon testing, data gathered from the SWT testing,
analysis, and Kennedy Space Center (KSC) tanking test.
Implementation of this philosophy is accomplished by a variety of methods that include:
• Membrane thickness increase--SLWT thickness is maintained at flight-verified LWT
thickness in select stability critical regions.
Independent Analysis--MSFC is performing independent analysis of the intertank, and
Langley Research Center (LaRC) is performing independent analysis of the lox tank; provides
increased confidence in design adequacy, particularly in areas where factor of safety >2.0
criteria are used.
• SWT Structural Test Article (SWT STA)--The SWT STA demonstrated loads with cryogenic
temperature and temperature transients when loading; data and experience if being built upon.
Component Test--A series of 12 groups of components tests being performed to demonstrate
or verify substructures; examples include hydrogen tank orthogrid panel compression tests,
intertank skin-stringer/joint compression tests, stress concentration tests, and intertank
crossbeam web tests.
Aluminum Lithium Test Article (ALTA)--A structural test article consisting of a 20-in barrel
representative of barrels 3 and 4, Z panels of barrels 1 and 2 of the hydrogen tank, a hydrogen
tank aft dome, and a lox tank aft dome; demonstrates orthogrid panel stability to ultimate and
capability loads, stability of lox tank aft dome, and 113 percent of limit load in tension for
forward hydrogen tank barrels and aft dome.
• Proof Test--Performed on each hydrogen and lox tank; demonstrates strength of each tank
pressure wall to 113 percent or greater of limit load.
Protoflight Test--Performed on each hydrogen tank; demonstrates stability of tank barrels 1
and 2 in the vicinity of the longeron and aft dome stability to 115 percent of limit load;
demonstrates strength of longeron region including welds of adjacent panels.
• Tanking Tests--Demonstrates prelaunch conditions to limit load.
Figure 108 shows this in a flow block diagram format as used by the team to asses the risks
associated with the approach. The innovative approach added to the program twofold: first, the hydrogen
tank proof test was augmented to include protoflight test at 115-percent external loads to verify stability;
second, the increase in material thickness to match LWT for buckling. In addition, LaRC and MSFC are
conducting independent buckling analysis. Figure 109 is a matrix of the total plan that ensures a safe
tank for flight. The concern over no cryo tank test was handled by conducting a series of cryo coupon
tests and extrapolating the data to flight conditions. This is possible since the basic material
characterization change is in strength and modulus, thus the resulting thermal-induced stresses and the
basic tank configuration did not change and were shown to be low.
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An aggressive, test based, verification program has been established and is being executed for the SLWT program.
The program builds upon the existing test base of the External Tank Structural Test Articles.
Testing completed to date has been successful.
A challenging verification program lies ahead of us.
Successful completion of the program established will assure a SLWT which is safe_fo fly,
Figure 109. ET test matrix.
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In summary, the SLWT has an aggressive test-based verification program that is being executed
and includes:
• Proof test for strength of the lox and hydrogen tanks
• ALTA and protoflight testing of each flight tank for stability
• ALTA thickness increases and independent analysis for stability of the lox tank
• Component tests and independent analysis for stability of the intertank
• Component tests for frames and substructures.
Successful completion of the program established will assure an SLWT that is safe to fly.
(8) Insulation debond on the nose of the lox tank was a major problem early in the program. It
was believed to be a debris source that damaged the frail orbiter reentry heat protection tiles. This prob-
lem was caused by the thermal gradients between the TPS and the substrate that was being driven
thermally by the cryo lox temperatures. Through proper layering of materials and better bonding, the
problem was solved. It serves as a good example of how an insignificant problem on one element can
lead to a serious problem on another element and to the system.
G. Hubble Space Telescope
1. Characteristic. The Hubble Space Telescope (HST) is the world's largest and greatest orbiting
optical telescope. 68 Its accuracy and precision are unprecedented. Even with the problem of aberration
of the mirror, which has been partially corrected, its contribution to science and our understanding of the
universe has grown by leaps and bounds. The pointing accuracy of 0.007 arc s, which is equivalent to
focusing on a dime from Washington, DC, to Boston, is unequaled in the optics world. The HST (fig.
110) is composed of the outer protective shell (called the SSM), the momentum wheels that control the
vehicle by varying each wheel's speed, and the aperture door for blocking direct sunlight from the
instruments, allowing more science time. The inner parts are the heart of the optical telescope assembly
(OTA) system composed of the metering truss mounting, the primary and secondary mirrors, the focal
plane structure, and the aft truss mounting the scientific instruments. Figure 111 shows an exploded
view of the OTA with the scientific instruments. To eliminate thermal distortion in one direction, the
OTA frames are built of composites that have near-zero coefficient of thermal expansion (CTE) in the
longitudinal direction. The mirrors must be accurately located relative to each other driving this CTE
requirement. The light enters striking the primary mirror, which focuses it on the secondary mirror. The
secondary mirror focuses the light back through a hole in the center of the primary mirror onto the
scientific instruments. The instruments are: (1) the fine guidance sensor, (2) the faint object spectro-
graph, (3) the wide field planetary camera, (4) the photometer, (5) the high-resolution spectrograph, and
VariOUS(6) the faint object camera. They function to perform the fine pointing and to gather " scientific
data for studying the universe (fig. 112). Power is provided by solar arrays in conjunction with storage
batteries. The control system uses six rate gyros and two fine guidance optical sensors to provide roll,
pitch, and yaw information, and is designed to the observatory, accurately locked to within the 0.007
arc s on a subject for extended periods. This is equivalent to a 1.22-cm offset at a distance of 600 mi
(1,000 km). Temperatures within the telescope are controlled actively and passively to assure pointing
accuracy and structural stability. The system was designed for maintenance and refurbishment on-orbit
at approximately 5-year intervals. The first of these repair missions has already occurred as a result of
the aberration problem. During that mission, the solar arrays, batteries, rate gyros, and fine guidance
sensor were replaced along with the aberration correction lens.
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Figure110. HSTcharacteristics.
2. Evolution/Creativity/Innovation. The prime technology driver for HST was the very high
pointing accuracy, which required several breakthroughs and developments: (1) development of the
pointing control logic and mechanism, including the fine pointing instrument (sensor), momentum
wheels, and vibration (modal) suppression; (2) development of low-force isolation techniques for
mechanical systems such as the momentum wheels (verification of these isolation systems required
innovative testing and data evaluation techniques); (3) development of composite materials that would
have near zero CTE in the longitudinal direction (you do not get something for nothing, so the low
expansion in one direction created deflections in the other directions, creating a major joint design
effort); (4) understanding and verification of the modal characteristics for both pointing while on orbit
and accurate loads predictions during launch and transportation; (5) accurate and efficient thermal con-
trol systems to protect the sensitive instruments and maintain pointing accuracy; (6) long-life mechani-
cal and electrical systems; (7) solar energy system to provide power to operate the system on orbit; and
(8) on-orbit servicing.
The solar arrays, supplied by the European Space Agency (ESA), created impulses to the system
when going through the day/night and night/day terminator due to thermal snap. Interaction with the fine
pointing system was many times more than would have been for the case for healthy solar arrays.
Reference 67 discusses this problem and its solution with the new arrays that were installed
during the repair mission. Flight data served to identify the troublesome modes, and a new
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Figure 112. HST solar arrays.
control law/stabilization filter was designed. The up-linked control changes enabled NASA to meet the
HST pointing specifications during the 2 years of operation before the repair mission. Over 20 structural
modes were suppressed with the new control law. This is the largest number of modes suppressed with
one control law and control system to date. The next section dealing with problems will discuss further
the items identified and the innovations applied.
Probably one of the great innovative achievements of the Hubble program was the repair mis-
sion, which not only required creativity for the mirror aberration solution, but required the best that man
could accomplished in space EVA's--first to capture the Hubble, then to repair it. The national cover-
age and interest in this mission alluded to its complexity and accomplishment.
Another creative achievement occurred late in the ground-verification portion of the program
when it was decided that the free-free modal test performed on part of the system, which adequately
verified the on-orbit configuration, had not verified the modal characteristics for the transportation con-
figuration when Hubble was attached to the orbiter payload bay. To test the total final assembled tele-
scope in the constrained mode would be at least very risky and very costly to the program. This problem
was solved by some very innovative workers, 67 which showed that a low-level impedance test of the
orbiter telescope attach points with the final Hubble configuration would adequately provide the missing
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data. The technique was demonstrated on simulated hardware, then the Hubble was successfully tested.
The data were excellent. The approach was not only a great cost saving (the all-up test cost $10 M,
impedance test cost less than $1 M) but greatly reduced the risk of damage to the flight hardware.
3. Problems
a. Mirror Aberration. The largest impact problem that occurred on HST was the mirror aberra-
tion that was caused by improper grind measurement tools that created a small error on the outer por-
tions of the mirror. Figure 113 shows the basic problem and the results it created. The problem did not
degrade all the science. The frequency spectrographs were not affected. A problem of this type shows
what negative publicity can do to an organization. To fix the problem, an innovative lens was developed
that corrected the aberration with a small loss of power. This design was probably the major innovative
device for Hubble. The repair mission was also one of the most exciting, with national interest and
television coverage. Much training in the Neutral Buoyancy Simulator tank was required for the
astronauts in order to achieve overwhelming success. Figure 114 shows images taken before and after
the lens correction and shows how well the fix worked.
The "best" focus for a beam containing spherical aberration lies somewhere between
the marginal and paraxial focus.
Lens
Marginal Paraxial
Focus Focus
Figure 113. HST spherical aberration.
b. Solar Terminator Excitation. After discovering that Hubble had an aberration problem, it was
mandatory that as much science as possible be salvaged until a repair mission could take place. In the
process of tuning up the pointing control system, it was clear that every time Hubble moved from day to
night, or night to day, a large disturbance occurred, upsetting the pointing system and disturbing the
observations.
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Two parallel efforts were carried out to understand and solve this response problem. First,
detailed simulations of the spacecraft with the pointing control system were conducted along with data
evaluation of the flight data in order to develop a control logic software change that could be uplinked
and that could solve this problem and save science. 67 Second, an effort was made through ground test
and analysis to understand or isolate the disturbance cause. This information would also help design a
fix to be carried up and installed during the repair mission.
The major problem was caused by the solar array bi-stem jerking due to thermal expansion. The
thermal deflections of the bi-stems resulted in mechanical binding and slippage, which occurred as the
telescope passed in and out of direct solar radiation. This sudden mechanical response induced torquing
disturbances to the HST's pointing control system. The ESA, the solar array vendors, conducted thermal
analysis and tests to address these deflections and the sudden mechanical response that had not been
predicted.
Once the problem was identified, ESA first conducted detailed thermal analysis, which basically
confirmed results found during the design phase. In addition, MSFC and Lockheed conducted parallel
analysis with almost the exact results for the temperature predictions. Next, ESA conducted simulated
solar radiation testing to evaluate the bi-stem response. Much work was also accomplished at the
Marshall Center from the dynamics and control organizations, as well as the thermal analysts, to help
understand the problem. 67 As a result, the understanding of the mechanical response was achieved and
ESA designed a replacement solar array that would solve the problem. The faulty arrays were replaced
during the repair mission with this new array. No further problem of this type has occurred in Hubble's
mission.
The control personnel at MSFC were able to design a control logic that would dampen the
oscillation, so that good science could be obtained while waiting for the repair mission to take place.
The damping of this disturbance was achieved at a much greater degree than expected, and the software
was data-linked up to Hubble, saving the science until the repair mission.
There are many lessons in terms o f understanding multidisciplinary interactions as well as testing
to the extent possible on ground. The designer should also pay much attention to the design of bi-stem
deployable rods, which are necessary (or some variation thereof) for collapsing arrays for transportation.
c. Designing for Low CTE and Other Design Issues. Highly accurate large space optical systems
are very sensitive to distortions and misalignments. One of the main sources of these disturbances is the
thermal expansions and contractions of the structure in the severe space environment. The approach
taken for Hubble was to build the basic truss structure out of composites where the CTE could be made
very low in the critical directions. This does not come for free, and many problems resulted. Carl Loy
(retired), one of the structural designer's at MSFC, provided a history of these problems. The following
are some excerpts from notes he provided the author.
(1) Metering Structure Joints. The first metering truss built by Boeing had a major problem with
the joints due to the laminate lay-ups transferring the loads for the low CTE direction into the other
planes. If the laminate is oriented such that its plies are perpendicular to, and the laminate makes up a
portion of a dimension that is to be controlled by near-zero CTE effects of the composite lay-up, the
expansion/contraction of the laminate thickness will tend to overwhelm the low CTE of the structure,
compromising the remainder of that dimension (fig. 115). This is because the CTE of the laminate
through its thickness is controlled by the matrix material, i.e., the epoxy. The CTE of the graphite fibers
perpendicular to the fiber length is also quite high. The solution to the problem was to remove the
laminate thickness from the "line of action" in the dimension that is to be CTE controlled (fig. 116). The
flight metering truss, the gusset plate that joins the strut in adjacent bays, passes through a slot in the
web of the ring. A clip is used to tie the ring to the gusset to maintain the location of the components.
(2) Secondary Mirror Support Structure. The secondary mirror support structure under thermal
deflections deformed the alignment between the primary and secondary mirrors. The metering structure
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Strut/Ring Joint Configuration in the
Boeing 3 Meter Metering Truss
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Figure 115. HST shelf.
Strut/Ring Joint Configuration in the Boeing
2.4 Meter (Flight) Metering Truss
Strut -_
Ring
Strut
Clip
Figure 116. HST metering truss fix.
design with the secondary support structure was located forward of the forward ring of the metering
structure (figs. 117 and 118). The primary reason for this structural arrangement was to save weight in
the metering structure. However, it was observed that a thermal change resulting in a uniform contrac-
tion or expansion of the diameter of the forward ring of the metering structure would move the secon-
dary mirror forward or back along the longitudinal axis of the metering structure. A thermal gradient
across the diameter of the forward ring will, in addition to the pumping action mentioned above, also tilt
the secondary mirror with respect to the longitudinal axis of the metering structure. Both of these effects
were noticed during the tests on the Boeing 3-m metering truss and the General Dynamics half-scale
metering shell. The thermal gradient was sufficient longitudinally. The solution to the problem was that
the secondary mirror support structure was redesigned so that it was symmetrical, forward and aft, about
the plane of the forward ring of the metering structure. That is, no bending or flexing of the support
structure will occur due to the thermal expansions/contractions of the metering structure (fig. 119).
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Secondary Mirror Support Structural Arrangement
for the Boeing 3 Meter Metering Truss and the
GD/C Half-Scale Meterlng Shell
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Figure 117. HST mirror deflection.
Secondary Mirror Support Structural Arrangement
for the Boeing Flight Metering Truss & the Air Force
Modified GD/C Half-Scale Metering Shell
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coincident with plane of the structural
support of the Secondary Mirror
Figure 118. HST secondary mirror.
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Figure 119. HST modified truss.
(3) "Bathtub" Fittings. The original design had "bathtub" fittings at the fine guidance sensor, and
the radial scientific instruments (SI's) points B and C latch locations (the focal plane side of each of
these points, i.e., the fixed half of the latch) were bolted to these "bathtub" fittings. All of the fittings
failed (three were tested) well below the design load. The failures were all in the length of the edge of
the fitting (fig. 120). The failure was due to the fact that the design did not place any graphite fibers in
the comer areas, i.e., in the areas indicated by N on figure 120. In others words, there was no graphite
reinforcement, but only epoxy, tying the base plate to the gusset plates on either side, where the failure
occurred. These failures occurred at such a time in the program that it was deemed feasible not to try and
remedy the design, but to replace the "bathtub" fittings with titanium-machined fittings having the same
configuration as the composite fittings. This was a good trade since the reinforced composite fittings
would weigh approximately the same as the titanium fittings.
Configuration of "Bathtub" Fitting in
Flight Focal Plane Structure
J
/.
ase Plate
(,,_jP"_._"_ _ Area of Crack
_;._ Development
J
Side
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Deformat on
I Direction of
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Figure 120. HST bathtub fitting configuration.
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(4) SSM ApertureDoor and Aft ShroudBulkhead.The SSM aperturedoor andthe aft shroud
bulkheadstructureswereof aluminumhoneycombconstruction;bothwere flat andboth wereof large
dimensionin lengthandwidth.The thicknessof thehoneycombcoreof thefacingsis typical, thoughthe
facingson the aperturedoor approacha thinnessthatrequiresverycareful handlingfor the largesheets
used.
Inspectionsof these two sandwich structures, after they were completed, indicated an area of
debond--critically so in the aperture door--and several "dings" in both structures. The inspection
reports, the manufacturing and bonding methods, and the processes and procedures were extensively
reviewed by Marshall personnel experienced in all of the affected disciplines. Both of these structures
were built in the Lockheed Burbank Aircraft facility, which has considerable experience in building
aluminum honeycomb structures; however, the aperture door and aft bulkhead were larger than any
honeycomb structure they had previously built. This lack of experience with that size honeycomb con-
tributed to the poor quality of the finished product. Also, the bonding tool used probably contributed to
the final quality of the product.
The solution to the problem was to analyze the aft bulkhead and accept it due to the smaller
panels created by the internal panels reducing the size of the debonds. The aperture door was rejected as
beyond repair, and a new one of much-improved quality was produced. The rejected door was used as a
substitute for the flight door in the various test programs until time to ship the Hubble to the launch site.
d. Thermal Vacuum Testing (TVT). Thermal testing of such a large spacecraft with subsystems
integrated from many different contractors was indeed a challenge. There was an abundance of
knowledge and experience gained during the course of Hubble's TVT testing. As with any TVT, the
amount of instrumentation was limited and continued to be a concern until testing. The successful
completion of Hubble's TVT, followed by math model correlation to the measured data, proved that
adequate instrumentation was provided and could serve as a valuable guideline for future testing of this
magnitude. The Hubble's TVT can also serve as a very good example Of environment simulation using
infrared (IR) lamp arrays. The Hubble program completed design, manufacture, checkout, and
implementation of a huge IR lamp array accompanied with thorough documentation. The knowledge
and documentation resulting from Hubble's experience should have direct application to any new
spacecraft system-level testing.
The Hubble program completed a rigorous evaluation to specify thermal stability criteria for
each test phase of TVT. After lengthy debates, the thermal group successfully obtained agreement to
conduct certain thermal balance test segments without interference from electrical reconfiguration of
power level changes. These tests were critical to the follow-on correlation to math models. The stability
criteria established had to be met before configuration to the next test segment was initiated. This
experience indicates that thermal balance tests should be a requirement for thermal control system
verification. This experience should also serve as a shortcut for future programs in specifying and
justifying criteria.
During TVT development testing for Hubble's SSE TCS, multilayer insulation (MLI) blanket
performance did not meet expectations, which were based on previous testing of the other Hubble
hardware. It was discovered that the outer layer material of aluminized Teflon TM, combined with the
absence of a netting spacer, is not suitable for the blanket design of small components. The CTE
differences between the aluminized layer and the Teflon TM substrata caused the outer layer to shrink at
cold temperatures. This shrinkage would compress the blanket at the comers, creating thermal shorts and
reducing performance. This prompted a more thorough evaluation test to determine relative MLI blanket
performance for small components. As a result, the final blanket design for the Hubble's SSE TCS used
Tedlar TM as the outer layer, and Dacron TM netting as the sublayer spacer, which gave much better
performance for such small MLI designs.
During Hubble's thermal vacuum test, several failures of the thermal control system occurred.
Posttest evaluation eventually traced the failures to faulty thermostats. The failures were specifically
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attributed to improper dry gas backfill by the manufacturer.A plan was developedto replace all
potentially affectedthermostats.This plan includedinstallationstepsto revivify heatercircuitry after
replacement.This particular stepwas especially important in the absenceof further environmental
testing.Accurate documentation of this step is very important for future reference.
e. Summary. The Hubble project taught many valuable lessons that have been briefly described
in the above paragraphs. Hubble was planned for orbital verification and mission support. Much effort
was expended to have all technical experts trained, and to have ground-based simulation of the on-orbit
spacecraft, etc., put in place for resolution of slight anomalies. One problem occurred during the initial
orbiting and checkout phase--the determination of the spacecraft orientation. Eventually, an abbreviated
method was developed to determine spacecraft orientation from telemetry data. Future spacecraft
training sessions must have a system approach so that this type procedure would not have to be worked
out in real-time.
Despite the various problems discussed here and the ones illustrated in the appendix, Hubble was
a very innovative and specialized design, as the current science being collected proves. The ability to
make telemetry software changes was a lifesaver and is a standard approach, but must be well thought
and designed for. The same is true for the maintenance mission, which required not only the design for
line replaceable units but consideration of the labor complexity involved for on-orbit repair in zero g and
by astronauts in space suits. The success of the original mission phase, the repair mission, and the
ongoing science mission after the repair gives evidence of design and program success. Figure 121
shows the repaired Hubble being deployed from the shuttle.
H. Spacelab
1. Characteristics. The Spacelab system was designed by the ESA to provide a flexible orbiting
laboratory within the shuttle cargo bay for conducting various experiments and research in space. 69 It
consists of different combinations of enclosed human working areas called modules (two lengths) and
open V-shaped pallets, which expose experiments to space or act as launching/retrieval platforms that
are exposed to open space when the shuttle cargo doors are open. The modules have a life support
system, experiment racks with power, etc., with space in between for the astronauts to work. Figure 122
shows a basic module and figure 123 depicts a typical pallet. Figure 124 shows some of the basic
combinations of modules and racks in the cargo bay. In the modules, the astronauts/scientists have
essentially a lab to work in as they do on Earth. The pallet experiments can be controlled from the
module or the orbiter crew observation deck.
Spacelab missions are cooperative efforts between scientists and engineers from around the
world. Teams from NASA Centers, universities, private industry, Government agencies, and
international space organizations design the experiments. Some scientists actually fly and run the
experiments in space, with support from scientists and engineers on the ground who work and
communicate with those on-orbit via voice, video, and data links. The reusable international vehicle
allows them to bring the experiment samples back to Earth for further study.
Many missions have flown using Spacelab hardware in various combinations. The experiments
covered the gamut from microgravity to stellar observation. For example, Spacelab flew on STS-9 in
1983, with 73 experiments. The laboratory module flew again on STS-51B, as Spacelab 3, emphasizing
low-gravity materials processing. Spacelab 2, on STS-5 IF, was a pallet-only mission, studying solar
science. Spacelab D-1, on STS-61 A, was a German mission.
Spacelab became more specialized in the 1990's. Astro missions were dedicated to ultraviolet
and x-ray astronomy. This included Atmospheric Laboratory for Application and Science (ATLAS),
Spacelab Life Sciences (SLY), United States Microgravity Laboratory (USML), United States
Microgravity Payload (USMP), International Microgravity Laboratory (IML), Spacelab J (Japanese
Materials Processing), and Spacelab D-2 (a German reflight with upgraded experiments).
133
Figure 121. HST deployment after fix.
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Figure 123. Spacelab typical pallet configuration.
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Figure 124. Spacelab module and pallet combination.
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Spacelab, as a laboratory, has emphasized microgravity science, life sciences, astrophysics, solar
science, space plasma physics, and atmospheric science. It has proved to be a very valuable workhorse,
extending the shuttle to be an effective short-term laboratory, and has established an excellent technical
base for the upcoming International Space Station.
2. Evolution/Creativity/Evolution. The basic idea of a combination of working quarters in space
(modules), in combination with the V-shaped pallets, was very creative. The modules themselves, with
the various type racks, gave much flexibility in terms of experiments and laboratory setups. Obviously a
laboratory must have the capability of heat and cold, vibration, etc. All the materials and equipment
must be compacted, stored, and fastened down to survive the launch, reentry, and landing environments,
which was no small feat within itself. Delicate observation instruments had to have the same stowed
requirements, yet, while in space, they had to be very flexible for pointing control, etc., and to some
extent be isolated from the shuttle on-orbit motions.
3. Problems. One problem area for Spacelab was the design and verification of the module racks.
There have been two basic problems, the first being the load paths and load carrying capability. The
other, the rack natural frequency.
Load carrying capability is best exemplified by the high stress levels that occur for the mission
peculiar equipment (MPE)-to-drop physics module (DPM) mechanical assembly interfaces, MPE-to-
Spacelab rack interfaces, and DPM microgravity measurement assembly (MMA)-to-Spacelab rack
interfaces. The cause of the high stress levels was due to the stiffness and large mass of the DPM in the
lower portion of rack 8, especially the MMA. The problem has been solved by maintaining minimum
"close fit" interfaces between MPE, DPM, and the Spacelab rack, using match and drill for MMA and
epoxy in selected slotted holes in the rack.
In order to ensure that Spacelab equipment and experiments do not tune dynamically with the
shuttle dynamics during lift-off and landing, a lower frequency constraint of 25 Hz was placed on major
elements, such as racks, and 35 Hz on secondary elements, such as experiments attached to the racks.
The racks had trouble meeting their frequency constraint, both analytically and through dynamic
verification testing. There were two solution options: (1) redesign the racks to accept the larger loads
introduced by the dynamic tuning, and (2) redesign the racks to meet the frequency constraints. The later
approach was taken, with minimum design fixes.
A few of the other Spacelab problems are listed in the matrix.
I. International Space Station
The design of a long-life space station must deal with several demanding requirements. First, it
must be able to withstand the launch environments, which have a different demand than on orbit.
Second, since it is not possible to launch the totally assembled station at one time, the station must be
designed for on-orbit assembly. Third, the station is to be human-tended, requiring a life support system
that has minimum refurbishment and logistic requirements. Fourth, the station must be designed to
withstand harsh on-orbit environments such as debris impacts, thermal variations, etc., with minimum
refurbishment. Fifth, power must be obtained from the Sun, which requires solar cells, batteries, etc.,
needing minimal attention. Sixth, it must be a scientific laboratory, with all that implies. Seventh, means
of docking and undocking spacecraft, such as the shuttle, must be accommodated with means of trans-
ferring crew and supplies, as well as having a crew return vehicle in case problems occur. Also, some
experiments can be deployed and retrieved. Eighth, cost is a big driver and must be a major criterion in
the design and operations. Finally, it can be a wayfaring station for missions to the Moon and planets.
As a result of these complex requirements, the space station configuration has gone through
many evolutions in order to cut cost and better align with the national budget constraints. During this
process, not only has the configuration changed greatly, but it has become truly an International Space
Station (ISS) with hardware being provided by Russia, Japan, Canada, and ESA (fig. 125). The impacts
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Figure125. ISS.
of these changes have affected not just the station, but have changed how science and operations are
achieved, as well as the impacts to the space shuttle hardware required in order to place the desired
components into the proper orbit. (These changes were discussed partially under the section on the
SLWT.) As a result_ the present configuration is now frozen and in final design, with hardware being
manufactured. This configuration meets all the basic requirements and is well on the way to operational
capability.
1. Characteristics. There are many crucial subsystems to a long-term orbiting station. They
include, but are not limited to: (1) life support, (2) power, (3) propulsion, (4) control, (5) science labora-
tories, (6) docking adapters, (7) structural systems, (8) meteoroid debris protection systems, and (9) crew
quarters. Most of these have many subsystems or elements themselves with specialized functions to per-
form. All these subsystems work together as the ISS.
The environmental control and life support system (ECLSS) is composed of several subsystems
(fig. 126). The ECLSS functions and subfunctions are shown on figure 127, and include atmosphere
revitalization, atmosphere control and supply, temperature and humidity control, water recovery and
management, waste management, fire detection and suppression, and other functions such as food
storage and preparation, radiation protection, etc. The goal of ECLSS is to provide a healthy,
supportable environment in which astronauts can live and work efficiently without costly use and loss
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(replace) as the current systems used on shuttle do. Instead of carrying enough oxygen, water, etc., for
the mission, the system recycles, as much as is economically feasible, comparable to the Earth's system.
Figure 128 is the basic ISS showing the ECLSS components. The U.S. laboratory module is shown of
figure 129. This module will serve as the main control to support the subsequent assembly flights. It
includes internal audio system, video system, and internal control and life support systems.
Another very critical subsystem is the meteoroid debris protection system. This system is
designed to mitigate debris damage to the station, potential loss of human life, and loss of critical func-
tions and science. The approach deals with the debris environment determination/impacts, impact
damage, and loss due to damage (fig. 130). The external protection system is built up of layers of
shields/bumpers as shown on figure 131.
Solar arrays provide the energy for the power system, as was shown on figure 125. The system
receives the Sun rays, converts it to electrical power, and stores the excess in the batteries. The structural
system is composed of the central truss around which the other elements such as the modules are
attached. There are docking modules for the space shuttle and Russian spacecraft and the abort crew
recovery system. Figure 125 shows many of these systems as well as the country providing the
hardware.
The space station is a very complicated system. It is not the purpose of this report to discuss all
these characteristics. It must be assembled in space using several launches spread out over a year or two.
To utilize the Russian launch capabilities, a 51" orbit inclination led to the shuttle performance
enhancements that included the development of the lighter weight external tank. At the time of this
writing, all were being accomplished as planned.
2. Evolution/Innovation/Creativity. There are so many innovations that have occurred to date in
the development of ISS, it is not possible to discuss them all. Obviously, since ISS is still in develop-
ment, many others will evolve.
The meteoroid protection system mentioned previously is truly a creative design. Not only does
it protect against impact damage, but it also deals with equipment location to minimize damage, crew
escape procedures, etc. Not only has the design been very creative, but it also has the analysis and
testing approach. The testing of impact damage determining hole size, leak resistance (rate), etc., for
many different protection approaches was completed. For example, figures 132 and 133 show the test
setup for measuring depressurization of a module.
Development of the life support system has many innovations in its design. These systems are
very complex, composed of chemical, fluid, electrical, hydraulic, control, etc., all linked together in a
highly interactive system. To develop and verify ECLSS, long-term hardware tests have taken place
from a module loop down to a water recovery system test. This innovative breadboarding has allowed
problems to be made visible and the design to be corrected.
The management approach between Government and industry has also been very innovative.
There is one prime contractor--Boeing. Integrated product teams are used for design and development.
These teams have Government support, with membership and engineering tasks from analysis, to
simulation, to testing. Integrating into the ISS, hardware from the international partners has challenged
the best in innovative management. To date, all is working well, hardware is built, other hardware is
proceeding, operational procedures are under way, as well as the on-orbit assembly techniques, etc.
Problems have occurred and will continue. The team in place should handle them well.
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3. Problems. Although many problems have occurred so far in ISS development, only a few
typical ones will be highlighted. As was experienced on the Spacelab project, the racks did not meet the
25-Hz frequency constraint due to its open box construction for crew utilization. The problem was
solved by adding stiffening to the rear of the rack and making the utility panel a structural element
instead of a closeout, which raised the frequency without compromising the crew access.
The meteoroid debris protection system design was discussed in section 2 and requires no further
discussion. The glass window design for the modules experienced fatigue cracking when the sustained
stress due to on-orbit delta pressure was applied. The problem was aggravated by the moisture content
of the ambient air, causing stress corrosion effects in the glasses' microcracks when under stress.
Several things were accomplished to solve this problem: (1) conservative fracture mechanics method-
ology was employed for the window redesign; (2) proof testing of each pane of glass was required to
screen initial flaws larger than those acceptable by the fracture analysis; (3) windows were redesigned
such that tension is not on the inside surface of the pane, making it damage tolerant; and (4) the cavity
between the primary and redundant pressure panes was vented to space to reduce exposure to moisture.
The development of the life support system has had several problems. These developmental
problems have utilized long-term ground demonstration testing of the various subsystems. As a result,
the hardware has experienced many development problems. For example, the testing of the Hab/Lab
element resulted in cyclic variations in cabin temperature, carbon dioxide (CO2) partial pressure, and
dew point. It was found that the CO2 removal subsystem was returning air exhausted into the cabin. The
solution was to reroute the CO2 removal subsystem exhaust to upstream of the condensing heat
exchanger. Another problem had to do with the overall system complexity and component redundancy,
which utilized separate loops for potable and hygiene water reclamation. The solution was to combine
the two loops into a single water reclamation loop. The water system in another problem was not
completely sterile prior to testing. This was caused by microbial growth in the test system particularly in
plumbing dead legs. The solution was to eliminate the plumbing dead legs and sterilize the system with
hot water at 250 °F. Water was also entrained upstream of the CO2 removal subsystem. This was caused
by a break down of the silica gel when subjected to liquid water. The CO2 removal subsystem was
modified by adding a layer of Zeolite 13x TM upstream of the silica gel, solving the problem. See the
matrix for other problems.
J. Titan Viking
The Titan launch vehicle has been a workhorse not only for Air Force payloads, but also for
many NASA payloads. The author worked the Titan Viking program from the launch vehicle standpoint,
which dealt with three launches: Viking simulator, German Helosis, and Viking, mainly from the
standpoint of a first stage pogo concern/problem. The pogo concern, and thus the pogo working group,
was active for approximately 2 years part-time. Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), LaRC, MSFC, and
Lewis Research Center (LeRC) were the NASA Centers involved with the Martin Aerospace
Corporation.
The vehicle had not only the boost stage with solid strapons, but also an upper stage called
Centaur. The basic problem that Viking faced had to do with a known pogo oscillation that occurred
near the end of the liquid boost stage burn. When the Titan Viking simulator test was flown, this pogo
oscillation was of family, creating loads on the spacecraft that were larger than the design loads. Since
the basic spacecraft was already designed, this was a major problem. Either the spacecraft had to be
beefed up structurally or the pogo problem eliminated. As a result, a blue ribbon team was formed to
understand and recommend actions in terms of the problem. The team stayed active until just prior to the
Viking launch. The preliminary assessment showed a dynamic tuning of the Viking simulator with the
vehicle longitudinal bending mode, reducing the equivalent damping or, said differently, increasing the
modal gain in the pogo loop. At that time, it was rationalized that the real Viking would be different;
therefore, the program proceeded.
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The nextTitan launchwas theGermanHelosispayloadand wascomparablein size to Viking.
SinceHelosishadno loadsproblem,it wasdeemedacceptableto launchthe system.The result of the
launchwassuccessful;however,thepogoresponsewaslargerthanfor the Viking simulator.Theteam,
alongwith contractors,spenta lot of time studyingthedata,runningsensitivitypogoandloadsstudies,
andconductingspecial tests.It was found that the vehiclehad stoodon thepad for 2 daysin a cold
wind, whichshiftedthegainin thepropulsionsystem,changingthepogoresponse.
Whenthis wasunderstood,it wasdecidedto putanaccumulatoron thepropellantduct,detuning
the structuralsystemfrom thepropulsionsystem,thuseliminating thepogooscillation.Parallelto this
fix design,structuraldynamictestswererunon theViking payloadin orderto helpverify themarginsof
the Viking system.The pogo fix wasdesignedandinstalled without impacting the launchdate.The
flight wassuccessful.No pogooccurred,thustherewereno loadincreasesto impacttheViking payload.
Historyshowsthefinal successof theViking probe.
The messageof this activity is very clear. When large energy sources(thrust) are present,
couplingdynamically with othersystems(structural,fluids, andacoustical),the responseis generally
nonlinearand is, therefore,very sensitiveto small variations.The small shift in dynamics(Viking
simulator) from prior systemsand the longerpadtime in low temperatures(Helosis)areexamplesof
how small changesand thenonlinearitiescancreatelargeunwantedresponses.Whentheseconditions
arepresent,it is alwaysprudentto eliminatethecouplingandmakethesystemrobust.This wasdonefor
Titan Viking, resultingin a successfulprogram.
K. Experiments
NASA and Marshall have flown many experiments, in particular on the space shuttle, mainly
using various parts of the Spacelab discussed previously. These experiments have many times been joint
ventures with other countries such as Italy, Japan, ESA, Canada, etc., where the system was built by the
International partners, flown by the U.S., and a joint experiment conducted. Others were totally U.S.
experiments. The following is a partial list of these experiments.
Experiment Purpose Supporters
IPS To develop a common pointing mount for flying
observatories in the space shuttle.
ESA/U.S.
SAFE/DAE To qualify a lightweight solar array with fold/unfold U.S.
capability and demonstrate on-orbit dynamic test
capability using remote sensing.
Astro To give astronomers a view of the universe U.S.
impossible to obtain from the ground.
1. Safe Solar Array/Dynamic Augmentation Experiment (SAFE/DAE). In September 1984,
NASA tested the SAFE/DAE on shuttle mission STS-41D. This testing qualified advanced solar arrays
and large space structures technologies that have several features which had marked improvements over
what was being used at that time.
The solar array was approximately 100-ft long (30.9-m) and 13.1-ft (4.0-m) wide. The total
experiment, including the array, totaled 940 lb in weight. The array was a flat-fold flexible substrate
solar array sized to output more than 12.5 kW at the base of the wing at 55 ° centigrade normal to the Sun
in near-Earth space. The array blanket consisted of 84 panels, 0.37 by 4 m (14.5 in by 13.1 ft ) in size,
that were mechanically hinged together to allow easy replacement of the panels. Only two of the panels
had active solar cells for the experiment. The other cells used glass sized simulators in order to reduce
experiment cost (fig. 134). The wing was deployed and retracted using an AEC-ABLE Engineering
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Figure 134. Solar array deployed.
Company mast that retracted into a canister (fig. 135). The solar array mast combination was attached to
a Spacelab pallet in the shuttle cargo bay. The array/mast was deployed and retracted four times during
the mission' s 231/2 h of experiment time.
Dynamically testing a large space structure in orbit is highly desirable since such a large
lightweight structure cannot be tested on ground in the gravity environment. Two approaches were used
to acquire the dynamic data when the system was excited using the orbiter's vernier control reaction
system (VCRS) jets. The two approaches were: (1) Photogrammetry using shuttle cameras to record the
dynamic motion of the structure. Sixty-three white circles, approximately 16.5 cm (6.5 in) in diameter,
were located at regular intervals on the front of the blanket. Another 63 were located on the back side of
the blanket. These data, collected during and after the VCRS firings, were evaluated using special data
reduction techniques to produce mode shapes and frequencies. LaRC developed the photogrammetry
approach. (2) Dynamic augmentation experiment (DAE). The DAE is an adaptation of a multifield star
tracker that was designed to determine the dynamic characteristics during the above discussed tests. A
retroreflector field tracker (RFT) positioned near the base of the solar array wing used laser diodes to
illuminate 23 targets on the array. A second microprocessor computed the dynamic displacement from
the line of sight, feeding the results to an onboard recorder. The data were ground processed, determin-
ing mode shapes and frequencies.
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Figure 135. Solar array deployment mechanism.
The results of the dynamic experiment were very good. One anomaly occurred when the array
went from day to night, causing curling of the array coupling pitch and yaw, and slightly shifting the
frequencies. Therefore, the frequencies of the deployed array were consistently higher in darkness than
daylight. Postflight analysis verified this effect. Overall, the predictions (after this modification) of fre-
quency, mode shapes, and deflection amplitudes matched quite well.
Damping was consistently higher for in-plane motion than for out-of-plane motion. Lockheed
performed tests showing that if the tension wire reel-out force was greater than the reel-in force by as
little as 1 lb, then the entire kinetic energy would be dissipated in one-half cycle in the free-motion
period. Testing found that the actual reel-out versus reel-in was about 0.65 lb.
The SAFE/DAE demonstrated that lightweight solar arrays, with reel-out/reel-in capability
works very well. Power generation predictions were also verified. A first step in on-orbit dynamic test-
ing of large space structures was demonstrated using two separate approaches. Both worked ade-
quately.70 75
2. Tethers in Space
a. Characteristics. Tethers can be used for many applications in space, a few of which are:
(1) Electrodynamics power generation (electrodynamics brake)
(2) Electrodynamics thrust generation
(3) Multiprobe for atmospheric studies
(4) Rotating controlled-gravity laboratory (tethered platform)
(5) Tethered satellite for cosmic dust collection
(6) Tethered docking
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(7) Scienceapplicationstetheredplatform
(8) Wastedisposal.
The first tetheredsatellite,calledTSS-1,wasbuilt and flown to demonstratethe capability to
deploy,performscience,andrecoveratetheredsystem.Two additionalsmall-masstetheredsystems,the
Small Expendable Deployer Systems(SEDS), have been launched successfully from unmanned
launchedpayloads.(TheseSEDSmissionswill not be discussedfurther in this report.) TSS-1had a
major problemwith the levelwind mechanismanddid not fully deploy(discussedbelow).As aresult,it
wasreflown in March 1996.
The TSS-1systemwascomposedof a spherical-shapedsatellite,containingnumerousscientific
instruments,antennas,the reactionjet control systemwith appropriatesensors,and the tetherattach
mechanism.72The satelliteweighedapproximately520kg. Thebasicfeaturesareshownin figure 136.
The attitudecontrol systemis composedof four rate-integratinggyroswith feedback,horizonscanner
(Earthscanner),accelerometersandmagnetometers,andthrusters(reactionjets) in thepositionsneeded
for attitudecontrol, science,andtetherdeployment.Thereareeight thrustersgroups.Four nozzlesare
in-plane(pitch), four areyaw, two areoutof plane(roll), andfour arein-line. Thetethertensionduring
operationsis maintainedby gravity,centrifugalforce,andin-planethrust.
The tetherusedfor deployment,retrieval,andasaconductorwas20-km(12-mi) long. It hada
core of NomexTM, the copper conductor, covered by a 0.012-in thick insjalation and wound with 10
strands of Kevlar TM, then braided on the outside with Nomex TM. It had a diameter of 2.54 mm (0.1 in)
and a mass of approximately 8.2 kg/km.
The support and deployer mechanism are shown in figure 137, including the docking and support
ring, while figures 138 and 139 show the system in the cargo bay with the boom partially deployed.
Figure 140 shows the tether control mechanism, while figure 141 is a sketch of the tether level wind.
The system was composed of the tether control deploy and take-up mechanism, the satellite support
structure, the extendable/retractable boom, the canister, etc., which served three functions: (1) provided
a means of transportation in the orbiter (launch and landing); (2) served as an operational base for the
deployer and, through the pallet, as an interface with the orbiter; and (3) deployed and retrieved the
satellite. In the mission scenario, the total mission time was approximately 30 h. Deployment took the
first 5.3 h, which was to be followed by 10.5 h of science time at the 20-km (12-mi) tether length. The
first leg of retrieval took 6.75 h, followed by 5.0 h of science. During this time, an orbiter yaw maneuver
can be conducted to dampen skiprope dynamics, if present and of a large enough magnitude. Final
retrieval was to have taken 1.9 h and contain a period of satellite attitude control to dampen the
remaining skiprope (fig. 142).
b. Evolution/Creativity/Innovation. The basic idea of a tethered system itself is very innovative,
especially in light of potential applications mentioned earlier, and others not mentioned. The basic
physics of the problem of using tethered systems centers around the conservation of momentum of the
orbit. In this case, the orbiter and the satellite are a system in a specific orbit at a certain energy level,
which must be held constant. The tether keeps the two bodies, though separated, operating as one
orbiting system with the energy level of the system before the tethered satellite was deployed. A
deployment force (thrusters) moves the satellite out from where the two end masses were initially in the
same orbit. The gravity gradient force is proportional to the separation distance. After a certain distance
from the orbiter, the combination of gravity gradient and centrifugal forces are sufficient to overcome
system losses (friction) and continue the separation. Because the two masses are constrained by the
tether, the upper mass gains a higher kinetic energy per unit mass than the lower mass. The tether
constraint causes the orbiter and satellite to have the same angular velocity. During deployment, the
lower mass will drag the upper mass until libration occurs. This results in momentum transfer through
the tether from the upper to lower mass as tension. The off-vehicle attitude is caused by the Coriolis
term of the acceleration expression creating libration of the system as the tether length is changed (fig.
143). The Coriolis force is perpendicular to the Earth's radius for radial deployment/retrieval.
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Figure 136. TSS-1.
154
Deployer-Satellite-EMP Pallet Interfaces
TSS-t Satellite _ _ _ F Sate
Support i_ ,"
Struts Tether Reel
Satellite Support Slruclure
Lower Boom
Tether Control Mechanism
Coldplate Mounted Equipment
tllite Restraint Latches (6)
Assembly
Closed-Circuit TV (CCTV) (2)
Figure 137. TSS-1 deployer mechanism.
..o,
_,_ ._t/ external
Oocking ring_ y_- ..: tl_ ring
l_Tip can
I, i.W------Satellite
_. dep 1oyment
boom
SSA 454 ring--______.__
Im-----1- ::J==F. s,telltte
II I I II"4t'r support
cture
Pallet'-"'__
Figure 138. TSS-1 in cargo bay partially deployed.
155
TSS Satellite Deployment Scenario
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Figure 139. TSS-1 in cargo bay partially deployed.
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As the deployed system moves around the orbit with the new center of gravity located on the
original orbit, it cuts through the low density atmosphere and the Earth's magnetic field. The
aerodynamic drag deflects the tether, as do Earth's magnetic fields (fig. 144). Cutting through Earth's
magnetic field causes a current flow, the direction of which can make it a generator or a thruster. Notice
also that the two bodies are now in different orbits, thus cutting the tether has an orbit change effect.
Obviously, many possibilities exist then for the use of tethers. It can be deployed earthward and used as
a sensor in the atmosphere. Sent outward, it can do science. The reader can explore these and many
more ideas in reference 73. There were many ingenious ideas used for TSS-1. Since most were used to
solve problems of the mechanism or of the system interaction with the environment, they will be
discussed in the next section on problems.
3. Problems
a. Dynamics. As discussed above, the orbiter-tether-satellite system interacts dynamically and
with the environment, setting up several modes of dynamic oscillation. These modes are shown as if the
orbiter was fixed, which is a fair assumption due to the relative differences in mass of the orbiter and
satellite (fig. 145). The libration mode can be damped by changing the tether tension with the correct
phasing with the motion. The pendulous mode can be damped with the satellite attitude control, if
needed. The major problem is the tether string mode governed by the tether length and tension. This
mode can be set up by the aerodynamic or electromagnetic forces, the greatest being the electro-
magnetic. As the tether is pulled in during deployment, due to energy conservation and the tether length
changes, the amplitude and frequency increase. As the length shortens to around 600 m, the string mode
and the satellite spin mode get in resonance, causing large satellite angular excursions. The results are
either the inability to dock the satellite due to the misalignment or the loss of tether tension, hence,
control. The basic problem is how to damp the tether skiprope so that there is not much energy avail-
able for resonating with the satellite spin motion. This skiprope management problem is
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complicated by the difficulty of sensing the amplitude, phase, and frequency of the skiprope dynamics.
It can be inferred by the dynamics it introduces into the satellite, by visual observations from the orbiter,
or by some other end effector sensor. It was decided to the use the telemetered satellite control system
data (rate gyros output) as the data source to infer the skiprope dynamics. Two ground operations data
processing schemes were developed to determine the tether skiprope state. The first was essentially a
Kalman filter that worked in the time domain. The second was a frequency domain scheme. Both pro-
duced accurate predictions and were used during the TSS-1 mission. The time domain filter was pri-
mary, with the frequency domain as backup. Numerous computer simulations were run with known
skiprope conditions to verify the approaches. With this ability to determine the skiprope characteristics
in real-time, the ability to deal with the skiprope problem was available.
The solution to the problem was then a multifaceted approach for containment of skiprope, pro-
ducing successful satellite recovery, and the elimination of safety concerns involving the orbiter and
crew. The basis of the approach was to determine how much skiprope amplitude could be handled from
600 m and provide a means of damping skiprope below this level prior to entering this period of satellite
retrial. The elements of this approach were: (1) observing the skiprope amplitude and phase using
satellite information (rate gyro telemetry data) as discussed above, (2) orbiter yaw maneuver during the
second period of science at the 2.4-km distance based on the observed data to reduce the skiprope
amplitude below 20 m (the amplitude that could be handled during reel in from 2.4 km),
(3) attitude control of the satellite during the resonance period discussed above, and (4) use of a passive
tether damper to suppress the skiprope as the satellite gets close to the orbiter.
The passive damper was an innovation within itself. Figure 146 shows the damper installed in
the docking ring. It consists of a yoke and ring through which the tether is passed from the reel below
and three small negator motors located 120 ° apart on the docking ring attached with cables to the
yoke/ring; thus, as the tether moves, the yoke/ring moves the cables and the negator motors provide
damping to the skiprope. The design trick was how to get enough damping without getting so much that
the yoke/ring forced a new end point for the tether, therefore, providing no damping. Through much
testing, including testing in a thermal vacuum chamber, this design goal was achieved.
_F Exisling
Docking
_ °°
Nega|or Spring Motor
Assembly
Figure 146. TSS-1 tethered satellite passive damper configuration.
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Actual flight of TSS- 1 showed conclusively that the multifaceted approach worked with little or
no skiprope and successful satellite docking.
b. Tether Hang-Up. TSS-1 was not successful due to tether reel hang-up at 256 m of deploy-
ment. Many attempts were made to free the system and deploy the tether, but none were successful and
the satellite was retrieved and returned to Earth for assessment and a later reflight.
Tether hang-up was caused by the installation of a larger bolt on the reel attachment to the pallet
in order to eliminate a negative structural margin of safety for the shuttle lift-off loads. The larger,
longer bolt protruded into the path of the level wind mechanism, catching it and locking it up in the
deploy direction precluding further deployment. A simple change, not verified for its system effects,
caused the loss of a potentially outstanding mission. The message is clear: changes must be verified for
their effects.
Other problems occurred during development, but they centered around the typical problems of
the development of mechanism and normal hardware and electrical fit problems. The development of
mechanisms of deployment provided the greatest challenge. The deployable/retrieval truss technology
was well developed by the time of TSS-1 and proved to be no real challenge.
L. National Launch System/Space Transportation Main Engine (NLS/STME)
Although the NLS/STME program was canceled, it was an early attempt to work a program
using Government/industry product development teams and other changes in the contractor's
relationship with the Government. The program was, in reality, a joint NASA and Air Force venture
where NASA was the basic program manager for the engine. All this restructuring was taking place at
the time of the peak of the Deming movement on quality in the United States and was influential in the
approaches used for this program.
Initially, the program had a major concern over the NASA-leveled criteria and requirements. In
order to deal with this issue, the first thrust was focused on the STME. The STME was to be developed
by a contractor consortium composed of Rocketdyne, Pratt & Whitney, and Aerojet, with oversight by
MSFC, using a chief engineer and a project or program chief. The contractor-led group was located in
Huntsville, near MSFC, with the basic work accomplished at each of the contractor's plants. The con-
tractors not only had the management of the total system at Huntsville, but had a manager at each plant.
In order to efficiently design and build an engine in this manner, the engine was divided by components
and assigned to the individual contractor's plants. Since the basic criteria and requirements came from
Marshall's Science and Engineering Directorate, it was decided to form a team composed of the con-
tractors' leads and the deputy directors of Marshall's Science and Engineering Directorate. The team
was led by NASA. The team started the process by visiting each contractor's plant and discussing the
program philosophy and the impacts of the current NASA criteria, etc., on program cost, etc. As the
team progressed in this activity, it became clear that the requirements and criteria, to some extent,
depended upon the management approach chosen by both Government and industry. The team spent a
major effort in setting up this approach.
The basic philosophy chosen was the institution of joint Government/industry product design
teams basically chosen for each engine component, plus an engine system and engine team. The teams
were to be pure design and manufacturing teams responsible for the product, including cost and
schedule. There was to be no distinction between the Government and contractor members, where each
worked their various tasks and together decided key issues. A steering committee was set up to guide the
program and resolve issues, and the program proceeded.
With this approach in place, the team could move into working requirements and criteria. Having
Government specialists as working members of the PDT's allowed sustainable reductions in
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documentationrequirements(150 reports reducedto approximately20). The criteria were worked
separatelyusingspecialistteamsof Government/contractormembers.Theguidelinesgivento theteams
werethat the criteria containno "how to's" andbe restrictedto critical mandatorycriteria to ensure
safety.The criteria were not to determinethe designsolution, freeing the design teamsto do good
engineeringwithout undueconstraints.Criteriawerereducedby approximately80percent.
At the time of programcancellation,the teamswereworking andsomedevelopmenthardware
wasmanufactured.Although this first approachwasnot perfect,it seta precedencethat laterprograms
haveimprovedupon.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Capturing what studying problems and experiences have revealed into a summary is very diffi-
cult; therefore, it is with some trepidation and risk that this necessary task is accomplished. Conclusions
are in the eyes of the beholder. Each should feel free to draw their own conclusions from the text. In
general terms, each separate set is valid and should be attempted. Woven into this fabric of "lessons
learned" is the naturally evolving formation and interaction of the design, analysis, and science groups
in a maturing technical organization. Central to the development of a product is the creative design
engineer, whose primary function is consumed with the work ideas and who is focused on the advanced
product, and its performance and reliability in all the interacting disciplines and the robust system.
Most of the time, the product performs well as designed, and sometimes it works adequately for
the wrong assumptions and phenomena, usually under less sensitive or demanding environments. How-
ever, where the appropriate emerging environments trigger the unsuspected phenomena that lead to
failure (Challenger SRM O-ring, SRB ignition overpressure, SRB aft skirt failure, etc.), experts are
drawn from the scientific staff and institutions to complement the design core analysts groups to resolve
the problems and establish another lesson learned.
What this implies is that a different mind set and skills are required for the different jobs in the
process, from science to design to problem solving. Universities have moved away from this under-
standing and now depend too much on the computer/analysis without putting the students into the real
world in order to develop the intuition required for design and problem solution. Students need to have
experience with hardware failures. Ferguson, in "Engineering and the Mind's Eye," an MIT publication,
has an excellent discussion on this viewpoint.
The author challenges each reader to compile their own valid set, corollaries, and derivatives.
. Engineering has evolved from an overall system design performed by a chief designer in
general at a drafting table to a design of specialization using large computers and work
stations. This is accomplished through compartmentalization, first into subsystems, elements,
and components. Then, each of these is separated out by disciplines. As each task by
discipline is accomplished, it is integrated into the component, then the element, the sub-
system, and finally the system (fig. 147). Looking at this evolved process, several lessons are
obvious:
a. The integrity of the product is in the system, since nothing exists in isolation and only per-
forms in the system as a system. "Now whenever a change is made, by the passage of
energy, and a result is left, it takes place in a group of things," David Pye.
b. The lack of a system focus is the main cause of loss of product integrity (problems) and is
not the result of missing technology.
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Figure 147. Design process.
C. The need is for the indepth specialist, with a system focus/viewpoint, to parallel with a
sound approach to systems integration that starts with analysis and test and ends with
hardware. The paradox faced is: how do you maintain the specialization yet be a generalist
and have a system focus?
d. The large volume of data/information generated requires the collapsing of the data into
general physical symbols so that understanding is ensured. Corollary computer simulations
must have the ability to go from wide angle (general) to telescopic (details) when required.
Example: general stress field versus stress concentration at a weld or flaw.
e. Metrics for the system design must be established that include cost, performance, opera-
tions, manufacturability, and reliability.
f. Design is a balancing act between conflicting requirements. You must take some of what
you do not want to achieve approximately what you want--always a trade that involves
risk, complexity, cost, performance, and verification.
g. Senge's fifth discipline 6 emphasizes the learning organization and the importance of sys-
tems, two very important parts of any successful organization and product development. In
other words, nothing operates "on an island"; it reacts and causes reactions, all of which
must be understood and balanced. We design systems based on our understanding of
specialties and how they interact together.
2. Insurance for survival of a product, program, or organization depends on its ability to
develop a three-pronged interrelationship focus consisting of people (skills), tools (includes
facilities), and technologies. It is, therefore, a learning organization that balances the three
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aspects, where problem history analysis becomes the fulcrum of the process. Taking away or
minimizing any one of the three prongs creates instability, ensuring the long-term failure.
Taking away the fulcrum takes away the basis for any insurance.
We must be constantly open to the challenges of the future, i.e., to changes and new tech-
nologies that bring about change. These challenges are not only the bevy of technical moun-
tains to climb, but must include processes, management, etc. Our openness to these chal-
lenges implies that we must identify profitable changes and aggressively accommodate them.
Successful engineering, organizations, and design are based on the quality of the people
involved--personal competency. Every person individually and every organization
collectively must be continuously growing (a learning organization). The message is two
fold: (a) search for opportunities for growth and (b) treat every experience, good or bad, as a
challenge for growth. Every situation contains those potentials. Look for them. Personal
entrepreneurship is, therefore, the hallmark of nobility for successful design and organiza-
tional growth. It involves empowerment, trust, constant training, and a learning environment
that develops the total person.
Criteria or legal requirements must be simple, concise, and direct, providing order to the
engineering, but not overpowering to where they stifle creativity and remove responsibility
(Dupree). Criteria cannot replace good engineering, they should be quiet aids.
6. Models are just that, models, and are only as good as the assumptions used.
.
.
a. All analyses are simulations that are not complete (limited), which attempt to predict
trends and what will happen. Models are not, therefore, exact representations of physicals.
b. A test (components, subsystems, systems, scale models, etc.) only partially replicates real-
life situations. It is biased by the limited insight and provisions of the test engineer. You
generally get what you are looking for. Improper boundary conditions can invalidate a
costly test.
c. How you put the analysis and test together in a cohesive unit to get a validated design is
the major problem engineers face.
d° Computer/codes are used as a cookbook and not as an extension of the human mind--a
major error. Cookbook approaches save a lot of time and energy, but can and do miss the
phenomenon. They are only aids to complement the human mind.
What you do up front to understand the system determines the product's performance and
quality. Poor concept selection can never be righted with outstanding design engineering
(Pugh). Spend the money up front and get the right concept, then good design engineering is
effective.
To ensure that design is practiced effectively and efficiently, it is necessary to utilize tech-
niques that enable the team to operate the design activity. According to Pugh, the designer's
tool kit must include.
a. Independent analysis techniques, modeling, etc., applicable to any project or discipline
b. Dependent techniques and technologies/knowledge to include:
stress
thermal
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dynarhics
fluids
controlandavionics.
9. Leadershipis the key to the future of any project/products'success.The sameis true of
organizations.
a. Themetricof leadershipis theindividual andcollectivegrowthof its people
b. Theleaderis a servant(Greenleaf,Covey,Dupree,Senge,Peck)
c. Thepeoplecreatetheleaderandgive him thepower
d. Leadershipisdoingoneactionata time
e. Leadershipinterests,whathe spendshis time on, andthe rewardspassedout determine
whathegets.
10. Teamingis aneffectiveapproachto ensureproject/programsuccess.
a. Theteamcanperformlittle betterthantheskills of its people
b. "The tendencyof a teamis to performat the lowestlevel of its members.Leadershipand
synergycan raise its performanceabovethe level of the best teammembers,"Senge.
Thereis noonebestteamingapproach.Theteamapproachselectionmustmatchthetasks.
11. Theconceptselectionanddesignprocessiskey to aqualityproduct:
- Progressive,convergent,increasingin depthconceptselection
- Sensitivityandtradesto identify keyparameters
- Systemfocus
- Interdisciplinaryanalysis/design.
12. Requirementsarethemantelthatdeterminetheproduct'scharacteristics,goodorbad.
- Mustbechallengedwith minimumconstraints
- Minimumchange
- Minimum requiredto maintainorder
- Leaveroomfor creativedesign(donotdictatedesign).
13. Models/analysis/simulationsarevirtual reality. Reality is in the hardware/systemtesting.
Readit; thehardwarecontainstheanswer.
14. Lessonsfrom the pastcontain the keys to the future, if used appropriately.Used indis-
criminatelyaspointsof departurefor extrapolationcanleadto majorproblems.
165
166
15. It is prudentto designfor fatigueandfracturecontrol,especiallyfor reusablesystems:
- Two differentdesignpoints
- Materialscharacterizationatright temperaturesnecessary
- NDEmustbequantified
- Eliminatedynamictuningasa fatiguemitigationtechnique
- Proof testinghasmerit if properlyused.
16. All designsmust havea systemfocus. Discipline focusedskills must be sharpenedand
honed,but neverin isolation:
- Technicalcommunication
- Teaming
- Interfacecontroldocuments(ICD's).
17. Designfor instrumentationduringdevelopment,thentestto off-nominal conditionsandthen
to failure.
18. You must constantlybe awareof, andguard against,dynamictuning betweenstructural,
fluid, mechanical,electrical,andacousticalsystems.
19. Rotordynamicshasbeenamajor designissue.Attack it up front anddesignfor it:
- Know environments
- Model in detail
- Teststructuresdynamically
- Planfor dampingaugmentation
- Pursuevariousoptionsfor rotorsupportsystems.
20. Cost, operations,manufacturability,and supportabililtymustbe a fundamentalpart of the
designequation.Metricsmustbedevelopedto support:
- Costandoperationalefficiencyrequiresamultiprongedapproach
(1) Calculatedrisk-taking/managementthat obviously includesa detailedassessmentof
consequencesmustbeapartof this risk-taking
(2) Product improvementthat reducescost and improvesoperations;reduction of the
numberof parts,simplicity,androbustnessarepartsof thisequation
(3) Developmentof criteria and requirementsthat neither over-specifynor dictate the
designsolution.
All this must be accomplishedwithout violating basic physics and while using good
engineeringpractices.
21. Thereis no smallchange.Effectsof changes usually have large magnification factors.
22. Failures will occur during design, development, and operations. Through the use of concur-
rent engineering teams composed of a cadre of all the potential specialists involved,
including manufacturing and processing, and using a formal fault tree approach (fishbone
works just as well),.the probe causes and solution can efficiently be found. All organizations
should be trained early in both teaming and fault tree analysis.
23. Regardless of the technical adequacy/integrity of the answer, it always has to be sold politi-
cally; therefore, it must become part of the design culture either by changing the culture or
the recommendation. In other words, the proposal must always be politically viable.
Engineers, therefore, must also be salesmen.
24. Quality must be built in, not inspected in. Inspections are only for insurance; therefore,
quality must be a mainstay in the design team's discipline makeup.
25. Understanding and using statistics/probabilities approaches are fundamental for conducting
studies, evaluating data, manufacturing hardware, understanding and quantifying sensitivi-
ties, and performing operations.
26. Maintaining electronic data bases of analysis, tests, and flights are necessary and should be
planned for. Electronic transfer of data and networking is necessary in today's multilocation
workforce. Communication is aided greatly by these approaches.
27. Design of experiments is an effective tool for both analysis and test planning and should be
in each engineer's tool kit.
It would not be appropriate to conclude this report without making some statement as to the
future challenges that face space exploration and what some of the present technology focus implies.
The biggest challenge facing space exploration is, "How do you effectively consider cost along with per-
formance and reliability as design metrics?" The biggest problem is obtaining the cost metrics so that
appropriate trades can be made and a true optimum system designed. This is complicated by the fact that
part of the cost metrics indicates higher performance and fewer launch stages, which greatly complicates
the equation since higher performance indicates greater sensitivities to uncertainties that include, but are
not limited to, manufacturing, environments, operations, and evolving requirements. For example, a
single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO) launch vehicle must balance three different efficiencies to narrow margins
if it is to meet both performance and cost goals. To a large extent, meeting these is a paradox in that to
get one will result in a costly change in another. The three keys are: (1) a highly efficient propulsion
system that not only includes Isp, but includes thrust and thrust-to-weight; (2) structural or dry mass
efficiency (this is not only the basic structure, but includes TPS, components, avionics, etc.); and (3) to
manage the losses (managing the margins) that includes technology readiness degradations,
environments surprises, etc. Past launch vehicles had many impacts due to not properly managing the
losses, resulting in load increases, inefficient trajectories, etc. Managing the losses effectively is a major
challenge. This means that sensitivities must be well understood, traded, and managed. For example,
high acceleration during the near-Earth phase of flight is efficient for managing gravity losses, but
creates unacceptable loads for the structure and for the humans. True optimum trajectories create large
aerodynamic loads, which are not acceptable. Load relief control reduces these loads, but introduces
path deviations, thus performance loses. Then when the vehicle moves back toward the optimum after
leaving the high-density part of the atmosphere, large angles of attack are introduced, increasing thermal
environments. Leaving the Earth's atmosphere, Isp is important for propulsion system efficiency.
Clearly then, understanding environments, sensitivities, and trades from a system viewpoint is
mandatory in order to meet the challenges of the future. The same types of things are true for satellites,
upper stages, etc.; however, the tent poles vary and are considered different parameters.
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The hypersonicaerodynamicvehicleis gettinga lot of emphasisandis a clearchallengeof the
future.Thechallengebasicallyfollowstheareasdiscussedin theproceedingparagraphs.
Delivering a cost-effective, minimum operating, intense space station is still in front of us
although much work has been accomplished. Much fine tuning and effective procedures still must be
developed.
Payloads, satellites, science, upper stages, etc., face the same set of challenges--reduced cost
while maintaining performance. This is very difficult for all systems. The challenge is to break the
cultural loop, reducing criteria, etc. For example, satellite missions could be structured so that more, but
much smaller, systems could achieve the same goals without the big costly one-of-a-kind satellite, where
a failure is a tragedy. The challenge is not only to attack how we can build and operate the system
cheaper, but also how we plan for achieving science.
Finally, the prime challenge is to get back to the basic that accepts failure as a stepping stone to
knowledge and not a failure. Engineering today cannot tolerate failure; which is leading to a protection
(low risk) design that in the end will stifle space exploration. Space exploration involves risks, risks that
must be calculated and minimized but not eliminated. Probably this is the hardest task engineering faces
in the future.
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APPENDIX A
The purpose of this appendix is to provide, by projects, a listing of the various problems
encountered and understood by the author (not the total set, since they were in disciplines not part of my
experience). The problems are summarized in matrix form, giving problem areas, problem statement,
problem cause, and problem resolution. In some cases, an outline of the problem matrix precedes it. This
brief summary should provide engineers with a starting point for design problem avoidance. It should be
recognized, however, as was stated previously, that every design is a design of compromises and a
design for failure, hopefully at a predetermined time and condition. Thus, problems cannot be avoided--
they are in the nature of design. Over design, as well as under design, can kill. Design is a balancing act.
In addition to the problem matrices, specific lessons learned are discussed and, in some cases,
particularly for the SSME, additional discussions of specific problems not discussed earlier in this paper
are presented. It is hoped that this added discussion will provide some more indepth insight into the
influence that high-performance requirements have on product sensitivities and problem occurrences. As
the author has pointed out in other publications, the sensitivity of the system varies nonlinearly with the
performance requirements) -3 The sensitivity is not only to environment unknowns, but includes
requirement changes, manufacturing tolerances and mishaps, and hardware aging. The SSME is a great
example of an outstanding machine that has high performance. The same is true of the total shuttle
vehicle and also for the HST. The key lesson to grasp is the total design process, so that during design
and development, shortcuts are not taken that lead to repeating past problems.
I. REDSTONE/JUPITER
The author's scope of activities was much narrower during the Redstone and Jupiter programs;
therefore, the matrix of problems is greatly restricted. However, the impacts of these problems on our
thinking and lessons learned were probably the greatest of any program. The problems experienced
taught some very powerful lessons, including insight into several system interactions.
The structural control jitter that occurred on Redstone during control system checkout, while the
vehicle was horizontal in a cradle, illustrates the subtleties of structural dynamics and control coupling.
The spacing of the potentiometer was such that the stepwise control impulse tuned with the first bending
mode. Dynamic coupling is a major concern in designing space systems. The fix was simple; break the
coupling loop either with a filter or use a continuous rate gyro pickup (sensor). Propellant sloshing
taught the same lesson in vehicle systems interactions. Sloshing also illustrated the need to have good
simple models of the dynamic characteristics.
Redstone and Jupiter reinforced the need to develop technologies, models, and data pertinent to
the project under development. No project can work all the potential technologies, etc.; therefore,
informed prioritization of tasks is required for program efficiency.
The matrix (table A-I) lists the key problems from control coupling, to aerodynamics, and to
thermal protection. The thermal problems were plume heating and the payload reentry, both requiring
protection of components and structure from the heating environments. Extensive effort has been spent
in the years since Redstone and Jupiter to further define both reentry and plume heating environments
and protection systems. The development of the effects of plumes on launch vehicles is a very complex
technology, from both an analysis and a testing standpoint. Scaling plumes in test, as well as
measurements during flights, is very difficult. Plumes not only produce base heating, but affect vehicle
drag, shift aerodynamic distributions, etc. Clearly, individual disciplines such as propulsion system
design create system problems due to systems interactions, as discussed above. All successful projects
have a good systems focus. Designers and engineers should not only be specialists, but must have a
system focus.
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Table A-1. Redstone/Jupiter.
Element Problem
Redstone
Control
Vehicle
Aerodynamics
Guidance/Control
Jupiter
Vehicle
Closed loop vibration of
structure/control systems
Oscillating shock off the
nose cone setup acoustical
excitation
Aerodynamic loads during
ascent through jet stream
created large structural
stress fields
Performance loss due to
wind, etc., induced trajec-
tory drift from optimum
Instability of control
system during max "q"
caused loss of vehicle
Loss of control during max
"q" due to loss of control
signal, loss of vehicle (first
flight)
Aerodynamic unstable
vehicle control without use
of fin (aerodynamic
compensation)
Payload reentry thermal
environment excessive
Problem Cause Problem Solution
Rate gyro potentiometer
feedback as wiper ann
jumped between wires
from structural dynamic
excitation, drove
vanes/rudders, further
exciting vehicle structural
dynamics
Angles of nose cone, etc.,
coupled with flow field
Wind-induced angle-of-
attack produced large
aerodynamic loads on
vehicle structure
Vehicle attitude control
responses to winds, etc.,
caused deviations from
optimal flight path
Propellant slosh dynamics
coupled with the control
system causing unstable
feedback and forced by the
trajectory tilt step
command
Plume heating/recircula-
tion burned the control
signal wires to the
actuators, causing loss of
control signal
i
Control authority require-
ments were excessive
using jet vanes or injection
methods
Aerodynamic heating
during reentry
Redesigned gyro pickup to
provide a continuous
signal
Designed structure to
withstand oscillating load
Load relief control logic
using Edcliff vane angle-
of-attack meter to generate
an angle-of-attack control
signal allowed vehicle
rigid-load relief (evolved
for Jupiter to pressure
sensors then to
accelerometers)
Developed drift minimum
control laws that balanced
between attitude control
and path deviations.
Introduction of propellant
damping into the
propellant tank and base
lining of a continuous rate
gyro signal pickup
Design and installation of
protective heat shield over
vehicle base with movable
port to accommodate
engine gimbal
Designed, developed, and
implemented an engine
gimbal ball to take out the
thrust loads and gimbal the
engine 7* in each axis for
control; roll control
accomplished using reac-
tion jet control system
Designed, developed, and
implemented ablative
covering of the structure,
eliminating the problem
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lI. SATURN/SATURN APOLLO/SATURN SKYLAB
These programs were the foundations of space exploration, ending with the "Moon walk" and
the Skylab space station. The problem list (table A-2) again is restricted due to the author's experience
level on these projects, but is very significant in terms of lessons learned due not only to the fact it was
on the frontier, but also the magnitude and scope of the endeavor. Landing a man on the Moon and
returning him safely to Earth was a major achievement.
Saturn clearly emphasized the importance of dynamics, dynamics and control interaction, and
systems focus in the design, development, and operations of complex launch systems. Most of the tools
and techniques of dynamics have their roots in the Apollo program. The importance of fracture control,
particularly for propellant tanks, was realized, with the first use of proof testing tanks starting on Saturn.
Buckling of large propellant tanks was brought to the forefront, teaching the need to design for, and
understanding potential failure modes, particularly those that have a medium-to-high risk of occurring.
Saturn indicated that it was prudent to design for robustness in order to have flexibility during develop-
ment and operations, as was discussed previously. Although in today's world of austerity, it probably is
not feasible now, Saturn clearly showed the advantage of evolutionary design using prototypes or flight
test vehicles to develop and verify critical subsystems, etc., as was done using Saturn I and lB. Saturn
was an excellent example of taxing the current program to provide facilities and technologies for future
systems. The plume heating technologies, dynamic and static structural test facilities, hot fire propulsive
test facilities, finite element structure modeling, modal coupling, etc., are examples.
The matrix (table A-3) contains some of the problems that occurred during the Saturn program.
IlL SKYLAB SPACE STATION
The Skylab space station was the first long-term American demonstration of humans living and
working in space. The human perspective was not only utilized to conduct science, but was the key to
saving the spacecraft due to the problems experienced during ascent launch. This was exemplified in
several ways by the several repair activities that occurred during the first two missions. The first was
releasing the hung-up (undeployed) solar array (the other solar array was lost during ascent) and
deploying a Sun shade (parasol) out the small workshop port. Releasing the stuck solar array required
several tries during EVA's, finally cutting the strap that constrained the array with bolt cutters. These
activities, along with orientation changes, etc., put the station back in working order and allowed a full
duration mission of the ATM and other sciences. On the second mission, a larger more effective Sun
shade was carried up and installed using astronauts EVA further enchancing the operational capability of
SkyIab. During the mission, a few other problems occurred, all of which had more than adequate
workarounds.
The Skylab missions taught many lessons, the most important being "that the ability to recover
from major problems is the secret to successful projects." Human presence in space greatly enhances the
ability to recover from problems that occur. The other major lesson clearly was: do not create a gap in
the Nation's launch capability. Since the shuttle had not flown and the Saturn program had been
canceled, the orbit decaying Skylab station could not be reboosted, although it was still functioning and
could have served as an interim station. The robustness built into Skylab allowed the potential, even
though Skylab had been inactive many years.
The matrix (table A-3) lists some of the key problems Skylab experienced during development
and operations.
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Table A-2. Saturn.
Element Problem Problem Cause Problem Solution
Vehicle Wind sounding balloon was unstable Balloon was smooth-skinned, Redesigned the balloon to have
during ascent, creating erroneous creating a type of vortex shedding, spikes patterned after golf ball
data inducing unwanted balloon dimples to eliminate the unwanted
oscillations oscillations
SI-C pogo
S-II pogo
Ground winds caused a vehicle
oscillation while attached to the pad,
creating large base bending
momen!s
SI-C oscillating plume
S-II oscillating shock
SIV-B panel flutter
SIV-B propellant utilization (PU)
guidance and control coupling
Excessive max "q" loads due to
wind gust and steady-state winds
Excessive instrument unit deflection
at the rate gyro location created
control/structural inaction instability
Hydroelastic (shell mode propellant
dynamic coupling)
Dynamic test data contaminated by
vehicle test suspension system mode
Simulating free-free conditions for
launch vehicle dynamic test
Vehicle longitudinal bending modes
coupled with the hydroelastic tank
and acoustical propellant duct
modes, creating oscillating thrust
that amplified the structural
oscillations (unstable)
Same as SI-C pogo; filling
accumulator during S-II engine start
gave a short-term tuning of
structural and propulsion system
Vortex shedding of cantilevered
vehicle attached to launch pad
Stiffness/frequency of panel was too
low, causing structural panel mode
to couple with aerodynamics
Propellant sloshing gave a dynamic
oscillation of propellant level,
creating guidance and control
signals that feedback, increasing the
propellant oscillation
Rigid-body accelerometers load
relief control amplified gust induced
vehicle structural dynamics
response; rigid-body wind angle-of-
attack coupled with attitude control,
creating large aerodynamic loads
The load path from the service
module came in at an angle through
the fairings, creating local deflection
at rate gyro location, increasing
structural gains, introducing
instability
Inability to model coupling between
fluid and structure
Dynamic modes of suspension
system coupled with vehicle lateral
bending
Vehicle constrained at base does not
simulate free-free flight conditions
Designed and installed an
accumulator on the feed line,
detuning the system; no occurrences
of SI-C pogo since
Problem was shown to not be
damaging; no fix instituted
Designed and installed damper near
top of vehicle between vehicle and
service tower
Lived with problem; no observed
impacts
No impacts
Stiffened panel, raising frequency
Designed a filter to filter out the
slosh dynamics, giving steady-state
fuel level signal; due to other
problems, PU was eliminated
• Eliminated rigid-body load relief
• Instituted monthly mean wind-
biased trajectory
• Instituted control to augment
structural damping in first two
lateral bending modes
Changed location of rate gyro where
local deflections were not present
Developed finite element model of
fluid and structure and verified with
dynamic test
Tied suspension cables at the center
(2 by 4) to test stand to shift cable
frequency
• Suspended vehicle using elastic
cables
• Suspended vehicle base on an oil
bearing (free-free lateral modes
only)
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Table A-2. Saturn (continued).
Element Problem Problem Cause Problem Solution
Scale model dynamic test mode Manufacturing tolerances not scaled Scaled manufacturing tolerances to
contamination as vehicle geometry created same scale at the vehicle geometry
nonlinear movement in tolerance
space
Complex modes of clustered tanks
difficult to model
Engines
SIV-B Stage
SIV-B Sky/ab fairing failure during
ascent damaging Skylab solar arrays
Increased vehicle loads during
ascent for Saturn V Skylab
configuration
Propellant feedline gimbal bellows
had a flow instability
SIV-B shell mode coupling with
control
Large fluid motions created at
engine shutdown on orbit
Individual propellant tanks of cluster
dynamically coupled, creating
complex load paths and dynamic
models
Improper venting of solar array
compartment during ascent caused
delta pressure buildup that failed
fairing and solar array
Aerodynamic shape change due to
elimination of command/service
module, creating big change in
aerodynamic distributions, creating
large moment
Fluid flow across bellows created
flow instability (type of vortex
shedding)
The deflection/frequency of shell
mode created dynamic control
structural coupling that was
feedback, creating instability
Energy conservation from high g to
low g greatly amplified propellant
dynamics, reducing propellant
ullage pressure and potential engine
restart problems
Generated special models that
produced individual modes of tank
elements with appropriate boundary
conditions and then coupled them to
system using Lagrangian equations
and verified by dynamic test; this
was a forerunner of present day
model coupling techniques
• On-orbit installation of new
Sky/ab thermal shield
• Astronauts space walk to free
second solar array
Cleared for launch using monthly
mean wind biasing and probabilistic
instead of deterministic loads
analysis
Installed liners inside the bellows,
eliminating unsteady flow
Designed and installed a control
signal filter, eliminating unwanted
shell mode dynamics
Installed large nylon baffles
Zero-g sloshing instability Coupling of sloshing dynamics with Tailored control system logic and
control system installed slosh baffles
No slosh damping in lox tank Reoriented slosh baffleBaffle orientation was such that
propellant flowed along baffle
instead of against it; propellant
surface is perpendicular to vehicle
acceleration vector (acts as a free-
falling object)
Inadequate slosh model Slosh model did not contain rotary A rotary inertia term to slosh model
inertia effect of propellant sloshing
Slosh dynamics characterization
beyond computer capability when
vehicle dynamics and control were
added
Solution of hydrodynamics
equations consumed computer
capability
Developed mechanical analogy
(mass spring damper) to
hydrodynamic solution by curve
fitting model parameters; verified
with dynamic test
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Table A-3. Lessons learned.
Element [ Problem [ Problem Cause [ Problem Solution
St-y/ab
OWS Loss of meteoroid shield Aero proturberance and Improved systems analysis
improper venting of m/shield
OWS EBW failed functional test Conformal coating flow caused Changed to maintain close, tight
circuit interruption fit to prevent flow
OWS, ATM 304 CRES corrosion caused Intergranular corrosion caused Metal reinforcement added for
CDF end fitting to split by carbide precipitation of the Sky/ab; process changed for
grain boundaries and exposure future hardware
to moisture
AIM False stars for star trackers Explosive components with Material change
metallic name plates and I.D.
tapes caused false stars for the
star trackers
OWS Viton static seal leak Cold flow plus sterilizing Changed to silicon seals;
process accelerated the problem considered nonoperational
environments for materials
OWS Ice bridge from liquid dump Liquid contacted another Do not let liquid contact another
surface before the liquid surface before phase into ice
changed to ice
MDA Moisture leaks in payload Overpressurization purge is Payload shrouds must be water
shroud inadequate to prevent rain leaks tight
OWS Paint debond Wear and flaking Use adhesive-backed materials
or permanent finishes
Airlock Coolant leak Mechanical connections Weld or braze connections
Airlock Reduced heat exchanger flow Dust/debris accumulation Incorporate replaceable filters
OWS, airlock Sticking valves Particulate contamination Avoid small clearances, filter
placement, use ultrasonic
cleaning
Spacelab
SL racks Rack STR margins Load increases Include good margins
Resource demandSL avionics air system
SL module
SL condensate dump
Very limited resource Allow for flow degradation due
to filter blockage or schedule
time for cleaning
New hardware stowage Fit check too late in KSC flow Fit check with flight hardware
prior to flight flow sequence
Not possible since correct
Q.D.'s were not stowed
Orbiter wanted to dump with SL
system
Add correct Q.D.'s to SL or
orbiter stowage
SL IML-2 CO 2 level requirement from Late definition of low CO 2 Early definition of requirement
principal investigator_ (P.l.'s) requirement important
not defined early
SL-1 Window cover thermal Crew failed to install cover Develop better timeline for
constraints violated before solar exposure requalifying window
SL remote acquisition unit Data skips with increased freon Design deficiency and limit Hardware modification
(RAU) temperature quality testing
Space Station
Modules Condensation M/D attachments and Guard heaters
penetrations
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AERO
Aerodynamics
Ignition transient
loads
Dynamic
Table A-4. Space shuttle systems.
Problem
Wing load increased over design;
discovered on first shuttle flights
Li ft-off acoustic
SRB ignition thrust created
overpressure wave that dynamically
drive the vehicle to 1 to 2 g's
response during lift-off on STS-I
High sensitivity of structural loads
during lift-off to model and
environment uncertainties
Element-to-element interface loads
sensitive to aerodynamics and
thrust vector variation
External lox tank buckling
External H 2 tank oil canning during
model excitation
Problem Cause
Inappropriate plume simulation in
wind tunnel testing led to
inaccurate aero distribution
prediction
Payload near the propulsion noise
source
Expanding SRB thrust compressed
air in flame trench/bucket, creating
overpressure wave
Dynamics of four bodies plus
payload are such that the elements
tune dynamically with low
damping, which creates high gains
and large sensitivities to frequency
content of environments
Aerodynamics and propulsion and
control forces created at two points
between each element
Small variations in environments
are reacted through long moment
al-ms
Propellant weight without internal
pressure
Dynamic test was conducted at
room temperature; therefore, SRB
to ET struts were canted
approximately 7 °, introducing roll
Problem Resolution
Beef-up wind leading edge
Change max "q" trajectory from
-2" to -6"
Accepted 5,000 performance hit
and launch probability reduction
Wind constraints
Day-of-launch l-load update
Water injection into propulsion
system flames
Water in injection
Water troughs for blockage (based
on 6.4 percent propulsive model
hot-fire test)
Characterized SRB pressure effects
on stiffness, also internal pressure
Dynamic test of elements and total
configuration 1/8, 1/4, and full
scale
300 mode dynamic lift-off analysis
for loads accuracy
2-sigma worse-on-worse parameter
variations for design loads
26 discrete design load cases
Time delay of SRB ignition to min
stored energy condition
Staggered SSME start and abort
shutdown
100 percent SSME lift-off
SRB case elongation characterized
Body-to-aero variations included in
design load
Structural beef-up in ET
Beef-up structure through increased
skin thickness
Fill tank against pressure
No fix required because flight will
be at cryo temperature; therefore,
struts will be perpendicular to tank
and main frame
SRB/ET/orbiter roll modes
ET Iox tank hydroelastic damping
very low at high fill levels
1/4 scaling impacts on
manufacturing
1/4 scale SRB attach fixture
distorted dynamic response
moment into aft main frame
The unsymmetrical coupling of the
elements through the interfaces
creates a rolling motion of the
element and pivoting of the
interfaces
Coupling between fluid dynamics
and structural shell modes of tank
Testing in l-g environments using
standard manufacturing problems,
creates exaggerated effects of joint
slope, etc.
Tolerances of the aft SRB strut to
ground fix was not rigid to ground,
changing test boundary conditions
Detailed dynamic test 1/8, 1/4, full
scale
Characterization of propellant
dynamics, pressure effects, etc.
Detailed finite element models of
elements modal coupled together
Detailed 3-D finite element
hydroelastic model generated to
mature modal characteristics
Redefined all manufacturing
tolerances for 1/4 scale to 1/4 of
standard tolerances
Redesigned test fixture to ensure
rigidity
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Table A-4. Space shuttle systems (continued).
AERO Problem Problem Cause Problem Resolution
Interdisciplinary
analysis/interaction
STS-5 i L, Challenger
Orbiter tile
Load relief control impacts
performance, thermal
environments, flutter boundaries,
and control authority
Performance loss due to "q"
constraints
SRB holddown bolt hangup
creating potential lift-off clearance
problems and extended hole in the
aft skirt
Day-of-launch constraints reduce
launch probability, causing launch
postponement for four shuttle
launches
SRB reentry imposed separation
conditions, impacts performance
Vehicle destroyed during flight due
to failed SRM causing loss of
vehicle control
Debris damages orbiter thermal
protection tiles, creating potential
safety problems and cost
refurbishment
Load relief drifts the vehicle off the
optimal trajectory; corrections
introduce large heating
environments and increases control
authority requirements
Meeting loads and flutter "q"
constraints requires combination of
SSME throttling and trajectory
lofting
Throttling approximately 25 lb per
1 lb/ft 2 of "q"
Lofting approximately 275 tb per 1
lb/ft 2 of "q"
Uneven firing of pyrotechnics of
frangible nut caused bolt to wobble
and hang up
Winds aloft create dynamic
pressures and loads greater than
vehicle capability
SRB separation conditions "q" and
ct creates nonoptimal trajectory
O-ring not sealing assembly
segment joint due to low launch
temperature and distorted case for
reuse
ET insulation deadband
Runway debris
Pad debris
Holddown bolt pyro debris
Tailoring between control, loads,
performance loss, and heating
environments
Gimbaling of SRM nozzles for
control authority
Partial reduction of performance
through adaptive SSME throttling
Day-of-launch l-load update
Tested characterized bolt pyros
Improve pyro firing electronics
Adaptive SSME throttling
Day-of-launch I-load update based
on launch minus 2-h wind profile
(problem not totally resolved; still a
probability of launch hold)
Optimize requirements between
SRB reentry and vehicle ascent
trajectory
Attrition criteria change
Parachute size increased
Joint was redesigned using three
O-rings and a y-clamp tank
interface
Flight suspended to redesign and
verify joint
Changed ET bonding and
inspection criteria
Redesigned holddown bolt
container
Prelanding pad and runway
cleaning
Control authority Inadequate control authority during Aerodynamic/gust response Redesigned SRM nozzle to gimbal
ascent using elevons and SSME's Thrust misalignment +_7.5* after PDR
only Thrust mismatch
IV. SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS
If the space shuttle taught one lesson, it was that the system effects predominated the vehicle
characteristics and the problems experienced. Therefore, system requirements and integration are key
elements for aerospace systems quality and, thus, success. It clearly taught a second lesson: "that the
higher the performance requirements, the higher the sensitivities to system interactions, environments,
uncertainties, manufacturing tolerances, and operational complexity." The matrix of problems, coupled
with the previous discussion, should give the reader a hint at these two profound lessons. The space
shuttle made very clear that design is a balancing act between conflicting requirements. The balancing of
these conflicting requirements requires interdisciplinary analysis and testing in order to properly
quantify the key parameter sensitivities and the trade factors.
The use of working groups and panels in a pseudo-concurrent engineering teaming fashion is an
efficient means for handling both the discipline technical issues and the systems issues and trades.
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Managingshuttlewasa major challengesinceit involved severalmajor contractorsandseveralNASA
field centers.Theworking groupsandteamscontributedgreatlyin meetingthemanagementchallenge.
Anotherclearlessonfrom shuttleis that manydevelopmentproblemscanbealleviatedwith operational
procedures,etc.;however,theyin generalcarryahigh pricetag.
The problemmatrix (tableA-4) lists someof the key problemsencounteredand solved.Many
havebeendiscussedpreviouslyin this paperor in other reportsandpapers.The missedaerodynamic
distribution createdproblems that must still be dealt with operationally today. The solution to the
overpressureproblem on STS-1 was major. The sensitivity at lift-off to the releasedynamics has
impactednot only thevehiclestructure,but alsothepayloadsit flies. Futurevehiclesshouldattemptto
designa releaseat lift-off that doesnot storehigh levelsof energythathaveto be releaseddynamically
at lift-off. The multibodyasymmetricalconfigurationclearlycontributedto this problem.
A. Space Shuttle Main Engine
The SSME, being a reusable high-performance liquid propulsion engine, has taught many valu-
able lessons. These lessons have been both general in nature as well as very specific technically. The
first major lesson is "high-performance requirements drive sensitivities, thus for reusable systems,
problems in fatigue and fracture. Fatigue and fracture then must be a major part of the design and opera-
tion of these high-performance systems. Welds in these systems should be designed to have lower stress
than the parent material, reducing fracture and fatigue concerns. Welds should be eliminated where
possible. Stress concentrations should be reduced or eliminated. The design should accommodate NDE
as well as repairs. This is particularly true for welds. Materials properties should be well characterized
for the operational environments, particularly for fatigue and fracture. Design development hardware for
instrumentation so that environments and dynamics, etc., can be verified. High energy concentrations
such as turbomachinery are very susceptible to instability problems such as whirl and must have design
augmentation to control potential problems. Dynamic tuning between structure, flow, and acoustics is a
major source of problems not only in turbomachinery, but also in all high q flow areas and combustion
devices. Many of these problems cannot be predicted; therefore, one must be prepared for problem
occurrence and have established problem investigation tools such as fault trees available and understood,
otherwise problems can grind programs to a standstill. In summary, high-performance liquid engines are
very complex, environmentally, dynamically, thermally, etc., requiring indepth technical penetration and
superior systems integration to ensure a quality product. Care must be exercised from design, manufac-
turing, and operations view points. Hot firing of the system is required to understand, develop, and
verify these systems.
1. L0x Pump Bearing Stress Corrosion. Stress corrosion is a problem that has plagued designers
from the start of technology. The corrosive material starts a crack and accelerates its growth to failure.
Since it is a known problem, great care is taken to manufacture and assemble hardware in clean rooms,
etc. Drying and cleaning processes are also implemented to reduce the potential of a problem occurring.
Even with these special efforts, small processing changes can result in unpredicted failures. Such was
the case on the high-pressure lox pump that flew on STS-27.
The SSME high-pressure lox pump is a high-energy (level and density) system that spins up to
30,000 r/min. The shaft has impellers on one end to pump the cryogenic lox. The other end has a dual
stage turbine that provides the energy. The shaft that contains these elements is mounted to the housing
with ball bearings. The bearings are fitted on the shaft such that there is a constant stress on the inner
raceway. This is accomplished by cooling the shaft and then inserting the bearings. The presence of any
contaminant with water will start the process. In other words, the triangular relationship between the
magnitude of the stress field, water, and contaminant leads to the failure.
The cracked race was found with borescope inspection after the STS-27 flight (fig. A-1). Materi-
als evaluation showed the cause to be stress corrosion. Chlorine was found on the part. The stress field is
known within certain bounds. Lab tests have shown that the stress level present was sufficient to crack
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A HPOTP Turbine End Bearings
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Figure A-1. Bearing failure/stress corrosion.
the race in the time available. The frequency (external accelerometer) response data show that the crack
was not present in the pump green run, but was present during the flight. When a failure like this occurs,
a detailed investigation must be conducted on all manufacturing, transportation procedures, etc., to
isolate a cause.
What had happened was that Rocketdyne, in order to have more capability to support shuttle
launches and development testing, built a new pump manufacturing facility for flight pumps. Some
changes in the manufacturing process and drying procedures were instituted that were different from
those used in the development pump room. The process in both facilities includes super cooling the shaft
to get the shrink fits required. On these super-cooled parts, water can be condensed out of the air. This
necessitates the drying procedure to eliminate the problem. For some reason, the drying procedure did
not work properly, causing the cracked race. Changes have been made in the procedure, with no further
problems occurring.
2. Lox Pump Bearing Wear. The original high-pressure lox pump has had a problem achieving
the required lifetime before refurbishment. One of the causes for early refurbishment was excessive
bearing wear. The specific cause of the bearing wear has not been determined at this time, though most
of the parameters that contributed to wear are known. The results of ground testing have shown various
degrees of wear and indications of wear (cage harmonics in vibration and strain data), including pump
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failure duringenginehot firings. Thelast failure thatoccurredwasengine02/2 testfiring 904-044.The
following excerptfrom thefailure investigationreportdescribestheincident.
"On June23, 1989,statictest904-044of spaceshuttlemainengine(SSME),unit number0212,
was terminatedby the enginecontrollerwhenthe main combustionchamber(MCC) pressureredline
limit wasexceeded.
"The purposeof the 1,338-stestwas to evaluatethe HPOTPblock I bearing modifications,
HPOTPweld 3 instrumentationandinternalinstrumentation.Theplannedtestconditionsincluded215s
at 109-percenthrust, 550 s at 104-percenthrust, 90 s at 100-percenthrust, and 320 s at 96-percent
thrust.Then two throttling profiles to 65-percenthrust wereplanned.Overall engineperformanceon
904-044 wasnormal until 1,267s whena slight downwardshift in MCC Pc occurredas a result of
downwardshiftsin HPOTPandHPFTPdischargepressures.Both preburneroxidizer valvesopenedto
rebalancethe engine.At 1,270.67s, a sudden,massivelossof lox flow from the HPOTPcausedthe
MCC Pcto decreasesuchthatthelow Pcredlinelimit wasexceededandthetestterminated.
"Posttest inspectionand engineteardownrevealedmechanicalfailure of the HPOTP turbine
section,ruptureof the OPBbowl, failure of theMOV actuatorandfailure of the PCA. Disassemblyof
the PBP bearing packageshowedseveredegradationof No. 2 bearing with cage destruction and
excessiveball andracewear.Theleft-handinducerbladeshadheavyerosiondamageandslagformation
on thesuctionsurfaces.
"The mostprobablecauseof themishapwasfailure of thePBPNo. 2bearing.Excessivewearof
the balls resultedin mechanicaldamageto thearmaloncageapproximately320 s prior to the mishap.
Thewear of the440 C bearingandthebreakupof thecagecontinueduntil severalof theballs jammed
in theouterraceandskiddedon theinnerrace.Thefrictional heatingresultedin moltendebrisfrom the
balls andracesbeingejectedinto thecoolant.Thehigh temperatureparticleswere oxidizedandforced
into the left-handsideof the inducer.The subsequenterosionandpromotedcombustionon the suction
side of the inducer by the high temperatureparticlescreateda large gasvolume that unloadedthe
HPOTP.The speedof theHPOTPincreaseduntil thefirst stageturbinedisc ruptured.Thefailure of the
discresultedin thefailuresof theOPBbowl, theMOV, andthePCA.
"The HPOTPU/N 2216R1onengine0212wasablock I developmentunit.Themodeincludeda
thin-bladedinducer,15-vaneinlet, PBPbearingbackpressureseal,reducedtoleranceon PBPdamping
sealdiameter,ion implantedbearings,elongatedcagepockets,andincreasedcoolant flow to theturbine
end bearing.The time on U/N 2216R1PBPNo. 2 bearingand its failure modewere consistentwith
prior bearingfailure. Basedon thedataandhardwareevidence,noneof thedevelopmentfeaturesbeing
testedweresignificantcontributorsto themishap."
Evaluationof thedynamicdatafrom externalaccelerometers,andstrainsmountedon the pump
housingand internal strain gaugeson the isolator and cartridge, showeda distinct eventat 1,240s,
indicatingsomeshift, apparentlythecagecracking.At this time, thebackpressurearoundtheNo. 1and
No. 2 bearingsstartedrising, probablydueto bearingresiduals(cageandwear),stoppingup theorifice
until pump failure. On prior tests,at approximately3,000-stotal run time, the cageharmonicsstarted
showingon theinternal straingauges.Theexternalstraingaugesshowedtheharmonicsaround40,000
s.The2X cageharmonicwaspresentfrom theteststartandbecamemoreandmoreorganized.
Cageharmonicsexist becauseof unevenball sizes.Theoretically, this is easily shown. The
various ball size combinationsproducedifferent ball sizes.Though the cage harmonic signature
characterizesrelative ball sizes,it is also a good indicator of meanball wear.The presenceof cage
harmonicsin apumpgreenrun testflight is arejectioncriterionfor flight worthiness.If oneis interested
in thedetailsof this failure,securethemishapreport.
The excessiveball wear is a major program cost that results from two sources:(1) pump
rejectionaftergreenrunand(2) thelimited numberof flightsduringwhich it is feasibleto runabearing.
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Ideally, one should get at least five flights before teardown and refurbishment. Currently, this is not
possible. Changes to improve the bearing life are in process. The turbine bearings wear can be
adequately accessed after each flight by making a shaft micro travel measurement. The pump bearings
(No. 1 and No. 2) are the main diagnostic problem.
3. Engine and POP's 2106 Incident. The combustion system/process has been the source of
many problems in liquid propulsion systems. The source of the problems is the big energy source and
the extreme environments that, when coupled with small changes, create problems. For example on July
1, 1987, test 902-428 of engine 2106 experienced a premature cut-off after 204.12 s of a 700-s test. The
test ended when the high pressure fuel turbopump (HPFTP) discharge temperature dropped below the
disqualification limit. Inspection revealed moderate erosion of the oxidizer preburner (OPB) faceplate
and a burn through of the high pressure oxidizer turbopump (HPOTP) inlet housing. Leak checking of
the OPB found a large leak due to braze cracking around a baffle. Metallurgical inspection of the crack
surface showed 10 arrest lines that seemed to match with the 10 proof cycles seen by the hardware.
Review of the test history found that this unit had experienced three large lox dome detonations (or
POP's) exceeding 8,580 g's peak-to-peak, with the last one happening on test 902-427. Based upon
these observations, it was determined that a poor quality braze joint was work hardened by proof cycles.
The POP during test 902-427 then loaded the braze joint to failure. POP's are caused during start and
shutdown when a mixture of oxygen and hydrogen suddenly ignites (fig. A-2). POP's can be controlled
with start and shutdown sequencing, but not eliminated; therefore, the method of brazing has been
improved and the shutdown sequence has been changed to reduce the chance of having damaging
shutdown POP's. Operationally, POP's are monitored on all engines, thus all cut-off POP's exceeding a
threshold limit implement a faceplate deformation inspection and leak check. If damage has occurred,
repair or replacement must be made.
Reference: E2106 Incident Investigation final report.
Oxidizer Preburner Oxidizer System
Shutdown POP
Sequence on at 1.8 sec to prevent POGO collapse
Shutdown > Pile
Helium Purge ASI Oxidizer Line
Outle!
Too large
to allow valve
to be open
unUI purge
flows
ASI
Line
Q
Oxidizer
Dome
ASI Fuel Line
From OPOV
88C-4-5360
2598m/43
Figure A-2. Shutdown POP.
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4. HPFTP Kaiser Nut Failure. The inlet into the turbine portion of the HPFTP experiences hot
gas temperatures of up to 1,444 °F. To protect the turbine bearing supports from this hot gas and guide
vanes, a flow shield is installed, which is held in place by a nut. When the flow shield is viewed from the
side, it resembles a World War I German helmet. Therefore, the flow shield and nut are referred to as the
"Kaiser hat" and "Kaiser nut."
With the introduction of the "phase I full power level (FPL) engine," three incidents of the
Kaiser nut backing off have occurred. The first occurrence was on HPFFP 2008. The nut backed off and
the flow deposited it into the first stage nozzle area, with the lock passing through the turbine. Then on
HPFTP 9207, the nut and lock came off and the nut passed through the turbine. This time, several first-
and second-stage blades were damaged. Finally, on HPFTP 0110, the nut and lock again came off and
were found in the first stage nozzle area.
Instrumentation showed that the area of the nut was approximately 500 °F hotter than in the FPL
engines. Analysis found that the nuts were failing in phase I engines due to the increased temperature.
Various nut redesigns, locking features, and ceramic coatings were investigated. Failure of engine 2013
was caused on the first use of a redesigned nut, which allowed a leak path for hot gas to reach the
turbine end bearings.
Ultimately, the problem was fixed with, in addition to a redesigned nut with no leak path, a
different engine start and preburner sequence. This sequence, certified in 1982, significantly lowered the
temperature flowing into the turbine inlet and onto the Kaiser nut.
5. HPOTP Capacitance Failure Incident. A premature engine cut-off occurred at 41.80 s during
test 902-120. A fire was observed in the HPOTP area. The failure investigation identified the fire origin
in the area of a capacitor device. The initial mode of failure was thought to be yielding and/or structural
failure of the capacitance package, which caused rubbing in a lox environment. In the early phase of
SSME development, this special capacitor device was installed to measure the bearing loads and the
rotation speed of the HPOTP. Since this device was initially intended to collect data for a better
understanding of the bearing package area, its further use was discontinued. The message is clear;
intrusive instrumentation in lox environments must be designed with great care. Technology is still
needed for measuring the motions of rotating turbomachinery parts.
6. Engine 0213, G-15 Crack. Joints between parts of a propulsion system, especially the engine,
are a constant concern and source of many problems. The joint between the nozzle and main combustion
chamber (MCC) of the SSME is an example. Upon disassembly of SSME 0213 the MCC and the SSME
nozzle, joint G15 was exposed, showing the G15 seal to be buckled and cracked due to overheating.
This occurred after 34 tests and 15,114 s of hot-fire time (fig. A-3). Also, three of the bolt holes on the
nozzle were found to be cracked. However, a G15 joint leak-check done after the hot fire did not
identify a leak. The MCC-to-nozzle combination on this engine had the maximum effective tube
protrusion, which caused the nozzle coolant tube crown to erode and the flow restriction inhibitor (FRI)
to deteriorate. The tube erosion, together with hot fire time, contributed to tube leaks (fig. A-4).
Although tube erosion, leaks, and FRI deterioration were noted during the 34 tests and bluing and/or
cracking of the seal was expected, the extent of the bluing and cracking was a surprise. Aerothermal
analysis found that the high protrusion and cluster of vented or leaking tubes created an artificial
(hydraulic) protrusion that directed core gas into the cavity. Discoloration of the G15 sealing surface
indicated exposure to hot gas of approximately 2,500 °F. A similar occurrence was noted on engine
0209, which had 0.077 in of effective protrusion and three leaking tubes.
Based upon ground test experience with varying degrees of protrusion and/or gap, a life limit
was placed on the hardware to assure a margin against the seal cracking. All life limits maintain a factor
of two for each combination of protrusion and/or gap tested on the ground. Additionally, all flight
engine G15 seal areas are inspected for the integrity of the FRI. If any FRI degradation exceeds the
empirical data base, the nozzle is demated and the sealing surface is inspected. Currently, with the
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improvement of nozzle coolant tube stacking, a need for thicker, denserFRI material is being
investigatedto furtherdecreasetheeffectof thehotgasleakin thisarea(fig. A-5).
ENGINE 0213 G-15 CRACK
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Figure A-3. G-15 configuration.
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Figure A-4. G-15 nozzle erosion.
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7. Fuel Prebumer (FPB) Lox Post Failore. As was discussed earlier, combustion devices are a
concern. The lox posts that carry lox to the combustion chamber are typical of a class of problems that
occur (figs. A-6, A-7, and A-8). Two incidents of fuel preburner lox post failures have occurred in the
history of the SSME test program. Failure investigation of engines 0009 and 0204 found that the damage
to the FPB was caused by similar failure mechanisms. Metallurgical examination of the lox posts from
both of these engines discovered high cycle fatigue (HCF) cracks located at the braze fillet radius
regions. Also, all engine 0009 lox posts exhibited cold worked material (austenitic to martensitic
transformation) at the fracture location. Analysis and tests confirmed high main stage mechanical
vibration and dynamic flow loads. Based on this, it was determined that the through cracks probably
developed at the fillet radius during main stage, thus mixing lox and fuel. However, it was noted that
although mechanical vibration was the main load source, it was insufficient to cause the damage.
Probably, offset fuel sleeve holes caused an additional flow-induced alternating stress. This, when
combined with the mechanical vibration stress, exceeded the material endurance strength.
Based on these observations, an eddy current inspection technique was developed to determine
the extent of the cold work at the fillet radius area due to fatigue. Metallurgical data determined that an
eddy current reading of 5 V or more is sufficient to aggravate the fatigue failure. A method to reduce the
fatigue load on the lox posts where eddy current exceeded or met a 5-V value was developed. This
technique requires the placement of three support pins, equally spaced between the inner and outer
sleeve annulus, thus. reducing the cantilever length and dynamic loads. All current flight preburner lox
posts are inspected at a predetermined interval and pins are installed if required. Also, an inspection is
done to verify that all pins are in place or a fatigue damage algorithm is used to limit hardware use.
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Figure A-6. Fuel prebumer.
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Figure A-7. Fuel preburner changes.
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Figure A-8. Fuel preburner element.
In combination, these controls have stopped reoccurrence of this failure. In addition, a design
change was made for the more recent two-duct powerhead configuration. This design change increased
the thickness of the inner sleeve and reduced the cantilever length of the lox post sleeve.
8. Test 901-222-Engine 0007, Heat Exchanger Fire Incident. The heat exchanger is used on the
SSME to convert lox to gaseous oxygen (gox). This system is a series of tubes surrounding the oxygen
pump preburner, pump turbine region. Problems have occurred in the heat exchanger. For example, the
first test of SSME engine 0007, test 901-222, was terminated at 4.34 s of a planned 50-s test. Engine cut-
off was due to the exceedance of the heat exchanger outlet pressure minimum redline. Also, an external
fire was observed iri the area of the oxidizer preburner. Extensive damage occurred to the combustion
system, heat exchanger coil, hot gas manifolds, main injector, and associated ducts (figs. A-9, A-10, and
A-11).
A failure investigation team was formed to investigate the cause of the incident and to identify
corrective actions to reduce future failures. It was concluded that the incident was caused by a leak in
the heat exchanger coil near the inlet and discharge area of the heat exchanger. Oxygen from the coil
leak mixed together with the fuel-rich preburner combustion gas and was ignited by the gas temperature.
This failure could have been caused by one of two possible modes: (1) undetected damage to the inlet
tube during reaming of the inlet for removal of the weld drop-through and/or (2) arcing damage
associated with a heat exchanger welding operation at the coil support bracket.
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Corrective actions have been implemented for all future builds. Some of them are: (1) leak-test
before each hot-fire test, (2) proof and leak check after each HPOTP installation, (3) visual inspection of
the heat exchanger area for evidence of damage, arcing, or weld discoloration, (4) modify the
manufacturing process to provide an electrical ground to the bracket being welded, (5) positive stop and
pilot for reaming and boroscope inspection after reaming, (6) increased coil proof test pressure to
provide a proof factor of 1.26 instead of 1.2, (7) improved leak detection requirement, and (8) purging
coil using a high-velocity nitrogen purge to clean out any contamination or debris in the tubing or outlet
area immediately before the installation of the inlet and discharge lines. In addition, all completed units
were inspected to ensure that a condition similar to the failed unit did not exist. Together, these actions
have improved safe engine operation.
Tables A-5 through A-9 list the problems related to the SSME.
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TableA-5. Outlineof SSMEproblems.
1. Turbomachinery
a. HPOTP turbine blades/disks
(1) First-stage turbine blade cracks
• Radial shank
• Radial platform
• Radial firtree
• Tip seal rail
• Center plate rail
(2) First-stage turbine blade high-cycle fatigue transverse shank cracks.
(3) Second-stage turbine blade cracks
• Radial airfoil
• Radial shank
(4) First-stage disk interstage seal pilot rib fillet radii cracking
(5) Turbine disk curvic teeth damage
(6) First- and second-stage disk firtree cracks
b. HPFTP turbine blades/disks
(1) First-stage turbine blade failures
• November 1977
• December 1977
• September 1981
(2) First- and second-stage radial airfoil cracks
(3) First-stage transverse leading-edge airfoil cracks. Transgranular fracture.
c. HPFTP whirl
(1) Rotating assembly instability with three-stage pump interstage seal. Subsynchronous whirl
vibration.
(2) Phase II HPFTP subsynchronous vibration. Subsynchronous frequency ranges from 47 to 52
percent, tracks pump speed
d. HPOTP whirl
(1) Phase I rotor is susceptible to second rotor mode whirl.
(2) Rotor instability
e. HPFFP bi-stable pumps
(1) Periodic MCC pressure oscillations due to control system interaction with flow variations from
HPOTP preburner pump
f. HPOTP bearings
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(1) Turbine bearing inner race cracking
(2) Delamination of No. 3 bearing cage
(3) Bearing No. 4 wearing more than bearing No. 3
h. Other HPOTP cracks
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a. HPOTP turbine blades/disks
Table A-6. Turbomachinery problems.
Component No.
1.a.1
1.a.2
l.a.3
! .a.4
1 .a.5
1.a.6
Problem
First-stage turbine blade cracks
• Radial shank
• Radial platform
• Radial airfoil
• Radial firtree
• Tip seal rail
• Center plate rail
First-stage turbine blade high-
cycle fatigue transverse shank
cracks
Second-stage turbine blade cracks
• Radial airfoil
• Radial shank
First-stage disk interstage seal
pilot rib fillet radii cracking
Problem Cause
Low-cycle fatigue caused by
thermal shock
Propagation is likely caused by
sustained load hydrogen
embrittlement
High-cycle fatigue/chipping
caused by damping contact
Previous one-piece damper design
did not provide enough damping
against vibration.
Low-cycle fatigue,
thermomechanicai
Failure mode is low-cycle fatigue
assisted by internal hydrogen
embrittlement predominantly
driven by shutdown thermal
shock, large strains caused by
small radius
Problem Solutions
DAR 2272: Life limited to 5,000 s
and 21 starts; supported by
statistical analysis (single flight
reliability) and assessment of
cracking as benign
First-stage turbine blade redesign
was two-piece damper. New
design improved damping,
reduced dynamic stresses, and
corrected transverse shank
cracking. Test history >600 tests
and >250,000 s without cracking
Life limited by DAR to 5,500 s
and 22 starts; supported by
statistics (SFR), >550,000 s
without transverse cracks
Problem solved by redesigning
with larger interstage pilot rib
fillet radii, rework has passed
certification, lift limited to 14
starts before rework
Turbine disk curvic teeth damage Removal of excess gold from the Life limited by DAR 2268 until
curvic teeth results in gouges reworked to remove gouges and
(fabrication induced) restore to CEI life
First- and second-stage disk firtree Low-cycle fatigue caused by Life limited by DAR 2023 and
cracks thermal shock assisted by 2024
hydrogen embrittlement due to
missing gold
b. HPFTP turbine blades/disks
Component
HPFTP
Sept. 1981
Dec. 1977
Nov. 1977
Sept. 1978
Apdl1979
Feb. 1977
1.b.2
l.b.3
1.b.4
Problem
First-stage turbine blade failure
(Incident No. 22)
(Incident No. 5)
(Incident No. 4)
First- and second-stage radial
airfoil cracks
First-stage transverse leading edge
airfoil cracks; transgranular
fracture (8 pumps with cracks)
Problem Cause
Localized high-temperature
streaking from the fuel prebumer
caused disbonding of the first-
stage turbine tip seals; excessive
rubbing of the blades caused blade
failure, rotor speed decay and a
resulting HPFTP inlet volute
rupture and Iox-rich shutdown
Caused by thermal fatigue
Crack propagation is HCF fatigue;
caused by superposition of high-
cycle excitation during test on a
high mean stress caused by start
thermal spike
Problem Solutions
• Elimination of the tip seal nickel
plating (first stage)
• Improvement in turbine inlet
temperature profile
• Tighter control on tip seal
clearance at assembly
• Improved retention of Kel-F
seals (failure increased
temperature/speed)
• Decreased turbine temperature
redline
• Eliminated nonstandard plugging
at Iox posts in preburner injector
Eliminated by application of blade
coating. Decreased start transient
temperature spikes
Problem reduced by modified
engine start with reduction of start
thermal spike (7/82); 22X inspec-
tion intervals were specified (4/79)
First-stage transverse trailing edge High-cycle fatigue caused by Eliminated by elimination of
cracks damper/blade bonding plating on damper
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Table A-6. Turbomachinery problems (continued).
b. HPFI'P turbine blades/disks t
Component No.
May 1978 to 1.b.5
present
Nov. 1978 to 1.b.6
present
Dec. 1978 to 1.b.7
Feb. 1991
June 1981 l.b.8
Nov. 1978 1.b.9
May 1977 l.b.10
May 1979 l.b.l 1
July 1978 l.b.12
Feb. 1978 1.b.13
July 1978 1.b.14
HPFI'P 1.b.15
May 1990 1.b.16
July 1991 1.b.17
Problem
First- and second-stage platform
cracks; intergranular and
interdendritic cracks
First- and second-stage radial
shank intergranular cracks
First-stage transverse upstream
shank cracks; pressure and suction
side corners (15 pumps)
First-stage transverse downstream
shank cracks (11 turbopumps)
First-stage transverse firtree
cracks; cracks at bottom firtree
lobe (12 turbopumps)
Second-stage platform cracks;
crystallographic fracture; pieces of
platform lost; one crack turned
and became transverse
Problem Cause
Caused by thermal fatigue
Caused by thermal fatigue
Low-cycle fatigue thermally
induced
Thermal cycles initiate cracks
because of local surface melting
surface carbide, and comer stress
riser; growth occurs due to high-
cycle fatigue
Transgranular fracture due to
overload and assisted by hydrogen
embrittlement
Fracture caused by stage one
HCF; initiation on underside of
platform at fretting caused by
damper
Problem Solutions
Decreased start transient
temperature spikes; required
boroscope inspections on first-
stage blades
Decreased start transient
temperature spikes; coating on
first-stage blade shanks
Coating on first-stage blade
shanks seems to have eliminated
cracking
Phase II modes: recontoured and
coating; no cracking with
recontoured blades
Crystallographic fracture assisted
by hydrogen environment;
initiation occurs at carbides at
surface
Shotpeen and radoised firtree
corners reduce acceptable
microporosity size limits, mass
finish, and optimized fabrication
sequencing; reverse broach first-
stage disk
Boroscope inspect through
turnaround duct; replace old style
damper with new lighter precision
damper
Second-stage transverse Initiation at geometric stress riser; Phase II modes; recontoured, shot-
downstream shank cracks; deepest propagation due to stage I HCF peened, and coated
crack 0.20 in
Second-stage downstream _rtree
cracks (39 turbopumps)
Thermal transientFirst-stage damper pocket cusp
cracks found in 15 turbopumps
First-stage turbine blade lobe
cracking resulting from blade
biasing
Rotating unbalance of turbine disk
(phase I HPFI'P)
First- and second-stage turbine
disks curvic teeth; after gold
plating, excess gold was
frequently found on the load fiats
of the curvic teeth; upon excess
gold removal, damage occurred to
the fillet region of the curvic teeth
on several disks
A difference in the direction of
broaching between the first- and
second-stage disk
The first-stage blades were coated
with zirconium; zirconium has
poor adhesion characteristics; loss
of coating caused rotating
unbalance
Excess gold occurred due to
insufficient masking; the damage
occurred due to improper
techniques for removal
Stress relief and bead blast; shot-
peen and radiused firtree comers,
improved surface finish on firtree
downstream face mass finish,
optimized fabrication sequencing,
reduce acceptable microporosity
size requirements of recontoured
shank
None - margin tested, risk
minimal
Revise the direction of broaching
of the first-stage disk ",obe the
same as the second-stage disk
Changed to Nicraly coating only
on blades
A rework procedure was
established to repair the damage to
the curvic teeth root radii; the
reworked configurations were
incorporated as new
configurations for the first- and
second-stage disks
E0215 failure; failure was due to a Blade fracture was due to a large Limited blade life; established a
second-stage turbine blade internal flaw assisted by hydrogen computer tomography inspection
fracture (incident No. 34) embrittlement criteria to attempt to flush pores
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Table A-6. Turbomachinery problems (continued).
b. HPFI'P turbine blades/disks (continued)
Component No.
Oct. 1991 1.b.18
April 1987 l.b.19
Feb. 1989 1.b.20
c. HPFTP whirl
Component No.
HPFI"P 1.c. l
Problem Problem Cause Problem Solutions
First-stage blade stop tab fracture;
rub mark 360 ° on fishmouth seal
below lip; loss of blade stop
creates a 2.33 grm unbalance,
which equates to a 0.2 grin
increase in synchronous vibration
Failure mode identified as
hydrogen-assisted high-cycle
fatigue; localized assembly
stresses in blade stop radius in
combination with operating
environment
Fragment is of insufficient mass to
cause downstream damage;
revised assembly procedure to
preclude blade stop damage during
installation
First-stage downstream pressure Mechanically induced by grinding Shotpeen and radiused firtree
side corner lobe cracks to remove excess gold corners; elimination of gold on
downstream face
First-stage radial downstream Intergranular cracking Microporosity size limits; mass
firtree cracks finish removes rough edges
Problem Problem Cause Problem Solutions
May 1988 1.c.2
Rotating assembly instability with
three-stage pump interstage seal;
subsynchronous whirl vibration
Phase 1I HPFI'P subsynchronous
vibration; subsynchronous
frequency ranges from 47 to 52
percent, tracks pump speed on
ramps, displays some wandering
during a test, has split into dual
peaks, and has modulated with
pump speed; also, occurs less
often with straight/smooth seals,
and more often with lower side
load
The initiation of subsynchronous
vibration is dependent on the
turbine sideload; as shown by the
presence of subsynchronous
vibration on the FMOF TAD
configured HPFTP's; there is no
definite correlation between
subsynchronous and rubbing
Incorporation of straight, smooth
sleeves and seals improved the
rotordynamics stability; damping
seals replaced smooth seals to
increase the rotordynamic stability
margin
Recommended that the
incorporation of damping seals be
included in the phase II+ design
for the two-duct HGM powerhead;
not considered a problem for
phase II
d. HPOTP whirl
Component No.
HPOTP 1.d. 1
1.d.2
Problem Problem Cause Problem Solutions
Phase I rotor experienced first
rotor mode whirl at >50-percent
synchronous speed
Phase I rotor experienced second
rotor mode whirl at 90-percent
synchronous speed
The straight turbine interstage seal
design enhanced the first rotor
mode whirl; the scalloped
interstage seal ring enhanced the
gas preswirl in the inlet of the
interstage seal
The labyrinth seal design
increased sensitivity to second
rotor mode whirl
Redesign of the turbine interstage
seal to a tapered shape plus a swirl
brake upstream enhanced the
rotor's stability by removing the
driving forces
The scallops of the interstage and
seal ring were eliminated,
stopping the driver of the fluid
preswirl and adding to the rotor
stability
New preburner pump damping
seal design reduces response
amplitude and provides additional
second-mode stability margin;
subsynchronous whirl no longer
exists
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Table A-6. Turbomachinery problems (continued).
Component
HPOTP
No.
I.e.1
Problem Problem Cause Problem Solutions
Periodic MCC pressure
oscillations (thrust variation
exceeds CEI allowable) due to
control system (OPOV position)
interaction with flow variations
from HPOTP preburner pump
Flow stall at lower power level in
preburner volute discharge vanes
• Limit orbiter to 67 percent of
minimum power level
• Redesign volute vane, vane
angle, and contour change
• Screen out one of approximately
every 20 volutes exhibiting bi-
stability in green run tests
Component
HPOTP
No.
l.f. 1
I.f.2
1.f.3
1.f.4
1.f.5
Problem Problem Cause Problem Solutions
Turbine bearing inner race
cracking
Stress corrosion cracking (SCC)
initiated from corrosion pit; key
ingredients for SCC are hoop
stress and trapped moisture
Delamination of No. 3 bearing
cage
Bearing No. 4 wearing more than
bearing No. 3
Bearing No. 2 wearing more than
bearing No. 1
Uneven wear of ball bearings
between beatings No. 1 and 2, and
between bearings No. 3 and 4
Four-lobe nut design tended to
cause pumping of lox against the
No. 3 bearing cage
Uneven load on the bearings
and/or unequal cooling and/or
unloading
Uneven load on the beatings
Uneven load on the beatings
• Roughen spacer to between 32
and 64 surface finish to enhance
moisture removal
• Delete heat gun use to minimize
moisture collection
• Spacer not bottomed prior to dry
cycle to enhance spacer/bearing
gap drying
• Multiple chills without dry cycle
not permitted
• Preheat vacuum dry oven to 185
to 195 °F
• Initiate vacuum cycle when
critical hardware temperature is
within 5" of oven temperature
• Vacuum cycle extended from 2
to 3 h to enhance moisture
removal
Turbine bearing nut changed from
four full-length lobes to two
shortened lobes; problem
corrected
Turbine beating cartridge
enlarged; problem of uneven wear
improved but not solved
Pump bearing isolator enlarged;
even loading of beatings was not
accomplished, therefore, change
did not help uneven bearing wear;
unincorporated solutions;
hydrostatic bearing, silicon nitride
balls
Preburner pump beating isolator
and turbine bearing cartridge have
had their deadband increased;
deadband is the space between the
outer race and the isolator and
cartridge; the greater the space, the
more movement before the load is
transferred to the isolator and
cartridge; in general, the turbine
end bearings No. 3 and No. 4
improved; little change in the
uneven wear between the No. 1
and No. 2 bearings
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f. HPOTP beat'in
Component No.
I.f.6
Table A-6. Turbomachinery problems (continued).
Sept. 1977 1.f.7
June 1989 l.f.8
Problem Problem Cause Problem Solutions
PBP ball bearings (No. 1 and No.
2) experienced spalling
Bearing number 3 failure (incident
No. 3)
Preburner pump beating failure
(incident No. 33)
In-housing rotor balancing with
inadequate lubrieation/cooling
Excessive coolant flow forces in
the preburner pump end bearings
unloaded the No. 1 bearing,
allowing high radial motion; the
excessive pump end radial motion
increased the turbine end
overhung rotor deflections;
unequal load sharing of the turbine
end bearings (No. 3 with most of
the load) combined with the high
synchronous rotor deflections
degraded the turbine beatings,
allowed rubbing and ignition
HPOTP PBP excessive ball wear
and failure of high time bearings;
beating heat generation escalates
cage degradation and breakup;
cage particles block coolant exit,
causing pressure buildup and
asymmetric coolant flow; high-
velocity particles impact and
ignite on the inducer, large gas
volume in inducer and impeller
area allows rapid speed increase;
turbine overspeed causes first-
stage disk failure
Thermal growth of ball bearings
caused balls to expand to the point
of detrimental rubbing with the
race; the inner race diametral
bearing clearance was increased in
conjunction with elongated cage
pockets; eliminated in-housing
rotor balancing; PBP bearing
springs between bearings No. 1
and No. 2 were softened to reduce
the axial load on the bearings
(bearing preload); the bearings no
longer spall, but bearing wear has
increased
• Decreased the bearing coolant
forces-pump and turbine
• Added turbine end bearing
coolant jet ring
• Increased bearing preioad
• Redesigned isolator and
cartridge
• Improved balance
The block I modification of this
turbopump was unique; the design
modification was intended to
reduce bearing wear and is not a
flight design
_. HPb-TP bearin_
Component No.
1.g.1HPbTP
July 1989
May1991 1.g.2
Problem Problem Cause Problem Solutions
Bearing cage cracks Six cage fractures to date; cracks Experience with fractured cages is
are discovered during normal benign; demonstrated factor of 2
recycle; test history indicates in excess of 2,500 s; life limited
cracks related to total time bearing to 2,000 s; cage was
thickened on 10 K pump
Missing chrome on turbine
bearing carrier at the No. 4
bearing location
Heavy spinning of No. 4 bearing
outer race caused by ball/race
friction, cage/race friction, and
bearing loads
10 K pumps with the FEP bearings
provide a reduced driving force
for outer race spinning; no
dynamic signature related to
wear/loss of chrome; no
anomalous bearing ball and
raceway conditions resulted from
loss of chrome or preload spring
wear
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Table A-6. Turbomachinery problems (continued).
Component No.
HPOTP 1.h. 1
1,h.2
1.h.3
1.h.4
1,h.5
l.h.6
1.h.7
l.h.8
1,h.9
1.h.10
Problem Problem Cause Problem Solutions
Cracks in the second-stage nozzle,
which extend beyond the
acceptable region of the inner
shroud relief grooves
Cracking cup washers
First-stage turbine disk coolant jet
ring S tubes cracking
Axial cracks are attributed to low-
cycle thermal fatigue damage
produced by thermal strains during
engine startup and shutdown
transients; aggravated by casting
microporosity/shrinkage
Previous cup washer material
specification was on the sheet
metal material from which the
washers were formed; cold
working of material resulted in
high hardness and low ductility,
predisposing washers to cracking
High-cycle fatigue
The cracks are controlled by
visual inspection at each
disassembly; all cracks outside the
relief groove area are evaluated by
MR; life limited by DAR; hipping
(hot isostatic pressing) of casting
to reduce microshrinkage
ECP written to define the material
properties on the shaped form
S tube material changed from 347
CRES to A286 stainless steel;
A286 has increased fatigue
resistance, solving the problem
Hydrogen leak allowed by 0.25-in Class II plug weld is susceptible to All HPOTP's are leak tested prior
crack in housing coolant plug shrinkage cracks to flight
weld No. 11
Balance piston cavity pressure
port welds
Lack of fusion or incomplete
penetration in class I1 fillet welds,
Nos. 22 and 24, of the balance
piston; existing NDI could not
detect root side or imbedded
critical size HCF flaws
Low-cycle fatigueHousing seal groove fillet
cracking
Diffuser vane cracks Main impeller blade wake
dynamic loading plus high mean
stress caused high-cycle fatigue
cracks at leading edge of vanes
Use as is; these welds are tolerant
to large defects; soap bubble and
mass spectrometer inspection done
after every acceptance test
Problem determined to be
acceptable via fracture mechanics;
flaw will not propagate past a
shallow residual stress depth
Improved loading path by cutting
back the leading edge of the
diffuser vanes 0.10 in;
reconfigured grooves adjacent to
vane passageway; shotpeen
leading edge area of vane after
proof test
Main housing drain "T" fitting Stringers in fitting material Changed fitting material from
leaks (CRES) CRES to Inconel 718TM; leak
check CRES fittings postflight
Main housing microfissures Casting process caused surface Life limited to 11,024 s by DAR;
microfissures; core reaction improved process to eliminate
core rP.._ction
Jet ring cup washer high-cycle Flow environment caused high Life limited by DAR; redesign
fatigue cracks (40 kHz) frequency high-cycle TBD
fatigue cracks
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i. Other HPFrP cracks
Component No.
HPFI"P 1.i. 1
May 1979 to
present
March 1985 1.i.2
July 1985 1.i.3
July 1989 1.i.4
August 1989 I.i.5
September 1989 1.i.6
1.i.7
September 1990 ! .i.8
Table A-6. Turbomachinery problems (continued).
Problem
First-/second-stage turbine nozzle
cracks; cracks are on leading
edges of vanes and inner and outer
shrouds; cracks initiate at low and
high time
Bellows shield cracking
First-/second-stage impeller
indentations; 30-mil deep cracks
predominantly in axial direction;
cracks observed in all three
indentations in or around galled
areas; 15 indentation depth, two
sets of indentations, three
indentations per set
First-stage tip seal/housing lug
fractures
Second-stage diffuser pilot lip
crack; circumferential cracks up to
7-in long; interstage seal wear
typical on units with cracked
diffusers
Center body casting to pump end
housing forging weld 59
indications; x-ray indications
show up as shadowlines and radial
indications; concern for joint
integrity because of x-ray
indications and, shadowline
masking of defects
Turbine support welds 16 and 17
flaws
Titanium inlet sheet metal weld
offsets; initial HCF analysis
showed many offset conditions to
be unacceptable
Problem Cause
Low-cycle fatigue caused by
thermal transient start
Failures not function of starts,
time, or power level
Indentations created by pounding
type contact and rubbing between
impeller inner diameter and the tie
bolt lobes; relative contact that
caused localized heating
accompanied by high-strain levels
to form microstructurally changed
material susceptible to crack
initiation and propagation
High mean stresses in both
housing lugs and tip seal lip; stress
is induced by housing distortion;
there is sufficiently high dynamic
stresses for high-cycle fatigue
failure
All eight cases due to out-of-print
diffuser or housing; diametral
interference of 0.0187 to 0.0297 in
Defects result from welding
difficulties
Penetrant indications are
frequently observed at these welds
after normal machining or thermal
processes, this problem was
designated a producibility item
Weld offsets are caused by
difficulty in the welding process
Problem Solutions
Modified start sequence to reduce
thermal transients; cracks are
shallow and monitored by
borescope and dye penetrant
inspections
Designed a short tip bellows
shield; vastly reduced occurrence
of cracking
Redesigned impellers
Redesign first-stage tip seal lip at
three locations to remove effects
of housing distortion; existing
hardware was to be reworked; the
redesign eliminated static load on
housing lugs, reduced mean stress
in tip seal lip, distributed pressure
load to ends of tip seal, increased
alternating stress capability by a
factor of 4, and smoothed
scalloped shape of tip seal
Document housing and diffuser
diameters prior to assembly;
increased groove radius; a pilot lip
fragment would be contained
during hot fire testing; prior flight
experience with cracked diffuser
was benign
Analytical results and inspection
requirements assure flight safety;
welding speed slowed from 30 to
20 in per minute for new housings
Fracture mechanics analysis was
conducted to develop a criteria for
acceptable flaw sizes; low-stress
machining was employed; weld
surfaces are polished to remove
flaws prior to etch and pent; the
preparation for weld 17 was
modified to improve accessibility
when making the weld
More detailed analysis was started
to eliminate conservatisms; for
this purpose, more hot-fire strain
gauge data were obtained,
laboratory testing to determine
bending/membrane splits was
conducted, and a fine mesh finite
element model was used for
calculating mean stresses
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Table A-6. Turbomachinery problems (continued).
Component No.
HPb"TP 1.i.9
March 1985
February 1991 l.i.10
August 1980 to
present
December 1991 1.i.12
January 1992 1.i.13
October 1981 to 1.i.14
present
March 1992 1.i. 15
July 1992 1.i.16
June 1990 1.i.17
Problem Problem Cause Problem Solutions
First-stage impeller front shroud
crack; high-cycle fatigue crack
initiated at impeller shroud O.D.;
initiation occurs at site having
adverse surface conditions (corner
break and surface finish)
Housing HCF life; discharge
volute welds 223 and 228 HCF
predicted life based upon limited
hot-fire strain gauge data and
worst-case drawing geometry is
less than the CEI
1.i. 11 Thrust ball cracks
Second-stage KEL-F support pilot
lip crack; visual inspection
detected crack in radius at
pilot/support interface
HPFI'P housing inner ring
cracking type A (through) cracks
through the bolt holes common to
all units
HPFTP turbine support sheet
metal fragments; dislodged
fragment of inlet sheet metal
detected during posttest
inspection; second occurrence on
same unit
Weld 56 turnaround duct weld
crack
HPFrP main housing bellow
crack; investigation of source of
Haynes 188 in engine revealed
cracks and missing fragments
from main housing bellow
LPFI'P second-stage rotor crack in
outer shroud; cracked rotor is fleet
leader for time and fifth fleet
leader for starts; unit No. 82106
Impeller diametral mode
resonance with first-stage diffuser
vanes; most probable impeller
response mode identified by
modal tests and structural
dynamics analysis; mode
characterized at !2 mod 3 mode;
this occurs in the 32,000 to 32,600
r/min range; and it requires
interaction with diffuser vanes
Several housings held with weld
discrepancies during fabrication
cycle; similar weld mismatches
have been observed in old and
new housings
Cracks found on the ball wear
tracks indicate high metal
temperatures and thermal
gradients; rubbing between ball
and insert causes localized heating
during contact
Two occurrences of support pilot
fracture in program; first fracture
at large pilot and second at small
pilot; high-cycle fatigue
propagation; first fracture due to
out-of-print condition; second
fracture still undetermined
Low-cycle fatigue caused by
punch loads from discharge struts
and aggravated by hot gas leaking
into the coolant circuit
Crack initiation and propagation
by high-cycle fatigue
Crack initiation and propagation
by high-cycle fatigue
Only one occurrence observed on
current configuration; bellows
manufactured with thin wall
High-cycle fatigue failure
Initially, the operation at the most
probable response mode was
limited to 160 s in the 32,000 to
32,600 r/rain range; improved
control of diffuser vane
dimensions; also, improved
surface finish and shroud corner
break control; increased shroud
corner radius allowed for
increased DAR limits
Flight based on single flight
reliability; analysis underway to
determine mean and alternating
stress to calculate life; 3-D FEM
submodel parametric model to
account for offset and radius of
volute
By analysis, high-surface tensile
stresses predicted; cracking
relieves residual and/or thermal
stresses; moly lube added to thrust
ball to reduce friction; thrust ball
inspected after every test; cracked
balls are replaced
Changed requirements for
repairing KEL-F supports; defects
deeper than 0.20 in and cracks are
rejected; monitored by DAR
inspection limit
DAR 1199 requires a complete
bolt hole inspection at each
turbine disassembly and at 20
starts and even 10 starts thereafter;
the interval drops to 5 starts if
crack conditions are severe
enough
All HPFTP's are inspected after
every hot-fire test for any out-of-
specification cracks; new
inspection requirements; DAR
limits sheet metal to 4,250 s
Added infield inspection and DAR
that life limited the weld to
13,600 s
New units correctly machined
DAR 2431 limits life to 15,000 s
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Table A-6. Turbomachinery problems (continued).
Component
HPOTP
July 1978
March 1977 1.j.2
ld.3
Problem Problem Cause Problem Solutions
Capacitance probe failure
(incident No. 9)
Primary lox seal failure (incident
No. 1)
Contact of the capacitance probe
plates with the pump shaft speed
nut; the resulting frictional heating
and abrasion of metallic particles
in a lox environment caused
ignition
Ignition in seal package area; most
likely the result of primary seal
bellows failure
Removed capacitance probe
• Redesign seal package
• Increased barrier pressure lower
redline from 75 lb/in 2 gauge to
170 lb/in 2 absolute
• Instituted HPOTP secondary seal
caviU{ pressure redline of 100
lb/in _ absolute maximum
Turbine to preburner interface HPOTP eccentric ring damage New single-piece design
leakage failure effects during pump installation implemented on all pumps to
reduce chance of crushing the ring
Problem Problem Cause Problem Solutions
Axial and radial rubbing of the Problem not accounted for in Reconfigured to eliminate axial
first-stage turbine blade tip seal original design and radial rubbing
Axial rubbing between the second- Insufficient clearances between Increased the clearances between
stage disk and turbine interstage turbine interstage seal/second- the turbine interstage seal/second-
seal stage fishmouth seal and second- stage fishmouth seal and second-
stage disk/forward blade platform stage disk/forward blade platform
Thin sheet metal bulging of inner Insufficient original design Increased the sheet melt thickness
and outer shrouds to eliminate bulging
k. HPFI'P Other
Component No.
HPFI'P 1.k. 1
! .k.2
1.k.5
February 1984 l.k.6
October 1981 1.k.7
August 1989 l.k.8
Pressure losses in the turnaround
duct portion of the FMOF HPb-TP
turbine
High turbine temperatures and
reduced pump efficiency
Coolant liner buckling failure;
engine 0108 (incident No. 28)
Phase 1 HPT did not eliminate
pressure losses; phase I1 had high
turbine temperatures and
transverse delta pressure
Metal impeller labyrinth seal
Coolant liner cavity overpressure
due to excessive hydrogen flow
past the lift-off seal into the liner
caused coolant liner buckling and
subsequent collapse of the
turnaround duct
Reverted back to FMOF inner and
outer shroud of turnaround duct,
but with thicker sheet metal in
diffuser section, to reduce high
turbine temperatures and
transverse delta pressure
Changed from metal impeller
layby seal to Kel-F seal; the KeI-F
seals contributed to reducing the
turbine temperatures and
improving pump efficiency
Redesign to eliminate excessive
seal leakage; redesign to eliminate
interstage seal axial rubbing;
coolant liner pressure redline
incorporated; acceptance criteria
developed for coolant liner
temperature and pressure
Turnaround duct failure (incident High-cycle fatigue cracking of Weld joint redesigned to provide
No. 23) weld 56 due to lack of weld better weld penetration
penetration
Relative motion between details;
internal melting (because of its
possibility of generating large
pieces) is most critical; internal
melting is believed to be due to
vibrations below 12 kHz
KEL-F seal internal/external Kel-
F melting, T-lock damage, support
fretting, antirotation pin damage,
nut lock damage, and loss of
preload on tapir nut
Seal redesign; improved
bottoming procedure has
eliminated support fretting and
antirotation pin damage; increase
torque on retaining nuts
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Table A-6. Turbomachinery problems (continued).
Component No.
December 1991 l.k.9
HPFI'P 1.k. I0
April 1982
H Pbq_ 1.k. 11
November 1989
March 1990 1.k.12
Problem
12 kHz vibration; most return to
flight units exhibited this
phenomenon
Kaiser hat nut failure (incident No.
25)
LPFI'P housing galvanic corrosion
LPFrP 330 Hz phenomena;
LPFI'P 4006 exhibited a strong
330-Hz phenomena that reached a
maximum amplitude of
approximately 6 g; several units
have had amplitudes in excess of
5g
Problem Cause
It is believed that the source of
12 kHz may be from the main
housing volute liner vent hole
diameters (01/93)
The Kaiser hat nut redesign
provided a hot gas leak path to the
Kaiser hat, resulting thermal
stresses led to fatigue failure of the
hat; the hat failure allowed hot gas
flow into the turbine beating
coolant, which failed the bearing;
this was the first test of a new
Kaiser hat nut redesign
Galvanic corrosion under copper
due to fluids entrapped during
plating; attributed to moisture
cryopumped during ground test;
moisture provides electrolyte for
galvanic action between dissimilar
metals; significant corrosion is
averted if flight occurs within 1
year of the initial ground test
Believed to be caused by incipient
alternate blade cavitation
Problem Solutions
Flying based on margin
demonstrated by unit 2027;
continued margin testing on units
2127 and 2227; develop a method
of quantifying damage and flight
acceptance criteria
• Redesign Kaiser hat nut to
eliminate leak path
• Decrease AS1 jet impingement
temperature on nut
Inspection of LPFFP volute based
on hot fire time and time between
potential moisture introduction
and first flight; vacuum dry
instituted after ground test to
remove moisture
Considered as a benign condition
because of ground test history
beginning with first fuel vent and
continuing through two units
greater than CEI life, flight history
beginning with STS- 1,
development tests with special
instrumentation, and pump
disassembly results
1.
Component
Lox Pump
No.
1.1.1
1.I.2
1.1.3
1.1.4
1.1.5
1.1.6
Problem Problem Cause Problem Solutions
Pump inlet housing vane leading Subsurface porosity breaking Improved casting technique
edge cracking through during operation
Bellows shield buckling Delta pressure across shield, Vent holes added
insufficient venting
Turbine turnaround duct cracking High-hoop strain caused by • Remove vanes
on vanes in fillet thermal gradient at shutdown • Slot inner flow wall
Turbine inlet housing dome cracks Higher than expected temperature Redesign, dome is now separate
on dome (2,200 OF), high thermal piece from inlet housing (hubcap
strain design); change dome material
from lnconel 718 TM to Haynes
230TM
Turbine inlet housing cracks in High stress concentration caused Casting redesign, added material
core breakout region of struts by tight fillet radius and rough so hollow core does not break
casting surface through, holes drilled instead
Inducer fatigue crack near fillet Blade rub on O.D., due to tight • Eliminated vibration problem
between blade and hub; failure on clearance and high vibration • Open OD. clearance from 10 to
unit 7-1G 29 mils
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Component
Table A-6. Turbomachinery problems (continued).
Lox Pump
(cont.)
m. Fuel
Component
Fuel Pump
No.
1.1.7
1.1.8
1.1.9
1.1.10
No.
l.m.l
1.m.2
1.m.5
Problem Problem Cause Problem Solutions
Bellows failure through crack
initiated at bolt attachment
SSME turning vane fatigue cracks
when ATD HPOTP utilized
Pump end ball bearing life below
prediction, heavy wear on inner
race, cage, and balls
Stress concentration from bolt
locking key was oriented in worse
location; slot was undersized (not
to print) high stress induced
during key installation due to
interference
ATD turbine discharge directs
more hot gas on vane than current
SSME HPOTP; flow-induced
vibrations cause cracking
Loss of lubrication
• Slots moved 90*
• Slot size is now controlled
• Reduced fit between bellows and
turbine outer vane support
In work (two options)
• Redesign ATD turnaround duct
geometry to direct flow similar to
current SSME pump
• Strengthen turning vane, increase
vane thickness, or change material
• Changed ball material to silicon
nitride
• The beating health was improved
by inner race cooling and outer
race guided cage
Step increases in synchronous Instability of the inducer and Increased inducer tip clearance (29
vibration levels shroud clearance aggravated by mil); improved damping seal
cavitation loads
Problem Problem Cause Problem Solutions
Lift-off seal cracking during initial High bending stress in first • Change taper in convolution
pressure test convolute region
• Material change, went from
Berylco to MP35N
Pump discharge housing cracks on 3-percent strain on trailing edge, • Increase housing wall thickness
trailing edge of splitter vanes displacement-driven problem; • Add stiffener ribs
original P&W finite element ° Cut back trailing edge
model had loads applied in wrong • Add dual splitter
direction
Diffuser cracking around orifice High stress concentration due to • Increase radius
hole sharp edge • Improve casting technique
Turbine inlet cracks on inner
shroud trailing edge
Turbine housing/discharge
housing bolt cracking
High strain during startup transient
due to thermals
High temperature on bolt head due
to recirculation of hot gas
• Slotted shroud, eliminated hoop
continuity
• Changed interference fits
• Add additional cooling to the
cavity
• Reduce recirculation with flow
blocker
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Table A-7. Rotordynamic problems.
Element/Subsystem Problem Problem Cause Problem Solutions
Rocketdyne HPFTP
Rocketdyne HPOTP
Rocketdyne HPFTP
Subsynchronous vibration
Subsynchronous vibration
A 175-Hz subsynchronous whirl
limited pump speed to 22,000
r/min
Rotordynamic instability-rotor
supported on smooth seals will
exhibit subsynchronous self-
excited whirl when the speed
approaches twice the first natural
frequency
Rotordynamic instability-rotor
whirled at 90 percent of shaft
speed due to destabilizing forces
generated by slipping spline
Rotordynamic instability
Damping seals reduce the
destabilizing cross-coupled forces
and allow stable operation beyond
twice the first natural frequency
Splines were piloted to prevent
slippage and damping seals were
incorporated to supply stiffness
and damping
Bearing carriers were stiffened
after coulomb friction devices
proved unsuccessful; further
stiffening was achieved by
replacing two major labyrinth
seals with two smooth seals
between the three pump impellers;
this raised the whirl frequency
from 175 to 300 Hz without being
eliminated
ATD HPOTP High-synchronous vibration Hydrodynamics excitation Redesigned inducer
resonance
ATD HPbTP Alpha vibration Hydro possibly Not solved
Simplex pump Critical speed in the operating Lengthened bearing span,
range (analytical) lightened inducer, reduced
overhang
2. Combustion Devices
a. Main Combustion Chamber
Table A-8. Combustion devices.
Component No.
MCC 2.a. 1
2.a.2
Problem Problem Cause Problem Solutions
Delamination of EDNi/Narloy-Z
bondline; typically located on
MCC aft end
EDNi material properties do not
meet specifications; yield strength
is below the specification
minimum
Attributed to two different
operations in the plating process:
(1) High copper levels in the
cathodic activation process
(2) Mercury contamination during
EDNi process
Inadequate control and definition
of processing variables; lack of
proper process monitoring
techniques, changes in raw
material, and general
contamination
• Improved process to remove
copper and other metallics for the
bath; established requirements that
allow only 25 percent of the
previous allowed metallic
contaminants
• Mercury was entering the tank
through the tooling used to rotate
the part; all the mercury has been
removed from the tooling and
replaced by copper brushes
A comprehensive set of CPI and
Taguchi experiments were
conducted to define the major
process control factors; limits have
been established for these factors
and are being tightly controlled;
an automated process control
system has been installed; a class 1
ECP was processed to better
define the process, including the
accept/reject; final acceptance of
EDNi properties is determined by
a specimen from excess stock on
aft end
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TableA-8. Combustiondevices(continued).
Component
MCC (cont.)
July 1980
2.a.4
2.a.5
2.a.6
2.a.7
2.a.8
2.a.9
Problem Problem Cause Problem Solutions
Inlet welds 4 and 5 do not meet
CEI requirements when minimum
wail thickness and maximum
allowable drawing mismatch are
considered
Conflicting tolerances;
manufacturing can make part
within specifications, but certain
combinations of thickness and
offset prevent NCF CEI life to be
shown by analysis
Pin hole leak in weld joint 12
detected during postflight leak
check of STS-26
Liner life analysis methodology Current analysis methods are not
does not predict the observed capable of modeling the failure of
midchannel failure location a hot gas wall of a MCC liner
X ray was able to identify lack of
fusion in weld joint 12
Two-duct hot-gas manifold MCC
erosion; overheating of hot-gas
well causes pinholes, cracks, and
dog-housing; extent of damage
exceeds that experienced by
higher time units
Burst diaphragm failures on
engines 2015 and 2107
MCC lee jet failure resulting in
incorrect chamber pressure
reading (incident No. 18)
Many factors contributed to the
accelerated erosion of MCC hot-
gas wail; the primary cause has
been attributed to an increased
amount of hot-gas ingestion into
the main injector coolant plenum;
other contributing factors include
lox post underbiasing and high
resistance MCC's
The presence of the silicone
elastomer on the diaphragm cap is
required to dampen the vibration
during engine operation;
diaphragms with improperly
bonded elastomer are subject to
failing at the coined groove
intersections due to operational
vibrations; the unbonded
elastomer that was evident on
these parts is suspected of
reducing the damping effect that
allows for vibration and premature
failure of the diaphragm at the
coined grooves
The lee jet retainer ring was
installed improperly; CH A PC
failure resulted from a PC sense
port purge lee jet becoming
dislodged and exposing the sensor
to the MCC coolant discharge
pressure
An additional requirement was
added to determine if units meet
CEI life requirements or to
determine the allowable life; this
was done using analysis, pull test
strain data, hot-fire strain data, or
surface contour data; this problem
points to the need to do sensitivity
studies in the design phase
MCC unit 4001 was repaired by
grind-out and weld fill; bondline
was not impacted; large throat
MCC configuration modifies
parent and weld material of welds
10, 11, 12, 13, and 14
Redesigned main injector
flowshields have been
incorporated into the phase li+
engines to decrease the amount of
hot-gas ingestion; other changes
included increasing the lox post
biasing requirements and
incorporating a revised CCV
schedule to increase the MCC
coolant flowrate at RPL and 104-
percent power level; additionally,
a new method of calculating the
MCC flowrate was developed
The elastomer application process
has been changed to improve the
bonding characteristics; because
bond failures usually result from
poor surface cleanliness, a solvent
rinse has been added prior to
applying the silicone primer; the
primer cure has also been changed
to room temperature rather than
the previous forced-air circulating
oven cure and the elastomer is
vacuum processed prior to being
injected into the burst diaphragm
cap; improved bonding has been
demonstrated in the lab when parts
were processed with the modified
application process
• Implemented shutdown for
"major component failure" prior to
SRB ignition during ground
testing
• Redesigned lee jet retention
device to prevent dislodgment
• Added HPOTP turbine discharge
temperature lower redline
Weld offsets General problem with weld offsets Improve welding process; design
due to difficulty in welding should be robust with respect to
sections with thin walls weld offsets
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TableA-8. Combustiondevices(continued).
Component No.
MCC (cont.) 2.a.10
March 1985
Problem Problem Cause Problem Solutions
Outlet manifold weld cracks
(incident No. 30)
Undetected flaw in outlet manifold
neck; an external leak developed;
see document RSS-8595-39
Near-term solution was to
reinspect MCC's to verify no
CIFS, reduce the life by one half
and to reinforce outlet with EdNi;
the long-term solution was to go to
a single piece forging
b. Nozzle
Component
Nozzle
November 1979
No.
2.b.l
May 1979 2.b.2
June 1982 to 2.b.3
April 1984
January 1991 2.b.4
September 1988 2.b.5
May 1992 2.b.6
2.b.7
1982 to present 2.b.8
Problem Problem Cause Problem Solutions
Nozzle steerhorn failure (incident
No. 15)
Nozzle steerhom failure (incident
No. 13)
Aft manifold thermal protection
burned up on reentry (STS-4, 6, 8,
9, 11); no nozzle structural
damage
Aft manifold siam holes cracked
as a result of low-cycle fatigue; no
effect on engine function or
performance
G 15 seal overheated and cracked
(stress rupture) during STS-26
Nozzle fatigue cracks in stubout
fillet radius
Nozzle stubout weld indications
Coolant tube fatigue
The fracture of the steerhom was
caused by the use of improper
weld wire in the welds on either
side of the T-joint; the joint failed
at the time of maximum strain
during shutdown
Low-cycle fatigue associated with
the 200 to 400 Hz oscillations in
the start and shutdown transients;
oscillations were unknown at the
time of the failure
During reentry, a shock attached
to the nozzle blunt body (aft
manifold lip, causing high
stagnation temperatures resulting
in TPS melting
Engines start and shuMown
transient loads (due to flow
separation) in combination with
the slam hole Kt produced fatigue
at the hole ligament
The seal heating is a result of hot
gas flow being driven into the
joint by nozzle coolant tube
protrusion into the hot-gas flow,
ovalness of the tube bundle and
gaps between the MCC and the
coolant tubes
Fractography confirms transient
fatigue mechanism as a result of
transient loading and fillet radius
stress concentration
Welding process insufficient to
eliminate the existence of porosity
in pores with tails
High strains during start and sea-
level shutdown transients
• Modify weld wire process
• EdNi plate nozzles in the field
with wrong weld wire
• Initiate nozzle lab testing
considering static and dynamic
loads to verify math models;
incorporate new steam loop design
• Add strain gauge instrumentation
to better define the start and cutoff
oscillations
• Redesign steerhorn duct with the
capability to withstand newly
identified loads; increased the wall
thickness from 0.049 to 0.080 in;
support the steerhorn at the No. 9
hatband and include an expansion
loop in the downcomer
TPS redesigned to eliminate blunt
body at aft manifold
Fatigue arrestor bolts were
designed and implemented to
extend the life of the slam holes to
CEI requirements; these bolts
eliminate the Kt during the
compression cycle of the loading
• A flow recirculation inhibitor
was designed and implemented to
preclude hot gas from reaching the
seal
• Limits on tube protrusion and
gap were established
Life limit nozzles to 18 transients,
which is 50 percent of 36
transients (when the first crack
initiation occurred)
Life limit nozzles based on
severity of porosity found
Criteria established for allowable
leakage limits; permits class I and
II leakage on hot and cold walls;
class III and higher leaks are
unacceptable and require repair
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b. Nozzle (continued)
Table A-8. Combustion devices (continued).
Component No.
1984 to present 2.b.9
May 1993 2.b.10
July 1993 2.b.11
c. Powerhead
Component No.
Powerhead 2.c. 1
Problem Problem Cause Problem Solutions
Coolant tube corrosion Contamination seeds and sustains
corrosion
Fabrication process improved to
minimize residual contaminants;
no leakage permitted on coldwall
side; minor leakage (CL I)
permitted on hotwall;
unacceptable leaks are repaired
Feedline elbow bracketed welds Welds with incomplete Life limit established at 22
penetration developed fatigue unrestrained transients with an
cracking during start and sea-level inspection required at 11; welds
shutdown transients reworked to extend life
Stubout weld defect Fatigue growth in a weld defect Life limited by generic stubout
(lack of fusion) while under start DAR at 27 total transients with an
and sea-level transients inspection required at 18
unrestrained transients
Problem Problem Cause Problem Solutions
2.c.2
2.c.3
2.c.4
2.c.5
2.c.6
March 1978 2.c.7
June 1978
July 1980
July 1981 2.c.8
September 1981
Fatigue of Iox post creates leaks
and destroys engine powerhead
through lox hydrogen fire
Crack initiation and propagation in
powerhead G6 flange; potential
hot-gas leakage across G6 seal
Powerhead coolant duct welds
have excessive mismatch and did
not meet CEI life requirements
Main injector oxidizer inlet
manifold base ring welds do not
meet CEI requirements;
specifically welds 6, 7, 16, 17, 52,
and 53
FPB liner tab failure on engine
2206
Oxidizer prebumer "POP's,"
which cause interpropellant plate
deformation and potential braze
joint damage
Hot-gas H2 flow creates vortex
shedding coupled with large static
load
Low-cycle fatigue failure due to
high strain caused by flange roll
and high HPFTP turbine discharge
temperatures; only two
powerheads with >85 ms starts
Baseline design deficiency;
fabrication of welds difficult; wall
thickness too thin
Analysis assumes all worst-case
geometries, i.e., maximum offset,
minimum wall thickness, material
properties not well defined; design
deficiency and fabrication
difficulty
Manufacturing error; weld
extended into radius, pump impact
during installation
Comingling and combustion of
hydrogen and oxygen in prebumer
lox dome due to aspiration effects
during transients
• Initial solution; installation of
flow shields on outside posts, two
posts per shield
• Two-duct hot-gas manifold
• Super posts tested but not
incorporated
°TBD
• High start units in test will be
inspected at approximately 80
starts
• Utilize inner guide ring to
minimize offset on later phase II
ducts
• Increase the thickness locally in
the area of the weld joint on phase
11+ ducts
Actual geometries measured for
weld joints 6, 7, 52, and 53 and
materials test program done; weld
joint 16 blended, 17 tracked by
DAR; newer powerheads have
forged tees so welds 16 and 17
meet CEI; robotic welding
improved fabrication
Considered unique
Flatness check of faceplate is
required if a "POP" occurs above
a specified "g" level; changed start
and shutdown sequence to reduce
occurrence
Main injector lox post thread/tip High-cycle fatigue failure due to Replace CRES post tips with
failures (same as item 2.c. 1) large fluctuating pressure loading Haynes tips
(incident Nos. 6, 7, and 17) and large static load
Main injector lox post inertia weld High-cycle fatigue failure due to Replace CRES posts with Haynes
failure (same as 2.c.2) (incident large fluctuating pressure loading posts
Nos. 20 and 21) and large static load
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c. Powerhead (continued)
Component No.
2.c.9
2.c.10
July 1987 2.c.11
2.c.12
2.c.13
2.c.14
February 1984 2.c.17
July 1980 2.c.18
August 1977 2.c.19
Table A-8. Combustion devices (continued).
Problem
Main injector interpropellant plate
cracking
Main injector lox post stub life
Engine 2106 OPB interpropellant
baffle pin braze joint failure
(incident No. 31)
Cracking on I.D. of FPB diffuser
Preburner lox post transformation
to martensite
4,000 Hz vibration on the main
injector lox inlet splitter vanes
creates fatigue cracks
Main injector lox post outer
diameter defects
Heat exchanger leak detected in
weld No. 4 bifurcation joint area
Fuel preburner manifold boss
crack (incident No. 29)
Fuel preburner liner and chamber
burn through (incident No. 16)
FPB housing burn through
(incident No. 2)
Problem Cause
High thermal gradient across the
interpropellant plate and hydrogen
charging of the hot-gas surface
causes thermal cracking
Fatigue life limited based on
correlation to interpropellant plate
cracking
Poor braze quality on units that
were brazed in ME&T fumace;
lO-percent braze on failed joint;
ductile overload assisted by LCF
Failures of plug weld No. 3 allows
diffuser to be internally
pressurized
Transformation can be caused by
material lot variation and/or
dynamic loading
Vortex shedding of splitter due to
small differences in vane trailing-
edge geometry, only 20 percent of
injectors show resonance at 4,000
Hz
Handling and fabrication damage
Inclusion in parent material
High stress concentration where
boss is welded to manifold
Injector faceplate deformation
biased lox element, which caused
liner erosion; low coolant pressure
allowed hot gas to contact the
body wall
Similar to incident No. 16
Problem Solutions
Improved the heat shield retention
system to eliminate heat shield
damage and accepted the thermal
cracked as a benign self-limiting
condition
Generic DAR based on single
flight reliability and elliptical
radius incorporated in 1987 to
reduce stress concentration factor
Verified braze quality on units
brazed in manufacturing furnace
to be a minimum of 50 percent
braze; problem unique to units
brazed in ME&T furnace;
improved braze process control
Cracked diffusers are acceptable
as is; no risk to engine operation,
weld No. 3 has been modified to
improve weld penetration
Phase !I, install support pins or
deactivate post at higher eddy
current readings; phase II+, posts
redesigned and lower dynamic
loads
• Sharpened trailing edge and
increased open space between
leading edge of the two splitter
vanes
• No 4,000 Hz resonance since fix
incorporated
• Gimbal bearing accels added to
screen
Analytically life limited and
revision to tooling/process
Changed material to vimvar to
eliminate inclusions and
redesigned to single-coil heat
exchanger, thus eliminating welds
Redesigned boss to be integrally
machined for development
engines; boss does not exist on
flight engines
Inspection is done to verify
element concentricity; divergent
liner was added to reduce hot gas
circulation; metering ring was
redesigned to increase coolant
pressure; a thermal shield was
added over the body wall, but later
removed
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c. Powerhead
Component No.
February 1982 2.c.20
January 1981 2.c.21
2.c.22
December 1978 2.c.23
2.c.24
2.c.25
2.c.26
2.c.27
Table A-8. Combustion devices (continued).
Problem
FPB fuel injector blockage (ice)
(incident No. 24)
FPB injector lox post failure
(incident No. 19)
FPB lox post failure
Heat exchanger coil failure
Heat exchanger coil leak detected
at weld No. !
Lox inlet seam weld rework
Proof failure of powerhead duct
Liquid metal embrittlement
(LME) in ASI tube brazing
Problem Cause Problem Solutions
Water was introduced into the
engine during an electrical
discharge machining process
performed on the test stand;
subsequent drying purges
ineffective; during engine start,
cold hydrogen caused the residual
water to freeze; resulting ice
blocked several FPB fuel element
inlets, causing a high oxygen to
fuel ratio and high combustion
temperatures
Metallurgical examination
revealed all posts to exhibit cold
work at fillet radius where high-
cycle fatigue crack was found;
GH2 flowed into lox post via
crack and ignited, which eroded
off lost post tip; damage self limits
during mainstage, but during
shutdown, GH2 flows into lox
dome through damaged element;
recirculating GH2 ignited with lox
residual in dome and caused
remaining element damage
High dynamic loading due to
swirling flow caused by misdrilled
holes
Heat exchanger coil leak most
likely caused by a welding arc
burn or wall thinning due to
reaming operation
Lack of weld fusion
Mistracking of EB weld of shells;
unauthorized TIG tack usage on
the root instead of face,
contributed to embedded defects
Duct not heat treated
Torch braze of sleeve and collar to
ASI line as it passes through thrust
cone caused tube to crack and
braze material to fill crack if
excessive heat was applied with
tube restrained
Redesigned boss to be integrally
machined for development
engines; boss does not exist on
flight engines
• Tighter fabrication tolerances
• FPB lox element support pins
• OPB eddy current inspections
Tightened control on drilling
operation, added eddy current
inspection, and installed support
pins; phase II+ element were
redesigned to reduce stress
• Changed welding procedure
• Changed reaming procedure
• Proof test after each HPOTP
installation
• Mass spectrometer leak test after
each proof test and prior to each
hot fire test
• Visual examination of heat
exchanger after every HPOTP
removal
Revising welding and inspection
procedure; designed single tube
heat exchanger with no weld No. 1
Short term - shells installed -
grind groove along length of EB
weld root side and IVC dye
penetrant and x ray; shells not
installed - grind to remove
defects, TIG weld fill, inspect
long-term, one-piece shell, no EB
weld
Perform hardness tests on all ducts
in the fleet; ensure all ducts in
manufacturing obtain heat treat
Lox line borescope inspected after
torch braze to verify no LME; fuel
line eliminated braze of sleeve and
collar and left a 0.040-in gap
requirement between tube and
thrust cone
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c. Powerhead (continued)
Table A-8. Combustion devices (continued).
Component Problem
Duct crackilag due to stress
accelerated grain boundary
oxidation (sagbo)
2.c.29 Secondary faceplate retainer
failures
Problem Cause
sagbo
High-cycle fatigue failure due to
high-flow loading
Problem Solutions
Recommended to not heat pass
903, but if required to be done
under ME&T supervision
Short term - Deactivated and
rodded high flow posts (8, 9, 78,
and 79); long term - heavy wall
secondary faceplate retainers
2.c.30 FPB ASI line rupture Contamination (metallic particle) Graphite wrap to reinforce ASI
lodged in ASI causing blockage; line
line overpressurized and burst
2.c.31 ASI contamination Contamination blocked ASI fuel Fuel filter or redesigned fuel filter
inlet, causing preburner ASI to go
lox rich, eroding face plate inner
rOWS
Table A-9. Ducts and valves.
Problem Problem Cause Problem Solutions
Tripod linkage failure of flex joint C Fatigue initiation at undersize fillet
(incident No. 32) radii region
3a. Ducts
Component
Ducts
June 1989
June 1985
June 1984
October 1989
January 1990
February1992
Titanium high-pressure duct flange
cracking
Low-pressure fuel duct buckling
Incoloy 903 TM corrosion (pitting of
the flange sealing surface)
Flex duct overangulation
High-pressure fuel duct failure
during cryogenic proof test
Torn LPFT discharge duct flex joint
liner
H2 assisted sustained load cracking
due to joint preload
Pressure built-up between duct and
nickel plating caused by cryo
pumping during propellant bleed
cycle
Incoloy 903 TM susceptible to
corrosion
Engine yaw stiff-arm disengaged
resulting in overangulation; human
efFOf
Ruptured at 8,000 lbhn 2 on first
pressure cycle to 8,360 llgin 2,
oxygen contamination of weld
resulting in brittle fracture titanium
weld
Liner was installed in a reversed
direction of flow, due to reverse flex
joint flanges
DAR 2296: limit use with a HPFTP with
synchronous frequencies greater than
609 Hz; restriction of time accumulated
at power level greater than 104 percent;
restriction based on power level
equivalency derived by direct correlation
to the failures; verify fillet radii
Reduced joint preload; initiated a
penetrant inspection at every 45-day
interval; redesigned using new material
(Inconel 71firM); all titanium ducts have
been removed from the flight program
Install helium bag; redesign foam
system (bonded foam)
Flange groove relapped to remove
corrosion; new material of plating on
seal being tested at this time for possible
future modification
Engine visually inspected; remove and
replace the articulating fuel bleed duct;
complete FRT' s while gimbaling the
engine in the allowable envelope
Palmdale facility modified/qualified for
titanium welds (all flight ducts are now
made of Incoloy 718 TM)
Liner flow direction verification
implementation initiated at flex joint
level, fabrication level, and engine
assembly level; reinspect all fleet ducts
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Table A-9. Ducts and valves (continued).
Component
July 1991
November 1990
October 1990
September 1988
July 1986
August 1982
Problem
Low-pressure oxidizer duct bellow
ply failure
Field site stretch fastener
requirements
RS007030 preburner fuel duct
failure during proof test
Rigid fuel bleed duct stress
corrosion cracking
1985 first occurrence
1988 second occurrence
LPOTP discharge duct flex joint
antibacklash tie pin (UCR A020205)
Elongation of hydraulic supply hose
Discharge duct failure (incident No.
27)
Problem Cause
Fatigue crack propagate through
inner ply; lox leaks into inner ply
cavity during operation; Iox expands
during posttest warmup resulting in
inner ply deformation and bulging
Requirements specified in the
specification were too tight
Duct was not heat treated; portable
hardness tester results invalid on
lncoloy 903 TM
Stress corrosion cracking of CRES
21-6-9 material
Tensile failure during fabrication
due to a misuse of a tooling fixture
Undersize braid wire; mishandling
(UCR A004122)
Mounting of experimental ultrasonic
flowmeter to high-pressure oxidizer
duct led to HCF rupture of duct wail
resulting in pump unloading,
overspeed, and turbine disk failure
m parallel with rubbing, internal
fire, and pump housing rupture
Problem Solutions
All bellows inspected posttest visually
for bulging; life limit imposed per FLC
2595 (50 percent of the failed unit)
Relaxed tolerance requirements based
upon statistical analysis and revised the
baseline analysis for the bolt joints;
revise specifications per ECP 1197 to
impose specific calibration requirements
All components in the particular heat
load verified; limits of portable tester
determined; reviewed heat treat practices
and fabrication flowpath of hardware
All CRES 21-6-9 material ducts;
application of zinc chromate primer and
strontiumchromate overcoat as inhibitor
(STS28 to present); reinspect corrosion
protection integrity at 2, 4, and 6 years
on one unit
Revise flex joint and duct drawings to
add notes to prevent compression of the
flex joint and resulting tensile load on
antibacklash tie; inspected next six flex
joints via x ray to verify corrective
action
Procurement inspection plan amended to
measure and record the braid wire
diameter used on each unit; measure the
length of the hose before and after the
proof test
• Establish criteria for mountings on
lines, ducts, and pressure vessels
• Require government approval for
configuration changes from that which is
certified
3b. Valves
Component Problem
MOV fire 901-225 (incident No. 12)Valves
December 1978
July 1979 MFV housing crack E2002 (incident
No. 14)
PCA accumulator cap
Problem Cause Problem Solutions
Fretting of inlet sleeve due to flow
oscillation at 4x HPOTP shaft
speed; fire initiated in the inlet
sleeve to bellows flanged joint
High-cycle fatigue failure; most
probable cause of crack initiation
was stress corrosion cracking during
heat treatment
During proof test testing, the
accumulator cap deflected and lost
its sealing capability
Increase sleeve and flange thickness;
sleeve bolted with 16 screws and locked
with cup washers; replace laminated 302
SS shims with one lncoloy 718 TM space;
apply dry lube to selected interfaces
Life limit imposed based upon an
analysis correlated with failure and fillet
radii in the failure region (interim fix);
completely redesigned cam follower
area; (increase fillet radii) and
implementation of process change
Redesign the PCA accumulator cap to
increase its thickness from 0.400 to
0.650 in and increase the length of the
two attachment bolts
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Table A-9. Ducts and valves (continued).
Component Problem Problem Cause Problem Solutions
May 1982 OPOV seal failure (incident No. 26) Shutdown sequence allows hot gas Modified the shutdown sequence for
to propagate to ASI tee-block; seal shutdown after 5.0 s; shutdown between
eroded by hot-gas impingement 1.5 and 5.0 s requires ball seal
replacement
Pogo accumulator Z baffle cracks Turbulent buffeting by main Required the vane edges to be
oxidizer flow caused high-cycle chamfered; crack length of 0.15 in or
fatigue cracks, which initiated in top less deemed acceptable by analysis
flange of baffle vanes
June 1978 Fuel inlet blocked by nitrogen
(incident No. 8)
Solidified nitrogen collected in the
screen in the main propellant duct
and restricted hydrogen flow to the
LPFP; the nitrogen was introduced
into the tank during pretest
chilldown operations due to an
incomplete electrical interlock
between the two tank vents, the
forward engine chill valve, and the
tank vent line, GN purge; and the
incorrect positioning of the main
propellant duct bleed valve and the
forward engine chill valve
• Modification of LH tank vent line
purge sequencing interlock
• All run tank vent line purges converted
to helium
• Relocation of LH barge tank vent line
purges to preclude backflow to the barge
tank
• Modification of test stand chilldown
procedures and safe-guarding systems
and procedures
• Implementation of engine inlet
pressure redlines
B. Solid Rocket Motor/Boosters (RSRM/RSRB)
Although, on the surface, it appears that the RSRM/RSRB is nothing but a large, simple booster,
it turned out to be a very complex system with many development problems. The complexity was
further enhanced by the requirement to recover and reuse the system 20 times. The magnitude and
complexity of the problems listed (table A-10) point clearly to this observation. The harshness of the
reentry, water impact, and recovery operations clearly added to the problems. The ablative gimbaled
nozzle has been the source of many concerns and problems. The joints and seals are a constant concern
and were the cause of the Challenger accident that destroyed the shuttle and killed the crew (Presidential
Investigation Committee Report).
There were several lessons learned in the RSRM/RSRB program. Since the SRM/SRB dry
weight only cost 1 lb of payload for each 10 lb of dry weight, it was a good trade to add conservatism in
the design by using maximum/minimum loads, which then allowed load increases without redesign. The
lesson: robustness early in a program provides flexibility to solve downstream problems.
The SRM clearly taught that an apparently simple system that contains high energy (pressure,
temperature, thrust) is in reality very complex, requiring great care and attention to prevent failures.
When additional functions such as providing control authority, more complexity and issues are added.
From a system perspective, however, the best place to put control authority is where the potential
authority resides (SRM thrust). In this case (space shuttle), major control disturbances also came from
the SRM natural thrust misalignments. Taking this disturbance out at its source is good logic.
SRM/shuttle reinforces the axiom that all design is a balancing act, a series of trades, giving up some
things in order to get others you want or need.
The matrix (table A-10) provides a listing of many of the problems experienced in the project
and should serve as a technical base for problem avoidance in the future.
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TableA-10. SRM/SRBproblems.
Component
Aft skirt
STA-2B - 1986
STA-3 - 1988
Bracket - 1994
Bracket- 1994
Problem
Structural failure occurred during
static test at loads below design
requirement; large cost associated
with NDE inspection of critical
region
Failure of nominal configuration
at higher than STS-3 load
All aluminum components Corrosion - Significant amounts
of salt water corrosion are evident
on much of the SRB hardware
Forward skirt Water impact and tow back
damage
SRB attach struts Expensive NDE and proof testing
ET attach ring Expensive NDE and damage
assessment
Systems tunnel Assembly
Nose cap Thrust post did not receive proper
heat treat
SRB separation motors, Potential for plume impingement
1979 damage to orbiter tiles
SRB nose cap, 1988
Blast container system,
1988
Holddown bolt hangup
TVC system, 1982
Recovery system main
parachute floats, 1982
Shedding of thermal protection
material damaged orbiter tiles
Frangible holddown nut debris
lost
Broaching of bolt in aft skirt hole
during lift-off
50 Hz oscillation in TVC system
during ground test
Floats for two main parachutes
entangled during deployment,
destroying one chute on STS-3
Recovery system Loss of both boosters on STS-4
g-switch, 1982 when chutes were prematurely
released
Recovery system main Excessive deployment damage
parachutes, 1992
Problem Cause Solution
A weld joint in the primary load- An external bracket has been
carrying structure fails at strain designed to reduce the strain in
levels far below the values the weld; the bracket was tested in
predicted by materials testing the first quarter of 1994
Study in process Pending
Cost-effective NDE and analysis
methods are being considered
The repeated exposure of
aluminum to salt water is causing
a deterioration of the SRB
components
Forward skirts have been scrapped
due to extreme water impact
damage; the skirts leak water
during tow back, damaging
expensive electronics
Water impact damage is
considered attrition; leakage
problem has been reduced by
improved door seals
Conservative fracture mechanics Reduction in NDE requirements
analysis by improvements in analysis
Water impact loading can cause None
significant damage to the ring
Occasional problems in assembly, Engineering has been put in place
caused by buildups in the to allow slotted holes and large
tolerance along the length of the washers to be used during
tunnel assembly
Lack of vendor quality control Thrust posts removed and
replaced
Size of particles in propellant Minimized propellant aluminum
combustion products content, 2 percent; extensive test
and analysis verification
Nose cap assembly age and TPS Developed and implemented new
material properties TPS material
Inadequate blast container design Designed, built, tested system
with plunger connected to
holddown bolt by frangible link to
close container
Bolt rotation after frangible nut
separation
Limited cycle oscillation was
caused by feedback of nozzle
modes through actuator
differential pressure loop at the
elevated hydraulic fluid
temperature seen in ground tests
Floats being stored above chute
_acks and frustum tilt during
deployment
G-switch for releasing mains at
water impact was triggered by
pyro shock at frustum separation
Chute contact with structure
reside frustum during deployment
Optimized frangible link size;
minimize bolt velocity loss and
constrain bolt to axial translation
Established fluid temperature
limits for LCC; analysis indicated
any flight oscillations would be
less than ground test experience;
no function or structure
degradation
Change float design such that
floats are stowed below main
chute packs and attached to risers
Electronically block out g-switch
until after frustum separation
Install rip-stops on all main chutes
to reduce damage propagation due
to deployment load
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TableA- 10. SRM/SRB problems (continued).
Component Problem Problem Cause Solution
Aft SRB components, Water impact damage High-impact velocity Changed main chute size from
1981 115 to 136 ft and applied foam to
aft skirt internal components
SRB aft skirl aft ring, Water impact damage Intact thermal curtain Reduced curtain strength and
1982 reverified functionality for
ignition overpressure
Aft skirt thermal curtain, Structural failure during reentry Aerodynamic flutter Risk of reentry thermal damage
1982 acceptable weighed against
increased water impact damage
with stronger curtain
Rate gyros in forward skirt Post separation damage Potentially reentry/vortex Perform gyro functional
shedding water impact, tow back acceptance testing prior to reuse
environment
Rate gyros in forward skirt Gyros/mounting structure tuned Mounting structure flexibility Reinforced mounting structure
with fourth SRB bending mode
SRB, 1979 Excessive reentry acoustics Nozzle acoustics during reentry Designed to separate nozzle aft
exit cone at apogee
Aft skirt internal Thermal damage Reentry heating/hydrazine fire Delayed nozzle aft exit cone
components, 1981 separation until after maximum
reentry heating
Main parachutes Lagging inflation failure to inflate Inherent to large chutes deployed Various improvements
in clusters implemented; vent cap addition,
packing changes
Reefing line cutter Failed to fire Pull angle too large Acceptable risk; redundant cutter
worked, low probability of high
pull angle
Pilot chutes Negative margins Increased deployment loads due to Waivers for higher load based on
higher SRB apogee test, then the pilot chute was
redesigned
Drogue deployment bag Negative margins Increased deployment loads due to Waivers for higher load based on
higher SRB apogee test, then the drogue bag was
redesigned
Main parachute support Negative margins at corner Increased deployment loads due to Waivers due to nonsafety of flight
structure fittings and frustum shear beam higher SRB apogee issue, then enlargement of corner
fitting bolts and holes
Main parachute deck Negative margins Increased deployment loads due to Redesigned fittings with larger
fittings higher SRB apogee pins and flanges
Thrust vector control Weld cracks Lack of full weld penetration due Analysis indicates the weld is not
system frames to configuration design required; frames are fully
inspected prior to use
ASRB IEA box Orbiter wind load lEA box location Value added by changing box
location, reducing wing load, less
than cost of new aero data bases;
lEA location was not changed
SRB lEA box, 1982 Vibration criteria exceedance IEA box hard mount Designed, developed, built
vibration isolation system
SRB APU, 1979 Vibration criteria exceedance APU hard mount Design vibration isolation system
SRB APU Turbine blade root and tip Unknown Statistics/analysis employed to
cracking determine critical crack size (0.09
in) and required time between
inspections (16 hot firings, 2
flights)
ET RSS electronics panel Vibration criteria exceedance Panel hard mount Designed vibration isolation
system
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Table A-10. SRM/SRB problems (continued).
Component
SRM field joints, January
28, 1986
SRM stiffener stubs
RSRM igniter seals, 1988
RSRM case segments,
1991
RSRM nozzle/case joint
1992
Problem Cause
Seal response was inadequate for
the joint displacement/rate at
ignition
Water impact
RSRM aft dome Y joint,
1992
RSRM, 1993
RSRM forward case
segment, 1993
RSRM nozzle, 1994
RSRM propellant, 1979
RSRM propellant, 1993
RSRM nozzle
RSRM combustion
chamber
Problem
Leakage of combustion gases
causing the 5 IL disaster
Cracks occur at stub holes,
potential unsafe condition for
reuse
High seal temperature required for
seal resiliency, putty blow holes
Forward case segments buckled
Gas path through polysulfide,
blowby of wiper O-ring
Heat treatment cracks missed by
NDE
Burn roughness at 65 to 75 s burn
time
Inclusion crack in interior
membrane missed by NDE
Phenolic liner/metal debonds
Analytical representation of
stiffness
Analytical representation of
stiffness
Excessive erosion, pocketing
16 and 32 Hz press oscillations
during motor burn
SRM filament wound case STS-2 failure under prelaunch
loads
SRM filament wound case
ASRM test segment
ASRM/RSRM flex
bearing
Excessive motor elongation at
ignition
Segment failed at 10-percent
_roof load
ASRM torque greater than CEI
specified requirement
Joint displacement magnitude, use
of putty
Water impact, slap down event
Trapped air at nozzle assembly
forced through uncured
polysulfide; wiper O-ring/NBR
contact not intended as seal
Pooling of mag/particle fluid;
eddy current of painted metal
Collection, entrainment, ejection
of molten slag
Unknown
Study in process
Inadequate computer
methodology for modeling
propellant and pressure
Inadequate computer
methodology for modeling
propellant and pressure
Nonoptimum composite part ply
angles
First two acoustic, organ pipe
modes
Excessive delams during
manufacture
Bending deflection of steel joints
and soft composite/steel
connection at joints
Incorrect heat treat for massive
bolted joint, NDE failure to find
cracks
Interpretation of requirement
Solution
Redesigned the joint to decrease
displacement/rate by 10X and
heated seals to enhance response
Repair damage by removing stress
concentrations
Redesigned joint, reducing
displacement and replacing putty
with insulation j-seals
Water impact damage accepted as
attrition
Extensive study indicated no
change required; primary and
secondary seals fully functional
Changes in NDE procedure and
analytical verification of proof test
screening
Statistical quantification of 3-
sigma mag, structural assessment,
and process controls to prevent
changes
Safety of flight ensured by
pressure proof test screening of
cases
Partial solution - implementation
of silane primer on metal parts
Developed empirical
stiffness/pseudo-pressure effect
using one-fourth-scale test data
Developed modification to
NASTRAN differential stiffness
code
Changed ply angles for phenolic
rings
Accumulated statistical data base,
computed maximum 3-sigma
magnitude, included effects in
systems loads equations for
structural assessment
Process changed to adequately
wet winding fibers with epoxy
resin (program canceled,
Improvements implemented in
Titan project)
Changed winding pattern so that
composite case portions decreased
in length at ignition
Recommended design specific
heat treat profile be developed;
removed NDE supplier from
approved list
Clarify division between ASRM
and ASRB torque contributions
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Table A-10. SRM/SRB problems (continued).
Component Problem Problem Cause Solution
RSRM flex bearing Delaminations Uneven heat distribution during Relocated heating elements on
bearing cure process bearing hemispherical shims
Nozzle boot ring Boot failure on DM-8 Unsuccessful boot ring redesign Changed to a dual-ply angle
design
Propellant Cracks Stress concentration at star Changed local propellant shape to
grain/center post transition eliminate stress concentration
ET/SRB strut 50-percent through crack Lack of weld penetration Improved welding
RSRM thrust Pressure/thrust spike Slag ejection Statistical loads bound determined
acceptable
RSRM nozzle Joint 3 primary seal erosion Gas paths through RTV backfill Process change
RSRM liner, insulation Environmental Asbestos used in liner, insulation Replacement material, Kevlar TM
filled NBR, being
developed/tested
RSRM component Environmental Cleaning processes use ozone Spray-in-air aqueous cleaning
refurbishment depleting compounds solution processes being
developed/tested
RSRM bonds Environmental Bonding processes use ozone Non-ODC replacement adhesives
depleting compounds are being developed/tested
RSRM bonds Increased findings of low density Improved NDE sensitivity Reassessment of bonds,
areas significance of LDA' s,
realignment of data base
RSRM 36 nozzle Aluminum/phenolic unbonds, Reentry/water impact Bond improvement using silane
nose/inlet assembly suspect ascent condition structural/thermal loads primer, comprehensive team
assessment indicated not ascent
problem
C. External Tank
The ET, although probably the simplest of the shuttle elements due to its expendable requirement
(throw away), had many complex issues and concerns. Since 1 lb of tank structural weight was
approximately equal to 1 lb of payload, it was imperative to control and reduce weight. Ensuring tank
break up on reentry further complicated the system. Welding and ensuring weld integrity was and is a
major concern since there is over one-half mile of welds in each tank and a leak is not acceptable.
Insulation to maintain propellant conditioning and propellant management was a major design issue,
particularly since debonded TPS could come loose and damage the orbiter reentry heat protection tiles
during the ascent maximum dynamic pressure regime. The shear size, coupled with highly accurate
geometric dimensions, led to the development of complex accurate tooling and jigs that have been key
to tank manufacturing quality.
Several lessons stand out from the tank program. First, NDE and proof test is a safety-critical
process and is a keyto producing quality hardware. This discipline, fracture control/fracture mechanics,
must be a prime requirement for safety-critical hardware, particularly large cyro-propellant tanks.
Second, manufacturing is a fundamental part of the design process and must be pursued concurrently
with the hardware design in a systems or integrated approach. Third, if the environments are well known
and the materials (hardware base products) are well characterized, criteria such as safety factors can be
reduced to increase performance. Fourth, process control from the ingot, to the forming, to welding,
must be characterized, understood, and controlled to achieve quality products. Since these different steps
usually occur in different industrial elements, communications, etc., is vital.
The matrix (tables A-11 and A-12) gives a history of the type of problems that can be expected
in the development of propulsion system propellant tankage.
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Table A-11. ET problem outline.
Problems are broken down into the following categories;
1.0 Systems problems
1.1 Shuttle systems problems
2.0
1.1.1 Trajectories
1.1.2 ET disposal
1.1.3 Loads
1.1.4 Environments
1.1.5 Range safety
1.1.6 Launch commit criteria
3.0
4.0
5.0
1.2 ET systems
1.2.1 Preflight problems
1.2.2 Loading problems
Structure problems
2.1 Design requirements
2.2 Design assumptions
2.3 Structural changes
2.4 Fracture control
2.5 Pyrotechnics
2.6 Structural test
Thermal protection systems problems
Ground handling and operations problems
Instrumentation problems
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Table A- 12. ET problems.
1.0 Systems problem list
Area Problem Problem Cause Problem Solution
1.1 Shuttle systems problems
1.1.1 Trajectory effects
1.1.2 ETdisposal
Design trajectories are
conservative
Abort and ET disposal targeting
leads to more severe induced
environments
Load relief measures to protect
orbiter wind create impact on
performance, control, and
induced environments
Day of launch l-load updates
(DOLILU) instituted to base
trajectory shaping on measured
winds on the launch day in order
to improve launch probability
Generic certification leads to
more severe design
environments
The ET must be jettisoned after
MECO in an acceptable manner
Requirement for ET to remain
intact until altitude is below
294,000 ft results in more
thermal protection
Inability to predict ET break-up
altitude
Design trajectories based on 3-
sigma systems dispersions lead
to conservatisms
Necessity to achieve abort and
disposal targets requires flight
path and attitudes that increase
environments
Max "q" trajectory changed
from -2" to --6"
Trajectories based on DOLILU
protect the vehicle from
excessive loads but can increase
heating
Desire to minimize preflight
analysis activities led to more
all-encompassing flight
conditions for certification and
resulted in more severe design
environments
The ET (actually its pieces that
result after aerodynamic
breakup during entry) must be
made to impact in preselected
ocean areas for ground safety
considerations and in
accordance with international
treaties; this applies to all flight
cases, whether under normal
flight or abort conditions
To minimize debris footprint,
ET must not break up until it is
below 294,000 ft
Uncertainties in analysis caused
an inability to accurately predict
break-up altitude
Accept conservatism initially
and redefine dispersion values
as flight data and experience
become available
Accept increased environments
to ensure abort and disposal
requirements are met
• Trajectories are designed for
best compromise that minimizes
impacts
• Wind constraints were
instituted
• Accept performance and
launch probability reductions
• Wind constraints were
instituted
• Accept increased protuberance
airloads
• Algorithms to indicate loads
for critical areas were developed
to assess the acceptability of the
various DOLILU options
• Design thermal environments
were increased to protect against
the heating increases possible
with DOLILU options
Accept more severe design
requirements to minimize
operational cost
• Trajectory shaping is required
to allow the ET to be released
under the proper conditions to
impact in the preselected
locations
• A propulsive "tumble valve"
was included on the first 22
flights to cause the ET to tumble
during entry and thus provide a
more stable entry that neither
"skips" out of the atmosphere
nor "dives into" the atmosphere
(valve was removed after flight
experience showed it was not
necessary for acceptable debris
footprints)
Accept additional TPS to
com.ply with break-up
requzrement
Measurements of break-up
altitude by DOD resources were
used to develop a statistical data
base for break-up prediction
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1.0 Systems problem list
Area
1.1 Shuttle systems problems
1.1.3 Loads
1.1.4 Environments
Table A-12. ET problems (continued).
Problem Problem Cause Problem Solution
Strut loading was excessive
SSME startup (and shutdown
for abort cases) cause excessive
loads
SRM thrust variations can
aggravate flight loads
Change in pressurization
method increased loads
Aerodynamic heating prediction
uncertainties
Plume-induced heating
prediction uncertainties
Booster separation motors
impinged on ET foam during
SRB separation
Ascent acoustics uncertainties
Cryo shrinkage of ET affects
strut loading
Simultaneous startup or
shutdown from all three
SSME's induces extreme loads
SRM chamber pressure
oscillations are caused by
internal motor acoustic modes
and result in increased flight
loads, reduced margins on
intertank buckling, and caused
some welds to be inadequately
proof tested
Change to fixed orifice
pressurization increased LO2 aft
dome loading
Trajectory, configuration, and
methodology uncertainties, and
initial lack of data led to
conservatism in predictions and
excess TPS weight
Trajectory, configuration, and
methodology uncertainties and
initial lack of data led to
conservatism in predictions and
excess TPS weight
SRB separation motors must
point toward ET for proper
separation of boosters
Trajectory, configuration, and
methodology uncertainties and
initial lack of data led to
conservatism in predictions
Struts were pretensioned to
minimize loading effects
Startup and shutdown of
SSME's was staggered
• Added factor to SRM thrust
loads to account for oscillations
• Certified structure for
increased loads
• Added postproof test x-ray
requirements for inadequately
proofed weld areas
• Added factor to account for
increased pressure
• Certified structure for
increased loads
• As trajectory and
configuration matured, more
detailed aerothermal wind
tunnel testing was conducted
• Flight instrumentation was
obtained on DDT&E flights
• Additional analysis points
were used for specific problem
areas
• Prediction methodology
techniques were improved
• Radiation measurements were
obtained on engine and motor
ground tests
• Prediction methodology
techniques were improved
• Flight instrumentation was
obtained on DDT&E flights
• Additional analysis points
were used for specific problem
m'eas
• Sep motors were moved to
.prec.lude direct normal
Impingement on ET
• Testing was performed to
quantify impingement effects on
foam
• Aluminum content of
separation motors was reduced
to minimize erosion of foam
• An early acoustics test (IS1)
provided general acoustics
levels
• Some flight instrumentation
was obtained on DDT&E flights
• Additional analysis points
were used for specific problem
areas
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TableA-12. ET problems(continued).
1.0 S),stems problem list
Area Problem Problem Cause
1.1 Shuttle systems problems
1.1.4 Environments (cont.)
1.1.5 Range Safety
1.1.6 Launch commit
criteria
Unsteady airflow over cable
trays caused structural concerns
Airloads on foam protuberances
caused structural concerns
Commanded destruct of the ET
is required for civilian safety;
nonfunctioning is unacceptable
and has been the cause of launch
scrubs; premature functioning
would be catastrophic
Deletion of the linear shape
charges pursued as a means to
eliminate a criticality 1 failure
point
Low temperature damage
Lightning damage
Wind damage
Debris damage
Normal flow over raised cable
trays can cause "galloping
instabilities" and extreme
structural responses
Airflow to flat-faced foam
protuberances can cause them to
shed debris
Commanded destruct caused
addition of explosive charges,
antennae, electronics, additional
TPS, ground stations, and many
ground checks
Removal of charges only
possible if tanks can be
destructed by other means
Low ambient temperatures can
cause ice formation in areas
where water has collected and
can damage components
Lightning effects can damage or
.destroy the ET or its
components
Hurricane force winds can
damage the ET on the launch
pad and high winds in flight can
damage ET structure
Debris at launch or during flight
can damage orbiter tiles or
windows
Problem Solution
• Several subscale tests were run
• Experts were put under
contract
• Foam ramps were added to the
ET at cable tray locations to
protect from this phenomenon
• Several subscale tests were run
• Foam ramps were added to the
ET at protuberance locations to
protect from this phenomenon
• Range safety electronics
package was added to ET
intertank area and cross-
strapped to the boosters
• Antennae were added to
receive commands
• Linear shape charges and fuses
were added, which required
special thermal protection
• Many preflight readiness
checks were instituted
• Linear shape charge on LH2
tank removed as analysis
showed it would be destructed
when SRB's are destructed
• Linear shape charge on LO2
tank could not be removed
Constraints were placed on the
shuttle system to prohibit
propellant loading and launch if
ambient temperature limits are
violated
• Lightning rods were placed on
the launch pad to protect the
vehicle while on the pad
• Constraints were placed on the
shuttle system to prohibit
propellant loading under
lightning conditions and to
prohibit flight when conditions
in the flight path can cause
lightning
• Shuttle vehicle is moved back
into the VAB if hurricane force
winds are predicted
• Constraints were placed on the
shuttle system to prohibit flight
if the winds aloft are predicted
to cause vehicle load
exceedences
• Launch pad has all loose
objects removed before flight
• Shuttle is prohibited from
launch if ET has any external
ice in certain areas or over 1/16
in of ice in other specified areas
or if the ET has any condition
that can shed harmful debris
during flight
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TableA-12. ET problems(continued).
1.0 Systems problem list
Area
1.2 ET systems problems
1.2.1 Preflight problems
1.2.2 Loading problems
Problem
Difficulty in mating ET to
shuttle stack
Difficulty in mating ET to
shuttle stack
Components and materials have
limited lifetimes
TPS materials were thought to
soak up moisture during on-pad
stay time; materials
performance degradation and
vehicle weight gain are potential
penalties
Damage to the exterior foam
TPS has been experienced at the
pad
Propellant gas boiloff must be
ducted away from vehicle
The ET shrinks during loading
The ET can form an external
layer of ice for certain weather
conditions
Geysers and "water hammer"
effects can be caused during the
LO2 loading process and can
harm the ET
All "compartments" on the ET
must be protected from the
buildup of hazardous gases
Problem Cause
Lack of space between ET and
boosters at forward attachment
Ball fittings on ET did not
match up exactly with orbiter
attach points
Range safety pyrotechnics,
batteries, and various other
components have limited
lifetimes
Open cell materials can soak up
moisture during rain and from
humidity at pad
Woodpeckers and other birds
have damaged the foam TPS
GH2 is potentially explosive
and GO2 coming from the ET
louvers can affect the
flammability of the ET foam
insulation
The cryogenic propellants cause
the ET to shrink
Cryogenic propellant
temperatures will, with time,
"cold soak" through the external
insulation and cool the external
surface of the ET
Gas bubbles can form when
cold LO2 is pumped through the
initially warm, long, and vertical
feedline that is used to load the
LO2 tank; this can lead to
geysers and "water hammer"
effects
Leakage from propellant line
joints could cause an
unacceptable concentration of
hazardous gases
Problem Solution
Shaved off some of the ET foam
around forward attachment area
Procedures put in place to track
ages of all limited life items to
ensure they will be within their
limits at launch
The first two ET's were painted
with a moisture barrier; the
closed cell foam on the exterior
of the ET was later shown to be
a sufficient moisture barrier and
the 600 Ib of paint was removed
Damage repaired as required
and bird repellent devices have
been implemented on the pad
• GH2 is ducted off to a burn
pond next to the launch pad
• A vent hood is provided to
scavenge the GO2 from the nose
louvers of the ET where it is
mixed with GN2 and ducted
away from the vehicle
• Attachment structure to the
other shuttle elements must
rotate to account for the
shrinkage
• The LH2 tank and LO2 tank
must be pressurized during
loading to protect structural
margins and the TPS bondline
integrity
• A sufficient thickness of foam
insulation is applied to the
propellant tanks to preclude ice
formation for most loading
conditions
• An algorithm that predicts ice
formation is used to assess
whether unacceptable is forming
during loading
• An "ice team" physically
inspects the ET before launch
• Initially a separate anti-geyser
line was installed on the ET; this
line was removed after several
flights
• A gaseous helium injection
system was installed on the
feedline to mitigate these effects
All internal compartments (such
as the intertank nose cap) are
continually purged with inert
gases during the loading process
to keep hazardous gases below
specified concentration limits
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TableA-12. ET problems(continued).
2.0 Structures
Element Problem Problem Cause Problem Solution
Lox Tank Filling without internal pressure Procedure change for operations
Hydrogen Tank
Scasols
Other
Nose Cone
Tank buckled during filling with
water' (forward ogive)
Damping during modal test was
very low for high tank fill levels
Aft section of tank oil canned
during dynamic test
Aft dome buckled during
structural testing of an
unpressurized prelaunch
condition
IM 2 tank cable tray support
cracked at 80% limit load but
carried 200% limit load
Proof test failure of stabilizing
arc frame tension splice
SLA (insulation) bonding failed
upon LH 2 loading
I_,H2 feedline "milk stool" failed
during static test at vendor
LH 2 siphon line failed during
static test; also failed random
vibration test due to screen
separation
Pressure transducer vibration
qual test failure
Temperature sensor vibration
test failure
Gaseous oxygen (GO2)
pressurization sliding bellows
collapsed during pressure test
Protuberance airload ramps
(PAL) cracked under applied
deflection
(30 2 press line lower flex joint
failed during static load test
Range safety system (RSS)
panel failed in random vibration
test
RSS panel failed in random
vibration test
Lightweight replacement
composite nose cone failed
during development test
Modal coupling between
structures and fluid modes
Dynamic test was run ambient
(flight is cryogenic), thus SRB
to ET strut is canted 7* from
perpendicular; cant caused rear
I-beam (circular) to rotate
creating canning
The strut loads introduced by
cryo shrinkage during hydrogen
tank fill caused the aft bulkhead
to buckle
Glass phenolic broke in bond
line due to shift but weak load
path
Bolt hole pattern was in line,
introducing large local loads
Thermal distortion coupled with
lack of cleanness during
bonding
Underdesigned
Permanent set in material
caused line to buckle
Over test due to wrong input
spectrum
Failure in protective cover
Underdesigned
Test up simulator of tank skin
was too long and did not
represent actual situation
Rupture of bellows support
structure (BSTRA) bellows;
BSTRA was underdesigned
Insulator was inadequate
Response was larger than
predicted
Missed coefficient of thermal
expansion and inadequate
design of mating bolt holes;
breakdown in system
requirements
Accounted for effect in pogo
analysis and pogo suppression
device design
Not an operational range since
cryo effects would put strut into
perpendicular position
Struts were prestressed in
compression to reduce load for
original tank; the lightweight
redesign added material,
eliminating the need for strut
prestressi ng
TPS trapped debris carried load;
redesigned for super lightweight
Redesigned bolt hole pattern to
not be in line
Revised procedures
Redesigned
Redesigned
Ran new unit to correct levels
Cover not required, eliminated
and solved problem
Redesigned
Retested with proper simulation
Redesigned BSTRA
Redesigned to be isolators;
retested and passed
Redesign
Redesigned unit to proper
systems requirements
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TableA-12. ETproblems(continued).
2.0 Structures
Element Problem Problem Cause Problem Solution
Fracture Mechanics
Super Lightweight Tank
(SLWT)
Concern over crack acceptance
criteria after Challenger
accident
Welding problems occurred on
the new AL-Li material;
priming and repair
Fracture toughness requirements
in conjunction with separation
of yield and ultimate was hard
to achieve
Formed Blue Ribbon Panel of
fracture experts to review
approach and make
recommendations
Material properties invalidated
weld procedures
The chemical makeup and heat
treat properties were very
sensitive to these parameters
Criteria and procedures were
changed; supported by detailed
analog coupon testing of
cracked specimens
New procedures were developed
Tight procedures control; lot
acceptance of each forging
3.0 TPS problem list
Area
TPS problems
Problem
Foam surface irregularities on
acreage areas
Foam cannot cover all metal
surfaces, thus allowing ice
formation
Foam becomes debris
Foam becomes debris
Foam becomes debris
Foam becomes debris
Foam becomes debris
Problem Cause
Spray system leaves waves on
surface due to spray pattern
Areas which require motion,
such as rotating brackets, cannot
be covered with foam
Voids under foam can expel
foam pieces during flight
Cracks in foam can cryopump
air under the foam, which can
expel foam pieces during flight
Spraying of foam over stringers
resulted in "rollover," which left
"lobes" of foam around the
stringers that were a debris
source
The "two-tone" foam design for
the intertank area suffered voids
between the layers and shed
foam pieces during flight
Areas of foam over ablator
could be expelled during flight
due to trapped gases from
abtator outgassing during the
foam spraying process
Problem Solution
• Spray pattern refined to
minimize wave height and
period; waviness factors (to
account for increased heating)
were introduced into heating
rates
• Criteria were placed on
production sprays to achieve
acceptable wave height and
period
• Areas that cannot be foam
covered were minimized
• Ice debris from these areas
were proven acceptable to the
shuttle system
Application procedures were
refined to minimize void
formation
Application and repair
procedures were refined to not
allow cracks
A "two-tone" foam system was
instituted that filled in the
stringer areas with one foam and
then applied a cover layer of
foam over the now
noncorrugated stringer area; this
avoided the fragile "lobes" of
foam
• Hundreds of vent holes were
drilled in the possibly affected
areas to vent the voids and avoid
the mechanism to eject foam
pieces
• A new spray method was
developed to allow a design
change to a single foam layer
Procedures were hanged to
provide vent holes around the
ablator during the foam spray
application; after the ablator
completes its outgassing, the
vent holes are closed out
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TableA-12. ETproblems(continued).
3.0 TPS problem list
Area Problem Problem Cause Problem Solution
Foam becomes debrisTPS problems (cont.)
Ablator causes debris
Ablator causes debris
TPS materials must comply with
EPA mandates
Foam over protuberances that
presents a flat face to the
aerodynamic flow will
experience airloads that will
break off pieces
Ablator bondline "glassifies" at
cryogenic temperatures and will
break when the ET is
pressurized to flight levels and
expands from a nonpressurized
cryoshrunk condition
Ablator spray formed on cable
tray covers shrunk during cure
process and created
unacceptable bondline stresses
Original foam systems do not
comply with EPA requirements
for environmentally friendly
materials
Ramps made of foam were
placed in front of these
protuberances to shield them
from the aerodynamic flow
Procedures were instituted to
pressurize the tanks during
loading
Process was changed to
adhesively bond "preshrunk"
ablator pieces onto the cable
tray covers
Large effort underway to
develop new foams that do not
use CFC-based blowing system
4.0 Ground handling and operati,
Area
Ground and operations
problems
ns problem list
Problem
14,000 lb of lox inadvertently
drained from ET; could not
recover before launch window
closed
GO2 vent louvers build up
unacceptable ice
A part of the launch pad vent
hood system, a plasticized fabric
"collar" around the louvers, can
adhere to the topcoat on the
foam and pull out foam pieces at
vent hood retraction
Problem Cause
Operator did not close valve at
proper time
Cold GO2 vapors exiting
louvers condense moisture from
atmosphere on louvers and form
ice
When the topcoat is too thick,
the topcoat adheres to the warm
surface of the bag and pulls
away from foam at retraction
Problem Solution
Procedures and training
improved to avoid a recurrence
A vent hood system was
installed on the launch pad to
duct away the GO2 and provide
a warm, dry nitrogen purge
around the vent louvers
Controls have been placed on
the thickness of the topcoat
layer
5.0 Instrumentation problems
Area
Instrumentation problems
Problem
Ullage pressure sensors had
erratic readings
Development flight
instrumentation installations
were said to allow ice formation
Problem Cause
"Stiction" problems with that
type of sensor caused erratic
readings
Foam could not be placed over
"instrument island" locations or
data would be compromised; ice
could form on these islands
Problem Solution
New type of sensor that does not
suffer "stiction" problems was
qualified for use
• DFI islands were removed
from STS- 1 if they were on the
orbiter side of the ET
• Island mountings were
improved to reduce ice
formation potential
V. HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE
The Hubble requirements are: (1) long-term lifetime on orbit with planned refurbishment and
orbit reboost and (2) highly accurate pointing control for science created many design and operational
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.problems; all of which have been solved or worked around, producing a very successful program. HST
is a program that has demonstrated the merit of designing for refurbishment, as was successfully
demonstrated by the repair mission and the subsequent science achieved. The lesson is clear: design
high-performance systems for operations and maintenance so that success of the mission is ensured.
Hubble taught the merit of Government/contractor teams working together at the industrial plants to
solve critical problems.
Hubble reemphasized the performance requirements/sensitivity lesson, adding the footnote that
for the high-performance systems, nothing can be left to chance, from design, to manufacturing, to
operations. Each is as critical as the other and must be pursued with diligence. The previous discussion,
in conjunction with the following problem matrix (tables A-13, A-14, and A-15), should give a good
feel for the thermal, structures, and pointing control areas. It is also obvious from the Hubble experience
that the technology is available to develop highly accurate pointing control systems for large telescopes
of the future.
Table A-13. HST pointing control problems.
Component Problem Cause Solution
Solar array
Antenna pointing
system
Reference gyro
assembly
Reference star selection
software (ground)
Solar array did not meet its
disturbance torque
requirement
When commanded to certain
regions of its gimbal domain,
the motor torque limit was
exceeded and the HST
entered safemode
Over the course of the first 3
years of the operation, three
of the six gj.ros failed,
requiring elimination of their
use
Stars tracked in the fixed-
head star trackers were often
not the correct reference
stars, causing errors in
attitude reference and failure
in finding guide stars
Thermal deformations
caused energy to be stored
and releasedsuddenly
throughout the orbit,
producing large pointing
errors
The cable that provides
power and data for the
antenna and its pointing
system was improperly
dressed and protruded into
the gimbal space, interfering
with antenna motion
Electronics failures in wheel
drives and torque rebalance
loops
The ground software used to
select reference stars did not
adequately allow for
magnitude and position
uncertainties in the star
catalog
Since the disturbance occurred at
the two lowest natural
frequencies of the solar array,
the pointing system control law
was redesigned to produce an
augmented gain at these two
frequencies and was uplinked to
the HST computer; this fixed the
problem, enabling the pointing
system to meet its specification
The region where interference
occurred was restricted from use
in the ground software, reducing
the allowable gimbal space by a
few percent
The failed components were
replaced by redundant units with
no effect on system performance
The ground software, used to
select reference stars, was
modified to take into account
catalog peculiarities
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1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
Table A-14. HST structural problem outline.
Metering Structure Joints
1.1 Metering Truss Thermal Instability
1.2 One-Half Scale Metering Shell Thermal Instability
Secondary Mirror Support Structure
2.1 Thermal Instability
Bathtub Fittings
3.1 Flight Focal Plane Strength Failure
3.2 In-House Development Program Strength Failure
Laminate/Ply Control
4.1 Metering Truss Strength Failure
4.2 Fine Guidance Sensor Warped Parts
Composite Structure Damage
5.1 GSE Impact Loading of Focal Plane Structure
Metal Matrix Structure
6.1 High Gain Antenna Welding Microcracks
6.2 High Gain Antenna Process Control Failure
Honeycomb Structure
7.1 SSM Aperture Door and Aft Shroud Bulkhead "Dings" and Debonds
Metallic Structures
8.10TA Main Ring Loose Joints
8.20TA Main Ring Attachment Joint Installation Problem
Nonmetallic Properties
9.1 Unclear Property Requirements
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Component
1.0 Metering structure joints
Metering truss thermal
instability
One-half scale metering shell
thermal instability
2.0 Secondary mirror support
structure
Secondary mirror support
structure thermal instability
3.0 Bathtub fittings
Flight focal plane strength
failure
In-house development
program strength failure
4.0 Laminate/ply control
Metering truss strength
failure
Fine guidance sensor warped
parts
5.0 Composite structure
damage
GSE impact loading of focal
plane structure
6.0 Metal matrix structure
High gain antenna welding
microcracks
High gain antenna process
control failure
7.0 Honeycomb structure
SSM aperture door and aft
shroud bulkhead "dings" and
debonds
8.0 Metallic structure
OTA main ring loose joints
OTA main ring attach joint
installation problem
9.0 Nonmetallic properties
Unclear properties
requirements
No.
1.1
1.2
2.1
3.1
3.2
4.1
4.2
5.1
6.1
6.2
7.1
8.1
8.2
9.1
Table A-15. HST structural problems.
Problem
Thermal growth of truss out of
specification
Axial thermal growth of shell out
of specification
Unacceptable thermal effects from
uniform and gradients
Failure of fittings during structural
load tests
Inconsistent failure loads even with
continuous fibers and epoxy
bonded on corners
Failure of cylinder strut to meet
thermal exposure tests
Numerous warped composite flat
plate parts
During removal of FPS from
thermal bakeout, hardware was
impacted by overhead hoist bracket
Extensive microcracks in weldment
of 6061 -T6 HGA
Inability of vendor to build a spare
component with the exact
equipment, processes, etc.
Inspections revealed numerous
debonds and "'dings"
Hollow box section Ti ring had
loose or missing blind bolt collars
on joints and component
attachment
Helicoils protruding above surface
Inconsistent material properties and
allowable with contractors; resulted
in varying number of material test
samples available
Cause
Laminate plies perpendicular truss
axial dimension
Field splice ring had laminate plies
perpendicular to axial
Uniform motion of forward ring
moved mirror along longitudinal
axis; gradients across forward ring
tilted mirror relative to longitudinal
axis
No composite fibers, only epoxy
between base and gusset sides
A small business source was not
able to control processes very well
One ply had been omitted in layup
processing
Lax receiving inspections
Inadequate maintenance and
inspection of GSE hardware
Not clear since material is very
common, no chill bars used during
welding
Contractor lost control of
processes; a second vendor also
unable to complete part
Due to size of components and
difficulty with tooling; also prime
had poor relations with sister
fabrication facility
Used blind bolts with no preload;
inability to properly use bolt
installation equipment; use of
inexperienced people for less
profitable programs
Poorly installed helicoils; use of
inexperienced people for less
profitable programs
Program failed to specify the exact
requirements desired for the
hardware
Solution
Removed laminate from line of
action; strut passes through slot in
ring and clip ties ring to gusset
Removed field splice; added a shell
bay
Redesigned mirror support
structure symmetrical about plane
of forward ring
Replaced composite fittings with
titanium ones
Current fitting designs are not
amenable to composite fiber/epoxy
processes
Changed fabrication procedure; kits
with prescribed with preassembled
parts
Do not allow subassemblies to be
adjusted to account for warped
parts
Scheduled inspections of GSE;
kinetic energy analysis of impact
NDE
Low stresses, adequate life, and
proof tests allowed use of cracked
hardware
Composite processing is not a pure
science; a preproduction part was
used
Aft bulkhead accepted as is
because of small debonds; aperture
door was rejected; new flight unit
built
Fixed loose collars by welds; some
were drilled out with new fasteners
installed; more surveillance by
quality in these cases
Driven below surface where tool
could grip; others were removed
and new ones put in
Clearly define requirements of
property and allowables; i.e., "A
basis" or equivalent versus a
typical of non_lali_tical value
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VI. SPACELAB
The Spacelab has demonstrated, in an excellent manner, the concept that a manned/unmanned
reusable laboratory for the space shuttle can accomplish a variety of scientific missions with low
maintenance and refurbishment of the basic hardware. The Spacelab has not been without problems
since it first of all has a manned laboratory module that not only has to have life support, but also must
be a laboratory with power, thermal control, etc., for running and observing scientific experiments. In
other words, it is a scientific laboratory, with all that implies, operating in the space environment. Those
features are not just limited to the manned modules, but include the pallets located in the orbiter payload
bay, used for remote sensing, etc., of Earth and space and for launching satellites. The system not only
must be rugged enough to withstand launch and landing environments, but also must operate in zero g.
In many cases, it must isolate the experiments from the disturbances caused by the orbiter and the crew.
The matrix (table A-16) lists some of the problems that have occurred during the program. These
problems and their solutions were complicated somewhat since Spacelab was built by the ESA and
operated by the United States. The cultural/communication problem was solved and a highly successful
program has resulted.
VII. TETHERS IN SPACE (TSS-1)
Tethers offer many advantages for certain on-orbit tasks; however, the complexity of the
dynamics and control problems are great (see the previous discussion). The design problems were
compounded by the fact that the system could not be fully verified on ground due to the large length,
vacuum, thermal, gravity gradient, zero g, and other environments that could not be simulated on Earth
for this large system.
The one great lesson TSS-1 taught was "always verify even the smallest change made to the
hardware late in the program and particularly at the launch site." The changing of one bolt, while TSS- 1
was awaiting installation in the orbiter for launch, without verification resulted in a basic loss of the
mission (table A-17).
A complex mission such as TSS-1 requires extensive planning and crew training to ensure a suc-
cessful mission. Nothing can be left to chance. This planning and training must start long before the mis-
sion. In fact, it of necessity should be a fundamental part of the design process, as occurred for TSS- 1.
Another key lesson: utilize the expertise that exists in the institutions and industrial complexes as
well as Governmental agencies to help understand and solve problems, as well as design issues. This
was done for TSS-1 and contributed greatly to the solution of the tether problems.
VIII. INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION
It may be premature to discuss ISS problems since it is still in development; however, some of
the problems that have occurred offer valuable insights and lessons. A major problem has been the many
changes mandated by the changing economic problems of the United States. Adjusting to the budget
constraints and redesigning to meet these constraints would be an interesting study within itself, but is
not included in this report. As the concepts, designs and hardware testing have evolved, problems have
occurred, particularly in the life support systems, which must function long term in space with minimum
maintenance and refurbishment. The same is true for the meteoroid debris protection system, which also
must function in space environments for extended periods. In other words long-term space stations
require the proper life support for the crew and protection from the harsh environments such as debris.
In addition to the previous discussion, the matrix (tables A-18 and A-19) lists some of these additional
problems.
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TableA- 16. Spacelabproblems.
Element Problem Problem Causes
Spacelab Module Rack
Spacelab Module
Underfloor
Spacelab Module Rack
Spacelab Module Floor
Support Structure
Spacelab Module Floor
Support Structure
Spacelab Emergency
Breathing System (SEBS)
CGF Experiment
AEPI Experiment
Atlas-I Orthogrid Strut
Gapping/Looseness
Spacelab Rack Overhead
"X" and "Y" Rod Attach
Hardware
Spacelab Module Rack
DPM has high stress levels for
(1) MPE-to-DPM mechanical
assembly (MA) interfaces, (2)
MPE-to-Spacelab rack interfaces,
and (3) DPM MA-to-Spacelab
rack interfaces
Negative margins calculated
Negative margins calculated for
GFFC front shear panel-to-rack
interface
During the roll-in of the floor
into the module on IML-1,
interference between the floor
and floor support structure
occurred
Measurements of the USML-1
floor showed that the floor
exceeded the SPAH envelope
According to analysis, the SEBS
bracket will not carry the current
loads being applied
CGF size and weight would not
fit within normal Spacelab rack
requirements
AEPI landing unlatched in
payload bay
Strut gapping effects not included
in Atlas-1 pallet verification
coupled loads models; MPE
modal surveys indicated some
struts had reduced effective
stiffnesses due to gap/looseness
Attaching racks to overhead
support structure is difficult task
Spacelab rack and rack-to-
module load carrying capability
needed to be increased
High stress levels due to the
stiffness and large mass of the
DPM in lower portion of rack 8
(especially the MA)
Utility equipment located in the
underfloor in front of rack 9 is
heavier than previously analyzed
Weight of GFFC inducing high
stress levels to rack
Threaded portions of the bolts
protruded beyond the nut
Interference between the payload
cable trays and the floor
structure; measurements indicate
that cable trays exceed the SPAH
envelope
With the IML-I loads applied,
the lower position mounting
bracket would yield, than fail
Latching mechanism would fail
to relatch after experiment
operation
Strut gaps result from a buildup
of tolerances between end
clevises, clevis pins, and
monoballs
Use of a one-time-only tab
washer; access area for working
with washer is severely limited
and shear carrying bolt is too
short
Acceleration and load levels that
Spacelab must withstand during
shuttle launch and landing
conditions has increased due to
revised forcing functions
Problem Solutions
Minimum "close fit" interfaces
were maintained for the
interfaces between MPE, DPM,
and Spacelab rack using match
and drill for MA and epoxy in
selected slotted holes in the rack
Used maximum torque on bolts;
showed friction would hold bolts;
had redundant bolts
To obtain a "close fit" interface
between the shear panel and rack,
eccentric bushings used in rack
bolt holes
Remove the threaded portion of
the HIGH LOK bolts that
protrude beyond the mating nut
Remove the threaded portion of
the HIGH LOK bolts that
protrude beyond the mating nut
A safety strap will be added to
the SEBS mounting
configuration to ensure the SEGS
will not separate from the
forward and aft end cone
mounting bracket
Special rack designed for GCF
that meet Spacelab rack safety
and interface requirements
Dynamic and static assessment
determined that landing
unlatched would not be a hazard
to orbiter
Dynamic analyses performed on
VCLA models with struts
modified per static analysis
results; minor frequency shifts
were within established
guidelines; therefore, VCLA
models are considered test
verified
Modification: supplying correctly
dimensioned bolts, eliminating
the tab washers and replacing the
nuts with steel lock nuts
Strength improvement to module
rack-to-rack and rack-to-
overhead support attachment
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TableA-17. Tethersin spaceproblems.
Component Problem Problem Cause Problem Solution
Tether Skiprope Tether current flow interaction Observers, orbiter yaw
with Earth's magnetic cause maneuvers, passive dampers,
phased current flow
Tether Skiprope observation Need for intelligence about Satellite attitude data to input to
skiprope for corrective actions Kalman filtering and fast Fourier
transform techniques
Tether Libration Interaction between Coriolis and Smooth and continuous reeling
gravity gradient forces command profiles, observers and
crew techniques for intelligence
for orbit translational maneuvers
Tether "Bobbing" tension oscillation Interaction between endmass Minimize thruster firings and
accelerations and stretch of the active damping through reel
tether motor back EMF
Satellite Satellite attitude oscillations Interaction with tether tension Satellite attitude reference, active
and slack tether, through modal automatic and manual rate
interaction and endmass damping by thrusters
movement, thruster
misalignments
Structure/level wind Interference Inadequate clearance after late Redesign for clearance
modification
Tether/guide pulleys Tether jam Inadequate tension management, Improved guides and tension
lapses in guides management through mainly
procedural changes
Deployer system/satellite Hazard of orbiter collision Deployer hardware failure Redundant overspeed detection
causing uncontrolled reel-in of circuits to automatically shut
satellite down reel motor
Tether Hazard to orbiter of tether Inadvertent severing of tensioned Automatic detection of slack
severance and recoil toward the tether by orbital debris of tether conditions through tension
orbiter meteoroids monitoring at both deployer and
satellite for rapid execution of
orbiter evasive maneuvers
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TableA-18. Spacestationstructuralproblems.
Rack
Component Problem Problem Causes
Low fundamental frequency
(<25 Hz)
MPLM/rack coupled loads High interface loads
Meteoroid/orbital debris Inability to meet PNP
Open box construction due to
crew utilization of requirements
shielding for space station
manned modules
Structural design and
verification criteria
Glass window design
requirements in U.S. manned
modules without complete shield
redesign and excessive
thickening of module skin
Safety concerns with fully
assembled international module
cluster having high likelihood of
penetration
Lack of common design and
verification criteria for NASA
and international partners
Sustained stress over 15 years
due to on-orbit pressure causes
static fatigue
Rack interface fittings not
designed to high load levels,
which the coupled loads analysis
discovered
Growth in debris environment at
station orbits
Growth of debris and exposed
size of module cluster taken as a
whole
Multinational program managed
by three different NASA field
centers
Moisture content of ambient air
causes stress corrosion effect in
glass microcracks under stress
Problem Solutions
Additional stiffening added to
rear of rack and utility panel
made structural, which raised
frequency to 25 Hz, while
retaining capability for front
access
Aluminum fittings were replaced
by titanium
Redesigned M/D shield
employing aluminum plus
composite sandwich
construction, integrated within
existing structure and envelope
raises PNP back to original
requirement; verified via impact
testing to predict protection
enhancement and thermal
performance, via mockups to
verify physical interface with
existing module structure
Developed analytical tool to
quantify and maximize crew
survivability following orbital
debris penetration; verified via
internal module impact effects
testing, hazards effects analysis,
including cooperation with DOD
in crew survivability;
implemented improved crew
operations with JSC astronaut
office and Russian station
partners
Common criteria developed by
NASA and contractor teams led
by senior NASA managers
• Structural design and
verification
• Fracture control
• Window design and verification
Conservative fracture mechanics
methodology employed in
window design
NASA/FLAGRO updated with
glass equations
Proof testing of each pane
required to screen initial flaws
larger than those assumed
Windows designed such that
tension is not on inside surface of
the pane (damage tolerant)
Cavity between primary and
redundant pressure panes vented
to space to reduce exposure to
mol sture
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TableA-19. SpacestationECLSSproblems.
Element Problem Problem Causes Problem Solutions
Hab element
Hab element
Hab/Lab element
Hab/Lab element
Hab/Lab element
Hab element
Incomplete waste water chemical
constituents for ground testing
Water system not completely
sterile prior to testing
Cyclic variations in cabin
temperature, CO2 partial
pressure, and dew point
Entrained water generated
upstream of CO2 removal
subsystem
Trace contaminant control
subsystem (TCCS) plumbed
downstream of CO2 removal
subsystem
Overall system complexity,
component redundancy
Ersatz mixtures utilized for
certain waste streams
Microbial growth in test systems
(particularly in plumbing dead
legs)
CO2 removal subsystem return
air exhausted into cabin
Silica gel breaks down when
subjected to liquid water
Trace contaminants removed by
CO2 removal subsystem rather
than TCCS
Separate loops utilized for
potable and hygiene water
reclamation
Use of "real" waste water sources
when available
Elimination of plumbing dead
legs, sterilization of system with
hot water at 250 *F
CO2 removal subsystem exhaust
routed to upstream of condensing
heat exchanger
Modify CO2 removal subsystem
by adding layer of Zeolite 13X TM
upstream of silica gal
Plumb TCCS so that cabin air is
pulled directly into TCCS
Potable and hygiene loops
combined into single water
reclamation loop
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